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Abstract
Security of systems has become a major concern with the advent of technology. Researchers
are proposing new security solutions in order to meet the area, power and performance
specifications of the systems. The additional circuitry required for security purposes can
consume significant area and power. This work proposes a solution which utilizes discretetime chaos-based systems to address multiple hardware security issues.

The nonlinear

dynamics of chaotic maps is leveraged to build a system that mitigates IC counterfeiting,
overbuilding, disables hardware Trojan insertion and enables authentication of connecting
devices (such as IoT and mobile). Chaos-based systems are also used to generate pseudorandom numbers (PRN) for cryptographic applications.
The chaotic map is the building block for the design of discrete-time chaos-based
oscillator. The analog output of the oscillator is converted to digital value using a comparator
or analog-to-digital converter in order to build logic gates or generate PRNs. The chaosbased logic gate is reconfigurable since parameters in the circuit topology can be altered
to implement multiple Boolean functions using the same system. The tuning parameters
are iteration number, control input, bifurcation parameter and threshold voltage of the
comparator.
The proposed PURCS system is a hybrid between standard CMOS logic gates and
reconfigurable chaos-based logic gates where original gates are replaced by chaos-based gates.
The system works in two modes: logic locking and authentication. In logic locking mode,
the goal is to ensure that the system achieves logic obfuscation in order to mitigate IC
counterfeiting. The secret key for logic locking is made up of the tuning parameters of
the chaotic oscillator. Each gate has 10-bit key which ensures that the key space is large
which exponentially increases the computational complexity of any attack. In authentication
v

mode, the aim of the system is to provide authentication of devices so that adversaries
cannot connect to devices to learn confidential information. Chaos-based computing system
is susceptible to process variation which can be leveraged to build a physical unclonable
function (PUF). The proposed system demonstrates near ideal PUF characteristics which
means systems with large number of primary outputs can be used for authenticating devices.

vi

Table of Contents
1 Introduction
1.1

1.2

1

Motivation and Research Goals . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

1

1.1.1

Chaos-based Logic Gates and Functionality Space . . . . . . . . . . .

1

1.1.2

Random Number Generation

. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

3

1.1.3

IC Counterfeiting . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

3

1.1.4

Authentication . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

5

1.1.5

Physically Unclonable and Reconfigurable System . . . . . . . . . . .

6

Dissertation Overview . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

6

2 Background
2.1

2.2

2.3

7

Introduction to Chaos Theory . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

7

2.1.1

Classification of Chaotic Map . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

8

2.1.2

Study of Chua’s Circuit . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

8

Introduction to Chaos Computing . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

11

2.2.1

Continuous-time Nonlinear System . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

13

2.2.2

Discrete-time Nonlinear System . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

16

2.2.3

Digital Logic Obtained by Varying Iteration Number . . . . . . . . .

19

2.2.4

Distinguishing Between (0,1) and (1,0) Input Pairs . . . . . . . . . .

20

2.2.5

Design of Multi-Input Multi-Output Logic Functions . . . . . . . . .

21

Concluding Remarks . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

22

3 Design of Chaotic Oscillator and Chaos-Based Logic Gate Using Three
Transistor Chaotic Map

24

vii

3.1

3.2

3.3

Design of Chaotic Map . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

25

3.1.1

. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

26

Design of Chaotic Oscillator . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

27

3.2.1

Iterating through the Map . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

30

3.2.2

Sensitivity to Initial Condition . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

30

3.2.3

Ergodicity of the Chaotic Map . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

30

3.2.4

Bifurcation Diagram . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

31

3.2.5

Lyapunov Exponent . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

31

Reconfigurable Chaos-based Logic Gates . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

33

3.3.1

Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

33

3.3.2

Design of Reconfigurable Chaos-based Gates . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

35

3.3.3

Complex Functions Obtained Using Single Chaotic Element . . . . .

40

DC Transfer Characteristics of the Map

4 Expansion of Functionality Space Using Three Transistor Chaotic Map

45

4.1

Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

45

4.2

Expansion of Design Space . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

46

4.2.1

Comparison of Area and Power Overhead . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

47

4.2.2

Design Space Enhancement . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

49

Application . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

52

4.3

5 Four Gate Transistor Negative Differential Resistance (NDR) Based
Discrete-Time Chaotic Map

53

5.1

Background . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

53

5.2

Four Terminal Transistor (G4 FET) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

54

5.2.1

G4 FET Operation

. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

56

5.3

G4 FET Based Negative Differential Resistance . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

59

5.4

G4 NDR Based Chaotic Map . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

61

5.4.1

Design of Chaotic Oscillator Using G4 NDR Based Map . . . . . . . .

62

5.4.2

Bifurcation Diagram and Lyapunov Exponent . . . . . . . . . . . . .

62

5.5

Design of Logic Gates Using G4 NDR Based Map . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

63

5.6

Expansion of Design Space Using G4 NDR Map . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

63

viii

6 Pseudo-Random Number Generation (PRNG) Using Three Transistor
Chaotic Map

71

6.1

Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

71

6.2

True Random Number Generator (TRNG) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

72

6.3

Pseudo-Random Number Generator (PRNG) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

73

6.3.1

Linear PRNG . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

74

6.3.2

Nonlinear PRNG . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

74

Proposed Lightweight and Reconfigurable PRNG . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

75

6.4.1

Chaotic Oscillator for PRNG Design . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

76

6.4.2

Correlation Coefficient . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

79

6.4.3

Seed Sensitivity . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

81

6.4.4

National Institute of Standards and Technology Tests . . . . . . . . .

81

6.5

Overhead Analysis . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

84

6.6

Application Lies in Security of IoT Devices . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

86

6.4

7 Physically Unclonable and Reconfigurable Computing System (PURCS) 87
7.1

7.2

IC Counterfeiting and Logic Locking . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

87

7.1.1

IC Counterfeiting . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

87

7.1.2

Background of Logic Locking . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

89

7.1.3

Threat Model for Logic Locking . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

90

7.1.4

IC Design Flow . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

90

7.1.5

Issues Mitigated by Logic Locking . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

91

7.1.6

Types of Logic Locking . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

91

7.1.7

Techniques of Inserting Key Gates

. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

93

7.1.8

Types of Key Gates . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

93

Authentication and Physical Unclonable Functions (PUFs) . . . . . . . . . .

96

7.2.1

Authentication of Devices . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

96

7.2.2

Types of Authentication Architectures . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

97

7.2.3

Process variation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

98

7.2.4

Background of Physical Unlconable Functions (PUFs) . . . . . . . . .

98

ix

7.3

7.4

7.5

7.2.5

Classification of PUFs . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 100

7.2.6

Chaos-based PUFs . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 104

7.2.7

Authentication Protocol . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 104

7.2.8

PUF Metrics . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 106

Proposed Computing System (PURCS) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 107
7.3.1

Design of Chaotic Oscillator for PURCS System . . . . . . . . . . . . 108

7.3.2

Bifurcation Diagram . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 108

7.3.3

Chaos-Based Logic Gate Implementation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 110

7.3.4

Characterization of the Chaos-based Logic Gate . . . . . . . . . . . . 112

7.3.5

Functions Generated by the Logic Gate in Different ICs . . . . . . . . 113

7.3.6

Reliability of the Functions Generated from Logic Gate . . . . . . . . 113

7.3.7

Creating the Characterization Table . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 115

7.3.8

Replacement Algorithm . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 117

7.3.9

Configuration Key of the Hybrid Circuit . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 119

Simulation and Results . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 121
7.4.1

Logic Locking Results . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 121

7.4.2

Authentication Results . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 123

Security Performance . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 125
7.5.1

Security of Logic Locked Circuits . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 125

7.5.2

Security of PUFs . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 133

7.6

Overhead Analysis . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 136

7.7

Modes of Operation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 137
7.7.1

Logic Locking Mode . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 139

7.7.2

Authentication Mode . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 139

8 Contribution and Future Work

140

8.1

Original Contribution . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 140

8.2

Future Work . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 142

Bibliography

143

x

Appendices
A

B

164

Random Number Generator . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 165
A.1

SKILL Code for Modeling the Chaotic Oscillator . . . . . . . . . . . 165

A.2

Matlab Code for Plotting the Bifurcation Diagram . . . . . . . . . . 169

A.3

Matlab Code for Plotting the Lyapunov Exponent . . . . . . . . . . . 171

A.4

Matlab Code for Generating the Random Numbers . . . . . . . . . . 175

PURCS System . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 183
B.1

SKILL Code for Modeling the Chaotic Oscillator . . . . . . . . . . . 183

B.2

Matlab Code for Creating the Characterization Table . . . . . . . . . 185

B.3

SKILL Code for Generating Data for Monte Carlo Simulation . . . . 186

B.4

Python Code for Calculating the Controllability . . . . . . . . . . . . 192

B.5

Python Code for Calculating the Observability . . . . . . . . . . . . . 195

B.6

Python Code for Calculating the Testability . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 200

B.7

Python Code for Solving a Given Netlist . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 204

B.8

Python Code for Replacing the Gates Based on Testability . . . . . . 207

B.9

Python Code for Calculating the Hamming Distance . . . . . . . . . 209

Vita

218

xi

List of Tables
2.1

Necessary and sufficient conditions to obtain different logic functions from the
nonlinear dynamical element [43]. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

17

2.2

One specific solution to yield different logic functions using logistic map [43].

18

2.3

Necessary conditions to implement logic functions from nonlinear systems for
varying iterations [43]. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

2.4

Necessary and sufficient conditions to build half-adder from the nonlinear
dynamical element [43]. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

3.1

19

22

Evolution of chaotic oscillator output with number of iterations. (Vc = 690
mV , C = (111010)2 = 58, Vth = 1.03 V , n = 5) [63]. . . . . . . . . . . . . .

42

3.2

Different configurations for 3-input 1-output instructions [63]. . . . . . . . .

42

3.3

Design of 1-bit full-adder using chaotic oscillator (Vc = 677.5 mV and C =
(011001)2 = 25). . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

3.4

43

Design of 3 × 8 decoder using chaotic oscillator (Vc = 710 mV and C =
(011001)2 = 25). . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

44

4.1

Overhead comparison of proposed work with previous work [150]. . . . . . .

48

5.1

Evolution of analog output from chaotic oscillator with different iterations
(µ1 = 0.95 M Ω, µ2 = 0 V, µ3 = 0 V , Cb = 0, Vth = 1.25 V ). Functions are
represented in decimal value. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

70

5.2

Three different configurations for six logic functions. . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

70

6.1

Correlation coefficient between the original sequence and the three cases. . .

82

6.2

NIST test results of the proposed PRNG [148]. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

85

xii

6.3

Overhead comparison of established PRNGs with the proposed design [148].

7.1

Evolution of chaotic oscillator output with number of iterations. (Vc = 552
mV , Cb = 1, Vth = 625 mV ) [149].

7.2

85

. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 111

Characterization table of the 2-input reconfigurable chaos-based logic gate for
Vth = 625 mV [149]. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 111

7.3

Characterization table of the reconfigurable chaos-based logic gate in different
chips for Vth = 625 mV [149]. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 114

7.4

Percentage of gates replaced to reach almost 50% Hamming distance in
ISCAS’85 benchmark circuits [149]. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 122

7.5

Results of standard PUF metrics for the benchmark circuits using testability
based replacement method [149].

. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 124

7.6

SAT attack on a logic locked circuit shown in Fig. 7.16b. [182]. . . . . . . . 130

7.7

Result of machine learning based modeling attacks on PURCS system using
testability based replacement method [149].

. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 138

7.8

An estimate of transistor count in different logic locking schemes [149]. . . . 138

7.9

Estimation of transistor count for both PUF and logic locking in a system
with 30-bit key/challenge [149]. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 138

xiii

List of Figures
2.1

Chua’s autonomous circuit [108]. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

9

2.2

Double scroll attractor using Chua’s circuit. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

9

2.3

Chaotic Chua’s attractor implemented in circuit to build logic gates [115]. . .

16

3.1

Three transistor chaotic map circuit designed in 65 nm process [150, 46]. . .

25

3.2

DC transfer characteristic of the three transistor map circuit [150]. . . . . . .

26

3.3

Traditional chaotic oscillator using buffer [85]. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

28

3.4

Chaotic oscillator using two map circuits [150, 46]. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

28

3.5

Iterating through the chaotic map. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

28

3.6

Sensitivity of the chaotic oscillator to slight change in initial condition. . . .

32

3.7

(a)-(d): Sampled output of chaotic oscillator for Vin = 750 mV showing
different states as Vc is changed (a) Period 2 (b) Period 4 (c) Period 8 (d)
Chaotic region. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

32

3.8

Bifurcation diagram of the chaotic oscillator [148]. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

34

3.9

Lyapunov exponent of the chaotic oscillator [148]. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

34

3.10 A basic 2-input chaogate using a single chaotic oscillator [139]. . . . . . . . .

34

3.11 Chaotic oscillator is shown in the dotted box. Two-input chaos-based logic
gate including digital encoding of the inputs and digital decoding of the
outputs [86]. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

36

3.12 Two-input reconfigurable chaos-based logic gate demonstrating all the tuning
parameters in red circles. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

36

3.13 Three-bit DAC for encoding digital inputs to analog values [86]. . . . . . . .

38

3.14 Decoder which converts final states to digital outputs [86]. . . . . . . . . . .

38

xiv

3.15 Multi-input multi-output reconfigurable chaos-based logic gate [63]. . . . . .

40

3.16 1-bit full-adder designed using chaotic oscillator [63]. . . . . . . . . . . . . .

42

3.17 3 × 8 decoder designed using chaotic oscillator [63]. . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

43

4.1

Transient response of the chaotic oscillator displaying that Vc is changed cycle
to cycle [150]. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

4.2

Comparison between the functionality space of the proposed work with
existing work for varying number of iterations [150]. . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

4.3

48

51

Number of individual functions increases linearly with the total functionality
space [150]. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

51

5.1

Four gate transistor (G4 FET) (a) Structure (b) Symbol [7]. . . . . . . . . . .

55

5.2

Cross-section of the G4 FET device [64]. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

55

5.3

Traditional 2-terminal JFET NDR [163]. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

55

5.4

Tunable NDR made with n- channel and p- channel G4 FETs (a) Circuit (b)
Symbol [9]. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

58

5.5

Transfer characteristics of G4 NDR. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

58

5.6

G4 NDR based discrete-time chaotic map which has three bifurcation parameters (a) Circuit (b) Symbol. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

60

5.7

Transfer curve of the G4 NDR map circuit for varying µ1 . . . . . . . . . . . .

60

5.8

G4 NDR based chaotic oscillator using buffer in the feedback. . . . . . . . . .

64

5.9

G4 NDR based chaotic oscillator using another G4 NDR map in the feedback.

64

5.10 (a) Bifurcation diagram and (b) Lyapunov exponent of the chaotic oscillator
for varying µ1 ; µ2 = 0 V , µ3 = 0 V .

. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

65

5.11 (a) Bifurcation diagram and (b) Lyapunov exponent of the chaotic oscillator
for varying µ2 ; µ1 = 1 M Ω, µ3 = 0 V . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

66

5.12 (a) Bifurcation diagram and (b) Lyapunov exponent of the chaotic oscillator
for varying µ3 ; µ1 = 1 M Ω, µ2 = 0 V . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

67

5.13 G4 NDR based reconfigurable logic gate. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

67

5.14 Comparison of functionality space among proposed and previous works. . . .

70

xv

6.1

4-bit linear feedback shift register [151]. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

73

6.2

Chaotic oscillator. The dotted lines represent the chaotic map [148]. . . . . .

78

6.3

Proposed pseudo-random number generator [148]. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

78

6.4

Distribution of correlation coefficient. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

80

6.5

Seed sensitivity of the PRNG for slight changes in the seed.

. . . . . . . . .

80

7.1

IC design flow with logic locking capabilities [132].

. . . . . . . . . . . . . .

91

7.2

(a) Unlocked circuit (b) Locked circuit with three XOR/XNOR gates [132].

7.3

Arbiter PUF [54]. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 103

7.4

Generic strong PUF based authentication protocol [161]. . . . . . . . . . . . 103

7.5

Reconfigurable 2-input chaos-based logic gate designed using chaotic oscilla-

92

tor, comparators and DAC [149]. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 109
7.6

Transient response of the chaotic oscillator [149]. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 109

7.7

Number of AND, OR and XOR functions in 10 chips [149]. . . . . . . . . . . 114

7.8

Effect of temperature variation on the oscillator output (Vin = 193.2 mV and
Vc = 490 mV ). . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 116

7.9

Effect of supply voltage variation on the oscillator output (Vin = 193.2 mV
and Vc = 520 mV ). . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 116

7.10 Algorithm for replacing gates using testability method [149]. . . . . . . . . . 120
7.11 (a) Unobfuscated circuit from ISCAS’85 benchmark suite (b) Obfuscated
circuit where two NAND gates are replaced with reconfigurable chaos-based
logic gates and the secret key is 20 bits long [149]. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 120
7.12 Hamming distance vs. percentage of gates replaced in ISCAS’85 benchmark
circuits (a) Gates replaced randomly (b) Gates replaced by measuring
testability [149]. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 122
7.13 Post-processing scheme for authentication [149]. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 124
7.14 Circuit to determine distinguishing input patterns (DIPs) [182]. . . . . . . . 127
7.15 Logic locking example (a) Original circuit (b) Locked circuit [160]. . . . . . . 127
7.16 Logic locking second example (a) Original circuit (b) Locked circuit [182]. . . 130

xvi

7.17 SAT attack implemented on C432 benchmark circuit for varying percentage
of gates and key sizes [149]. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 130
7.18 (a) Logic locking mode (b) Authentication mode. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 139

xvii

Chapter 1
Introduction
Hardware is a fundamental and root of trust component in any security system. Recently,
many software-based security solutions have been migrated to hardware in order to mitigate
security threats.

All cryptographic protocols rely on two basic assumptions: 1) read-

proof hardware that prevents the adversary from learning the contents stored 2) tamperproof hardware that prevents the adversary from altering the information stored. Existing
cryptographic algorithms are stored in tamper-proof hardware which the adversary has
knowledge of, but cannot change the content. There is also a secret key involved which
is stored in read-proof as well as tamper-proof hardware which the adversary does not
know about and cannot change either. It has been brought into light that hardware is also
vulnerable to security threats and that adversaries can learn information from the systems
using reverse engineering, testing and side-channel analysis.

1.1
1.1.1

Motivation and Research Goals
Chaos-based Logic Gates and Functionality Space

In the 1960s, Gordon Moore predicted that the number of transistors in a chip will double
every two years. This hypothesis has been true for a long time. As technology is scaling,
designers are able to integrate more transistors in an IC but it comes at a cost of short
channel effects and heat production in a chip due to increased density of transistors per
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square area. A solution is to build gates that can implement multiple functionalities using
the same system by altering the circuit parameters.
Researchers have studied chaos theory for the past few decades and proposed to build
a chaos-based computing system which utilizes chaos-based logic gates. These logic gates
are reconfigurable and capable of implementing multiple functions by tweaking different
parameters in the system. This feature of chaos-based logic gates can be leveraged to reduce
the number of gates in a system. Chaos-based logic gates are comparable to look-up tables
(LUTs). The hardware required for increasing the number of inputs scales exponentially
in LUTs due to usage of SRAMs, MUXs and inverters. In chaos-based logic gates, the
only component that needs to be scaled for increased input is the digital-to-analog-converter
(DAC) which is used at the input of the chaotic oscillator and the rest of the system remains
unchanged. It is also possible to design complex functions (multi-input multi-output) such
as adder, subtractor, decoder and encoder using the complex dynamical systems.
Chaos-based logic gates have additional overhead compared to conventional CMOS logic
gates. One way to justify the additional hardware cost is to ensure that a single chaosbased logic gate possesses a huge functionality space. Here, functionality means the Boolean
function as well as the configuration of the chaos gate in order to achieve that function. The
functionality space is large if there are numerous ways to execute the same Boolean function.
This work explores two types of discrete-time chaotic maps, three transistor map and
a G4 NDR based map. The goal is to design a chaos-based logic gate which has multiple
tuning parameters to change the logic function of the gate.

The parameters are bias

voltages (bifurcation parameters), threshold voltage, control bit and iteration number. Bias
voltages are chosen from the chaotic region using the bifurcation diagram. Changing the
bias voltage in each cycle of the chaotic oscillator can lead to an increase in the entire
functionality space and number of individual functions with respect to iteration number.
The three transistor map has one bifurcation parameter whereas the G4 NDR map has
three independent bifurcation parameters. The three bifurcation parameters enhance the
functionality space without using a very high value of iteration number.
The increase in functionality space can be applied to security of computing systems
against power analysis based side channel attack. The attacker learns the power profile of
2

the executed instructions on the processor and tries to decipher the code by making an
educated guess based on the collected data. Chaos-based logic gates can help in mitigating
this attack since different functions can be executed using the same reconfigurable block and
the power signature of different instructions will be difficult to classify.

1.1.2

Random Number Generation

Good quality random number generators (RNG) are required for cryptographic applications.
Linear RNGs repeat after a short period which makes it unsuitable for security applications.
If the period needs to be extended then the circuit design becomes very complex and
performance overhead increases. Chaotic systems are nonlinear dynamical systems which
maps inputs to outputs in a deterministic but random manner. A lot of research has been
done on using chaotic systems such as logistic map, tent map and sine map to be used as a
pseudo-random number generator (PRNG). These maps are mathematical equations which
can require a handsome amount of hardware to be implemented in an IC.
The goal of this work is to use a simple three transistor chaotic map which portrays
chaotic behavior because it has non-monotonic transfer characteristics. A chaotic oscillator
is used to map the inputs to outputs. The output of the oscillator is analog so the output is
converted to digital value using 10-bit ADC. The least significant bit (LSB) or the 10th bit of
the ADC is used since it has the most entropy. A single chaotic oscillator is not sufficient for
the sequence to pass all the NIST tests. Two chaotic oscillators are used and the outputs are
XORed to ensure that the generated sequence passes the NIST tests and that the sequence
can be used for security applications. G4 NDR based discrete-time chaotic map can also be
used to generate random numbers.

1.1.3

IC Counterfeiting

Silicon fabrication facilities are very expensive to build, maintain, operate and manage due
to which many U.S. high-tech companies have gone fabless in recent years. In 2015, the cost
of building a new semiconductor fab was approximately calculated to be $5 billion dollars
along with large recurring maintenance costs [185]. The cost will keep on increasing as the

3

technology scales down to smaller technology nodes. This has led to the globalization of
the Integrated Circuit (IC) supply chain and the fabrication of the chips are outsourced
to multiple facilities in the design flow process. However, the globalization of IC design
is making it easier for adversaries in the supply chain to overbuild ICs, pirate ICs and add
hardware Trojans to the design. The semiconductor industry loses $4 billion dollars annually
due to counterfeiting issues [87, 78].
Researchers have proposed various solutions to mitigate counterfeiting such as watermarking, split manufacturing, IC camouflaging and logic locking. Among all these techniques,
logic locking has gained the most attention because it can protect the IC content throughout
the entire IC design flow. Logic locking adds extra gates to the IC design in order to hide
the original functionality of the design. If conventional XOR/XNOR gates are added, then
the attacker can reverse-engineer the layout in order to figure out the netlist. The attacker
can apply different keys and match it with the outputs of a functional IC bought from the
market. The XOR gates are just standard gates added to the design and attackers can utilize
techniques such as FIBing to bypass the XOR logic.
The goal of this work is to provide logic obfuscation by replacing some standard CMOS
gates with chaos-based logic gates. The chaos-based logic gates will be difficult to bypass
because they replace original circuitry. Moreover, each chaos-based logic gate has 10-bit
key whereas each XOR gate can only provide 1-bit key. The 10-bit key is made up of the
tuning parameters in the circuit topology such as iteration number, control bit, bifurcation
parameter and threshold voltage of the comparator. Hamming distance between correct and
wrong output is measured and the aim of the design is to ensure that half of the output
bits are corrupted. In order to achieve 50% Hamming distance with lower overhead, the
chaos-based logic gates are replaced using testability based method. Boolean SAT attack
has been implemented on a single benchmark circuit and the attack complexity increases
exponentially due to increase in number of replaced gates and increase in key size for a fixed
percentage of gates replaced.
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1.1.4

Authentication

Due to technology advancement, smart devices have become a major part of everyone’s life.
Application of smart devices can range from mobile phones to smart cities. All the devices
are connected to each other and it is essential to ensure that information is being exchanged
between two authentic parties. Authentication of devices is important otherwise attackers
can steal confidential information such as passwords. The devices are usually used in an
untrusted zone and the adversary might have physical access to the system. The solution
to saving confidential information is to install a key unique to each device which can be
achieved by using a physical unclonable function (PUF).
PUFs demonstrate unique characteristics in each IC due to the process variation in the
manufacturing process. Each device will respond differently to inputs because of slight
changes in the internal characteristics of the device due to fabrication procedure. The input
to a PUF is called “challenge” and the output is called “response”. If the PUF has many
challenge-response pairs, then it is impossible for the attacker to model the PUF. Even the
manufacturer will not be able to replicate the same PUF if the same manufacturing process
is executed.
Chaotic systems are vulnerable to small changes in the initial condition. During the
manufacturing process, the internal characteristics of the circuit will be slightly altered
which means that the same circuit in different ICs will respond differently to inputs. The
hybrid system of CMOS gates and chaos-based logic gates, discussed earlier, can be used as
a PUF. The chaotic oscillator will map the current states to future states in a unique manner
in each IC due to process variation. The output of the system requires post-processing to be
used for authentication purposes. The post-processing technique adds very little overhead
to the design. The system demonstrates ideal PUF characteristics such as uniqueness, bitaliasing and uniformity. The immunity of the hybrid system has been tested against common
machine learning based attacks.
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1.1.5

Physically Unclonable and Reconfigurable System

A single computing system is proposed that can provide both authentication and logic
locking. It is possible to provide both features because chaos-based logic gates are used
in the design. Each chip needs to be characterized after fabrication since process variation
will change the functionality of the system. The correct keys can be stored in a tamper-proof
memory for correct functionality in logic locking mode. In authentication mode, the keys and
primary inputs make up the “challenges” to the system. The “challenges” are provided from
the verifier using the CRP table in the authentication protocol. The PURCS system behaves
like PUF due to the unclonability feature present due to the effects of process variation. The
overhead of the system is significantly lower compared to a system that contains hardware
for both logic locking and authentication purposes.

1.2

Dissertation Overview

The dissertation is organized as follows.

Chapter 2 introduces chaos theory and how

chaos can be used to make computing systems. Chapter 3 discusses the three transistor
discrete-time chaotic map and oscillator and focuses on features such as bifurcation diagram,
Lyapunov exponent and transfer characteristics of the map. The functionality enhancement
technique of the three transistor chaotic system is discussed in chapter 4. In chapter 5, a
novel G4 NDR based discrete-time chaotic map is introduced and its functionality space is
explored. Pseudo-random number generator designed using the three transistor chaotic map
is discussed in chapter 6. Chapter 7 elaborates on how a single system containing chaos-based
logic gates can be utilized to obtain both authentication of devices and logic obfuscation to
mitigate counterfeiting. Chapter 8 contains the contribution of the entire dissertation and
discusses the future direction of the proposed work.

6

Chapter 2
Background
2.1

Introduction to Chaos Theory

Chaos has generated a lot of research interest in the past few years. Chaos is present in
many disciplines such as engineering, biology, chemistry, medicine and physics. Chaotic
phenomena is found in electronic circuits, lasers, chemical systems, hearts and brains. The
discovery of chaos along with quantum mechanics and theory of relativity are considered
the three monumental scientific findings of the twentieth century. Lorenz described chaos
as a deterministic non-periodic flow of a system’s state through its entire state space [100].
Chaotic behavior is present in a range of natural and made-made systems starting from
weather to integrated circuits. Chaotic systems have two important features:
1. High sensitivity to initial conditions.
2. The behavior is apparently random but deterministic.
Chaotic systems are hard to predict, difficult to study and change their behavior
very fast over time. Chaotic systems are aperiodic in nature and even though they are
finite, they never converge to any value.

Chaotic behavior of systems open up new

areas of applications in the field of engineering, annealing noise of networks, chaos-based
communication systems and chaotic neural networks [72, 69]. Design of chaos-based systems
should have a simple structure and most importantly they should be compatible with
standard CMOS technologies. Deterministic chaos can be used to implement electronic
7

random signal generators by leveraging their sensitivity to initial conditions which is also
known as the butterfly effect. A chaotic system is ideal for encryption schemes since it is
extremely difficult to predict their long-term behavior [11, 12].

2.1.1

Classification of Chaotic Map

Chaotic maps can be classified into two types.
One-dimensional (1D) Chaotic Map
One-dimensional chaotic maps are mathematical systems that capture the evolution of a
single variable in discrete time. Examples of 1D map are Gauss map, logistic map and tent
map. 1D maps are easy to implement and have simple structures. However, they suffer
from some weaknesses such as small parameter number, the outputs are predictable with
low reverse-engineering cost and their dynamic range is limited.
High-dimensional (HD) Chaotic Map
High-dimensional (HD) maps are mathematical systems which model the evolution of at
least two variables in discrete time. Examples of HD maps are Lorenz system, Henon map,
Chen and Lee system and hyperchaotic systems. HD maps have better chaotic performance
and their chaotic sequences are harder to predict in comparison to 1D maps. However, HD
maps are difficult to implement in hardware and they incur high computational cost. This
limitation does not allow designers to use them in real-time applications.

2.1.2

Study of Chua’s Circuit

The study of the complex behavior of nonlinear dynamical systems can be easily done by
using Chua’s autonomous circuit as shown in Fig. 2.1. Chua’s circuit was the first chaotic
system that has been derived [32], diligently studied [31] and physically confirmed [108].
The simple circuit can be used to study the characteristics of dynamical systems such as
period doubling, bifurcation, chaos and attractors. Chua’s circuit represents a continuoustime dynamical system. The circuit is made up of a capacitor, C2 and inductor, L in
8

Figure 2.1: Chua’s autonomous circuit [108].

Figure 2.2: Double scroll attractor using Chua’s circuit.
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parallel which makes up the lossless resonant component. The conductance, G provides the
coupling between nonlinear resistor, R and the capacitor, C1 in parallel with it. The transfer
characteristic of the nonlinear resistor is a three-segmented piecewise curve.
The nonlinear element, R can be designed in several ways in practice. It has been
designed with a single operational amplifier (op-amp), two diodes and resistors [109], two
bipolar transistors, two diodes and resistors [31] and two op-amps and six resistors [84].
Initially, the system demonstrates a transient response by finally settling into a steady-state
response. The steady-state response is also known as the attractor of the system which
means that the passive part of the system can have many different initial conditions but
eventually the system converges to the same steady-state behavior. The control parameter
in the circuit is the conductance, G and small or large changes in its values causes the current
and voltage of the passive elements to portray the same values after a certain period. The
period of repetition of the values is the same as the driving force so the system is called
a period-one attractor. As the value of the conductance increases, the period of repetition
doubles from the period-one solution and the system displays a discontinuous change in the
response known as bifurcation.
Period doubling is a universal phenomenon in nonlinear dynamical systems.

The

same behavior can be observed in many physical systems such as the forced movement
of pendulum. Period doubling cascade is a common behavior of chaos-based systems. In
any chaotic circuit, it can be seen that period-two doubles to period-four and period-four
doubles to period-eight. Small changes in the control parameter can create an endless series of
period doublings representing all the characteristics of the chaotic attractor. An interesting
property of chaos is that infinite number of periodic solutions from all periods exist with
chaos. Slight tuning of the control parameter can result in absence of chaos and instead a
periodic solution appears. The chaotic attractor can suddenly reappear after the conductance
is changed minutely. This behavior is known as the appearance of periodic window [70]. The
existence of the periodic windows prove that a chaotic solution is available rather than noise.
A demonstration of double scroll chaotic attractor using Chua’s circuit is shown in Fig. 2.2.
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2.2

Introduction to Chaos Computing

Chaos-based systems generate sequences and their sensitivity to initial conditions allows
them to switch between different sequences exponentially fast. Even lower dimensional
chaotic systems can exhibit a variety of behaviors depending on their initial condition,
function of time or parameters. Chaos-based systems are popular for their rich temporal
behavior and determinism for applications in computation with contrast to stochastic and
linear systems. Linear systems will not be able to generate all the possible logic functions
because their temporal patterns are inherently limited. As a result, linear systems do
not have versatility and reconfigurability. On the other hand, stochastic systems contain
many temporal patterns but the sequences are not deterministic so they cannot be used for
computing purposes.
Nonlinearity is an essential feature in order to generate all the logic functions but chaos
may not always be required. In some maps, all the functions exist only when the system
is chaotic. The amount of nonlinearity necessary for producing all the Boolean functions
depends on the chosen system and the technique that is used to generate the input-output
mapping. It is also possible that some systems will generate logic functions without actually
being in the chaotic region.
Boolean functions can be generated from chaotic systems by tuning the control
parameters in both continuous-time and discrete-time systems.

Sensitivity to initial

conditions can be leveraged to achieve fast switching between all the logic gates generated by
chaos-based system. The chaos-based computing systems can be made of arrays of chaotic
elements that can be individually programmed to generate all the possible Boolean functions.
The array of chaotic elements can then be used to perform higher order functions such
as memory, arithmetic logic and input/output operations and the system will be able to
switch rapidly between different function executions. The chaotic computing system will be
able to provide the reconfigurability of field programmable gate arrays (FPGA), the speed
and optimization of application specific integrated circuits (ASIC) and the general usage of
central processing unit (CPU) within the same architecture [45]. Chaos-based logic gates
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can be beneficial for many research areas such as hardware security, reliability enhancement
and reconfigurable logic.
It was proposed in 1998 that chaotic systems can be used to design computing systems
[154]. When the research on chaos computing started, the motivation was to prove that
chaotic systems can be exploited to perform universal computing. The main objective was to
leverage the sensitivity to initial conditions and sequence generation features. In later years,
researchers found out that chaotic elements are reconfigurable and are able to generate all the
logic functions by using a thresholding mechanism [113, 155]. Traditional programmable gate
array elements achieve their reconfigurability and flexibility through the usage of multiple
single function logic gates whereas chaotic elements are able to perform several functionalities
using the same chaotic element. Sinha et al. demonstrated that dynamical systems are able
to encode numbers, perform arithmetic operations such as multiplication and addition and
also calculate least common multiplier from a list of integers [154]. Murali et al. built an
universal NOR gate using continuous-time chaotic Chua’s circuit [115]. Rizk et al. designed
a universal logic gate which can perform all logic functions such as AND, OR, NAND, NOR
and XOR using Chua’s circuit [136]. Chaos-based system has been used to design flip-flops
which is a building block for memory elements [27].
The method of thresholding provides a flexible tool for controlling chaos and there can
be a wide variety of applications ranging from engineering to biology [114]. The strategy
is to monitor one state variable and changing its value when it exceeds a certain threshold.
In this type of control mechanism, computation and run time knowledge is not required to
gain the desired controllability. The method only involves monitoring a single state variable
and other parameters are not changed in the system. The thresholding mechanism does not
stabilize unstable periodic orbits instead, it focuses on clipping the desired time sequence
and enforces a periodicity of the sequence by resetting the initial conditions. Chaos-based
systems are ideal candidates for this controlling mechanism because it possesses a wide range
of temporal patterns which can be clipped to demonstrate different behaviors.
When chaos-based logic gates are implemented in VLSI technology, the input and output
should have the same level which allows a direct connection between different gates without
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the need of level converters. In [137], researchers proposed a method that allows continuoustime chaos-based system to be morphed into any logic function by using thresholding
mechanism while keeping the input and output level unaltered.
In the earlier days, two-input reconfigurable chaotic logic gates (chaogate) were built and
were capable of generating all the Boolean functions [117, 115, 116]. Researchers have also
demonstrated the design of multiple-input logic gates using chaotic elements which reduces
area overhead and propagation delay in circuits. Multiple-input chaotic elements would have
a wider range of applications, more power efficient and demonstrate higher performance.
The advantages of using chaogate are:
• Fast switching between different logic functions using the same chaos-based logic gate.
• Ability to perform complex instructions which require complex design of logic gates.
• Reduction in transistor count for performing complex tasks.
Dynamical systems can be of two types, continuous-time and discrete-time. A discretetime system is also known as an iterated map. In order to design a nonlinear iterated map,
the output of the map has to feedback to the input. A dynamical system maps the initial
condition to future states which is identical to a function mapping its inputs to the outputs.
Examples of both types of systems are described in sections below.

2.2.1

Continuous-time Nonlinear System

Digital logic can be obtained from a continuous-time nonlinear system. The nonlinear system
is defined by the following equation:
dx
= F(x, t).
dt

(2.1)

where x are the state variables x1 , x2 , x3 ....xN and F is the nonlinear function. In this
system, if x1 is chosen to be thresholded by E, then x1 = E whenever x1 is greater than E.
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In continuous-time systems, 2-input 1-output logic functions are realized by choosing an
input-dependent threshold voltage represented by:
E = Vc + I1 + I2 .

(2.2)

where Vc represents the dynamic control signal which chooses the functionality of the
processor and I1 and I2 are inputs to the logic gate. As mentioned earlier, I1 or I2 has a
value of 0 when logic input is zero and has a value of Vin when logic input is high. Threshold,
E is equal to Vc when I1 and I2 are (0, 0), Vc +Vin when I1 and I2 are (0, 1) or (1, 0) and
Vc +2Vin when I1 and I2 are (1, 1).
The output, V0 is interpreted as logic 0 if x1 < E and V0 = 0. The logic output is 1, if x1
> E and V0 = (x1 –E) ∼ Vin . For example, in order to implement a NOR gate (Vc = VN OR ),
the following equations must hold true:
1. when inputs are (0, 0), logic output is 1, which implies that E = VN OR , output is V0
= (x1 –E) ∼ Vin .
2. when inputs are (0, 1) or (1, 0), logic output is 0, which implies that E = VN OR +Vin ,
x1 < E so output is V0 = 0.
3. when inputs are (1, 1), logic output is 0, which implies that E = VN OR +2Vin , x1 < E
so output is V0 = 0.
An example of a continuous-time chaotic map is the double-scroll chaotic Chua’s circuit
which is represented by the following set of differential equations:
x˙1 = α(x2 − x1 − g(x1 )).

(2.3)

x˙2 = x1 − x2 + x3 .

(2.4)

x˙3 = −βx2 .

(2.5)

where x1 , x2 and x3 are the input variables, α and β are system parameters and g(x) is
a characteristic function described below in equation 2.6.
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gx = m1 x + 1/2(m0 − m1 )(|x + 1| − |x − 1|).

(2.6)

Realization of Multiple-Input Logic Gates
Previously, 2-input logic gates have been discussed and in this section we discuss about
designing 3-input logic gates using chaotic elements. Here, continuous-time system is chosen
as discussed in section 2.2.1 to demonstrate the functionality of 3-input logic gates. In this
system, if a state variable, x1 is chosen to be thresholded, then whenever the value of the
variable exceeds the threshold, E, x1 resets to E. The value of E is selected based on the
logic inputs, I1 , I2 and I3 . The equation of the threshold for 3-input logic gate is given by:
E = Vc + I1 + I2 + I3 .

(2.7)

where Vc is the dynamic control signal determining the functionality of the system. By
changing the value of Vc , the logic operation can be changed.
I1 or I2 or I3 has a value of 0 when logic input is zero and has a value of Vin when logic
input is high. Threshold, E is equal to Vc when I1 , I2 and I3 are (0, 0, 0), Vc +Vin when I1 ,
I2 and I3 are (0, 0, 1) or (0, 1, 0) or (1, 0, 0), Vc +2Vin when I1 , I2 and I3 are (0, 1, 1) or (1,
0, 1) or (1, 1, 0) and Vc +3Vin when all the inputs are (1, 1, 1).
As discussed before, the output is interpreted as logic 0 if x1 < E and V0 ∼ 0. The logic
output is 1 if x1 > E, and V0 = (x1 –E) ∼ Vin . In order to design logic gates like NOR and
NAND, knowledge of the dynamics of the nonlinear system is required in order to choose
the values of Vc and V0 .
The differential equations 2.3, 2.4 and 2.5 are used to represent the double-scroll chaotic
Chua’s attractor. The chaotic system that implements the attractor is shown in Fig. 2.3.
In the figure, E = Vc + I1 + I2 + I3 known as the dynamically varying threshold voltage.
Voltage, VT represents the signal from the threshold controller and V0 is the difference voltage
signal. The state variable, x1 which is represented by voltage V1 is thresholded by the control
circuit with voltage E setting different threshold voltages. Equation 2.4 is changed from
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dx2 /dt = x1 – x2 – x3 to dx2 /dt = E – x2 – x3 only if x1 > E, otherwise, no controlling
action takes place.
The classical Chua’s circuit in Fig. 2.3 works in the following manner:
1. When the value of E is greater than the value of V1 , diode, D turns on. The circuit
now acts as a voltage follower and voltage, VT is equal to V1 .
2. When the value of E is less than the value of V1 , diode, D is off and voltage, VT is the
same as voltage, E.

2.2.2

Discrete-time Nonlinear System

In discrete-time dynamical systems, the chaos is generated by using a set of differential
equations known as a chaotic map. A discrete-time chaotic map can be used where the
state is represented by variable, x. In order to generate responses by utilizing the different
patterns generated by chaotic circuits, a thresholding mechanism can be used to generate
AND, OR, NAND, NOR, XOR and NOT functions [44]. The simple steps used to make
logic gates from chaotic systems is given below:

Figure 2.3: Chaotic Chua’s attractor implemented in circuit to build logic gates [115].
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Table 2.1: Necessary and sufficient conditions to obtain different logic functions from the
nonlinear dynamical element [43].
Logic Gate

AND

OR

XOR

NOR

NAND

I1 , I2

Output

Necessary condition

(0,0)

0

f(xAN D ) < E

(0,1), (1,0)

0

f(xAN D +Vin ) < E

(1,1)

1

f(xAN D +2Vin ) ≥ E

(0,0)

0

f(xOR ) < E

(0,1), (1,0)

1

f(xOR +Vin ) ≥ E

(1,1)

1

f(xOR +2Vin ) ≥ E

(0,0)

0

f(xXOR ) < E

(0,1), (1,0)

1

f(xXOR +Vin ) ≥ E

(1,1)

0

f(xXOR +2Vin ) < E

(0,0)

1

f(xN OR ) ≥ E

(0,1), (1,0)

0

f(xN OR +Vin ) < E

(1,1)

0

f(xN OR +2Vin ) < E

(0,0)

1

f(xN AN D ) ≥ E

(0,1), (1,0)

1

f(xN AN D +Vin ) ≥ E

(1,1)

0

f(xN AN D +2Vin ) < E

1. Inputs:
x → x0 + I1 + I2 .

(2.8)

x → x0 + I.

(2.9)

Equation 2.8 is the state equation for two-input logic gates and similarly equation 2.9
represents the state condition for single input gates. Here x0 is the initial state of the
system, I = 0 for logic input zero and I = Vin for logic input high.
2. Dynamical system:
x → f (x).
Here f (x) represents a highly nonlinear function.
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(2.10)

3. Threshold mechanism:
V0 =



0,

if f (x) ≤ E
(2.11)


f (x) − E, otherwise.
Here, E represents the threshold.
In a chaotic system, if the initial state is required to be set accurately, then a controlling
mechanism is required. A threshold controller can be used to set the initial state, x0 . It is
also important to ensure that the input and output have equivalent definitions for different
logical operations. In order to ensure this condition, same Vin is used throughout the system
and this will allow the output of one chaotic element to couple with the input of another
chaotic element. An example of discrete-time chaotic map is the well-known 1-D function
called logistic map which is implemented using the following equation:
f (x) = ax(1 − x).

(2.12)

where x ∈ [0, 1] and the variable, a determines whether the system is in chaotic or
periodic region. The characteristic of logistic map is analogues to biological and physical
phenomena. Nonlinear oscillators and electrical circuits portray such phenomena. The
logistic map generates sequences in real number domain and needs to be converted to binary
representation in order to be used in different applications.
Table 2.1 shows the necessary conditions that must be fulfilled in order to implement the
different logic gates. If logistic map is used as the chaotic element, then typical values of x0
and E are shown in Table 2.2. The value of a from equation 2.12 is equal to 4 and Vin equals
1/4 for all logic gates [43].

Table 2.2: One specific solution to yield different logic functions using logistic map [43].
Operation

AND

OR

x0

0

1/8

1/4

3/8

E

3/4

11/16

3/4

11/16
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XOR NAND

In chaos computing, a set of initial conditions and parameters need to be determined to
produce logic functions from a specific chaotic system. A set of parameters can produce the
results for a logical OR or a logical AND. The parameters can be stored as a ”lookuptable” for future computations. There might be conditions or parameters that do not
generate desired logical functions and those parameters can be discarded. The chosen set of
parameters should lead to the correct output.

2.2.3

Digital Logic Obtained by Varying Iteration Number

In addition to perturbing the initial condition of the nonlinear dynamical system, digital
logic can also be obtained from the time evolution of the states. This concept is stating
that logic gate can be obtained if the initial condition is kept fixed and output is sampled at
different iterations, then it is possible to obtain multiple logic functions. The advantage of
this technique is that a single system will be able to perform complex operations efficiently.
In section 2.2.2, it was shown how different logic functions like AND, OR and XOR were
obtained by sampling at a fixed iteration. With varying iterations, it is possible to obtain an
AND logic in the first iteration and an OR logic in the second iteration. Hence, a sequence of
logical or mathematical operations can be performed as smoothly as a single operation. As
discussed previously, for two-input logic operation the initial state is given by the following
equation:
x → x0 + I1 + I2 .

(2.13)

Here, x0 is the initial state, I = 0 for logic input zero and I = Vin for logic input high.

Table 2.3: Necessary conditions to implement logic functions from nonlinear systems for
varying iterations [43].
Logic

AND

OR

XOR

NOR

NAND

Iteration n

1

2

3

4

5

Input (0, 0)

x1 =f(x0 ) < E

f(x1 ) < E

f(x2 ) < E

f(x3 ) > E

f(x4 ) > E

Input (0, 1), (1, 0)

x1 =f(x0 + Vin ) < E

f(x1 ) > E

f(x2 ) > E

f(x3 ) < E

f(x4 ) > E

Input (1, 1)

x1 =f(x0 + 2Vin ) > E

f(x1 ) > E

f(x2 ) < E

f(x3 ) < E

f(x4 ) < E
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After n iterations, the output is determined by using the following equations:

V0 =



0,

if fn (x) ≤ E

(2.14)


fn (x) − E, otherwise.
Here, E is the threshold.
The main difference from the previous approach is that n is the tuning parameter and
it is varied to implement different logic functions. In earlier approach, n was held constant
at the first iteration, i.e. n = 1 and Vc was tuned to change the mapping of input-output
patterns. The inputs set up the initial condition of the system using equation 2.13. The
system evolves over n iterations and reaches the final state, xn . The final state is compared
with a predetermined threshold, E. If the state is greater than E, the output is 1, otherwise
the output is 0. Table 2.3 shows the necessary conditions to implement logic functions
from nonlinear dynamical systems by altering the iteration number and keeping the initial
condition fixed.

2.2.4

Distinguishing Between (0,1) and (1,0) Input Pairs

Section 2.2.2 describes a discrete-time nonlinear system that cannot distinguish between the
input pairs (0,1) and (1,0). There might be cases where it is required that the two pairs
generate different logical outputs. In this technique, a two-input logic gate is considered
with inputs, I1 and I2 . The initial condition is generated by the following equation:

x → x0 + X 1 + X 2 .

(2.15)

where X1 = 0 when I1 = 0 and X1 = Vin when I1 = 1. X2 = 0 when I2 = 0 and X2 =
2Vin when I2 = 1. Vin is a positive constant.
All the input combinations are considered below:
1. I1 = I2 = 0 so x = x0 +0+0 = x0 .
2. I1 = 1, I2 = 0 so x = x0 + Vin + 0 = x0 + Vin .
3. I1 = 0, I2 = 1 so x = x0 + 0 + 2Vin = x0 + 2Vin .
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4. I1 = 1, I2 = 1 so x = x0 + Vin + 2Vin = x0 + 3Vin .
The above encoding of the inputs treats (0,1) and (1,0) as separate input combinations
and hence can implement asymmetric logic functions. Logic outputs are determined in
the same manner as in equation 2.11. Symmetric gates can also be evaluated using this
scheme which is capable of generating all the 16 possible Boolean functions in contrast to
the maximum 8 functions when (0,1) and (1,0) were equivalent. The designer needs to
determine values for the threshold, E, constant Vin and initial state, x0 to implement the
logic gates.
Another method of distinguishing the input pairs is to utilize the iteration number, n by
using the following equation:
n → n + X1 + X2 .

(2.16)

The above equation yields four distinct conditions.
1. I1 = I2 = 0 so n = n+0+0 = n.
2. I1 = 1, I2 = 0 so n = n + Vin + 0 = n + Vin .
3. I1 = 0, I2 = 1 so n = n + 0 + 2Vin = n + 2Vin .
4. I1 = 1, I2 = 1 so n = n + Vin + 2Vin = n + 3Vin .
After n evolution in time, the final state is achieved and fn (x) is the desired output.

2.2.5

Design of Multi-Input Multi-Output Logic Functions

Combinational logic can be implemented by a single chaotic element. An example can be bitby-bit arithmetic addition which involves two logic gates, an AND gate to generate the carry
and an XOR gate to generate the sum. Using the previously mentioned scheme, the halfadder operation can be obtained in consecutive iterations. Table 2.4 shows the necessary
conditions for implementing half-adder using a single chaotic element.
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Table 2.4: Necessary and sufficient conditions to build half-adder from the nonlinear
dynamical element [43].
Logic Operation

I1 , I2

Output

Initial State

Necessary Condition

(0,0)

0

x0

x1 =f(x0 ) ≤ E

(0,1)

0

x0 + Vin

x1 =f(x0 + Vin ) ≤ E

(1,0)

0

x0 + 2Vin

x1 =f(x0 + 2Vin ) ≤ E

(1,1)

1

x0 + 3Vin

x1 =f(x0 + 3Vin ) > E

(0,0)

0

x0

x2 =f(x0 ) ≤ E

(0,1)

1

x0 + Vin

x2 =f(x0 + Vin ) > E

(1,0)

1

x0 + 2Vin

x2 =f(x0 + 2Vin ) > E

(1,1)

0

x0 + 3Vin

x2 =f(x0 + 3Vin ) ≤ E

Carry

Sum

Moreover, the implementation of full-adder requires two half-adders along with an OR
gate. A full-adder requires five gates in total including two XOR gates, two AND gates and
an OR gate. If logistic map is used as the chaotic oscillator, then only three iterations are
required to implement the full-adder operation. This technique allows combinational circuits
to be implemented with fewer computational components and without cascading.

2.3

Concluding Remarks

Previous sections demonstrated how a single computing system made with nonlinear
dynamical system can implement all the Boolean functions.

The nonlinear responses

generated by the system is utilized to generate functions. In contrast, field programmable
gate arrays use multiple single purpose gates which makes the reconfiguration feature
wasteful of area on a chip and degrades the performance of the system. Preliminary goal
was to prove that chaotic elements can be used to design computers which provides better
performance and flexibility. Systems that combine CMOS circuits along with programmable
chaos-based circuits are also a design option.
A major drawback of using chaotic-based logic gates is that the hardware cost is larger
compared to traditional logic gates. In [35], it is discussed that the op-amp based design
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of Chua’s circuit along with the capacitor and inductor area, a total of 52 transistors are
required to implement the chaogate. This limitation of chaos-based systems can be overcome
by increasing the number of inputs of the logic gate.
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Chapter 3
Design of Chaotic Oscillator and
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Figure 3.1: Three transistor chaotic map circuit designed in 65 nm process [150, 46].

3.1

Design of Chaotic Map

In this work, a three transistor CMOS circuit is implemented in 65 nm process which can be
used as a map to generate chaotic signals [46, 80]. The circuit is extremely compact which
makes it suitable for integration in VLSI chips with area and power concerns. The nonlinear
map circuit is analog since the state variables are analog. A one-dimensional discrete-time
chaotic series can be generated by a simple iterative method:
xn+1 = f (xn ).

(3.1)

where f (x) represents a nonlinear function. Several analog circuits have been proposed in
order to generate chaotic signals [164, 48, 37]. The CMOS implemented circuits are usually
designed to imitate one of the popular chaos maps, such as, tent map or logistic map. Chaos
maps can be achieved with V-shaped functions [37]. The branches of the V-shaped curve
can be generated by different functions which allows a degree of freedom in constructing
the map circuit. This kind of design is more suitable for applications in stochastic neural
networks where accuracy of the map function and the statistical properties of the generated
signal are not important as long as the map is able to generate random-like signals. The
V-shape can be designed using two circuits and the nonlinear function achieved will be the
DC characteristics of the final circuit.
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Figure 3.2: DC transfer characteristic of the three transistor map circuit [150].

Chaos map circuits are expected to portray a non-monotonic characteristic where the
‘average steepness’ of the generated chaotic signal is greater than unity. The chaotic map
circuit used in this work is shown in Fig. 3.1. The DC transfer characteristics of the map
circuit for different values of the bias voltage voltage, Vc is shown in Fig. 3.2. As can be
seen from the figure, the three transistor circuit generates a V-shaped map. The negative
slope is constructed using a common-source amplifier and the positive slope can be obtained
from a source follower. The circuits are connected in parallel so that the final response is
a summation of their DC characteristics. In the three transistor map circuit, transistor M3
acts as the source follower with M1 as load and transistor M1 acts as the common source
amplifier with M2 as load. The two sub-circuits share the same input and output in creating
the V-shaped transfer curve. The operation of the map circuit is explained below.

3.1.1

DC Transfer Characteristics of the Map

When Vin is less than the threshold voltage of transistor M1 , the output Vout remains at VDD
= 1.2 V . At this point, transistor M3 is turned-off. As the value of Vin increases, Vout starts
to decrease as transistors M1 and M2 act like an inverter. The slope of the transfer curve
depends on the sizes of M1 and M2 and the value of the bias voltage, Vc . At some point,
the value of Vout falls below Vin such that the gate-source voltage of transistor, M3 becomes
larger than its threshold voltage and the transistor starts conducting. If the value of Vin is
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increased further, Vout increases since M3 acts like a source follower. The current through
transistor M1 keeps increasing due to increase in Vout . The slope of Vout against Vin can be
close to unity if the aspect ratio of width to length of transistor M3 is much larger than M1 .
Process variation might affect the steepness of the slope of the transfer curve so it is
important to make the design robust. The physical implementation of the two map circuits
will never be identical due to component mismatch. Despite this mismatch, the mapping
function will result in chaotic behavior. In this design, the controllability and flexibility exists
since the bias voltage, Vc of the map circuit can be adjusted to get different transfer curves
as shown in Fig. 3.2. The bias voltage, also known as the bifurcation parameter, determines
whether the chaotic generator produces periodic or chaotic signals. The controllability of
the circuit can be essential for applications such as chaotic neural networks [6].

3.2

Design of Chaotic Oscillator

Traditionally, two sample-and-hold circuits were required in addition to the map circuit
to design the chaos generator in order to generate discrete-time chaotic signals [37]. The
schematic of the conventional chaotic oscillator design is shown in Fig. 3.3. It is assumed
that the map circuit has high-impedance input. Two non-overlapping clocks, φ1 and φ2 are
used in order to avoid race conditions. Initially, the input of the map is equal to xn . The
nonlinear map circuit evaluates the initial voltage and output, xn+1 is generated which is
sampled on the capacitor, C1 . On the second phase, φ2 , the value of xn+1 is transferred to
capacitor, C2 where it is held constant at the input of the map circuit for the next iteration.
In some cases, the buffer is not used and a large ratio of C1 /C2 is used in order to reduce
charge-sharing error of the second sample-and-hold circuit.
The settling time, tset of the map circuit along with C1 sets the limit on the minimum
period of φ1 . The disadvantage is that the time required to perform the second sample-andhold reduces the maximum operating frequency of the chaotic oscillator. In this work, a
chaotic oscillator with two identical map circuits is used so that the maximum frequency,
fmax = 1/tset . The schematic of the proposed chaotic oscillator is shown in Fig. 3.4. Each

27

Figure 3.3: Traditional chaotic oscillator using buffer [85].

Figure 3.4: Chaotic oscillator using two map circuits [150, 46].

Figure 3.5: Iterating through the chaotic map.
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map implements a nonlinear function which helps to generate chaotic signals. The discretetime dynamical system can only map analog inputs to analog outputs. The replacement of
buffer with another map circuit doubles the rate at which the map iterates which in turn
helps to speed up the computation process.
On the first phase, φ1 , initial condition, xn is applied to the forward path map circuit
and it produces the next response by using equation 3.1. On phase, φ2 , the next response is
generated from the second map circuit in the feedback path by using the following equation:
xn+2 = f (xn+1 ).

(3.2)

The response, xn+2 is then applied to the forward path map circuit again and the process
continues to generate new responses. The frequency and duty cycle of the clocks are defined
by the RC time constant of the sample-and-hold circuits and the propagation delay of the
system. Pass transistors are used to select which map circuit produces the response. This
method of using two map circuits is efficient since all the transistors are part of the map
circuit or act as switches and the system does not consume extra power and area due to
sample-and-hold buffer.
The chaotic oscillator has been designed in 65 nm process. The size of the transistors
used in the map circuit are: M1 : 0.15 µm/60 nm, M2 : 0.15 µm/60 nm and M3 : 4 µm/60
nm. The switches in the chaotic oscillator are implemented by pass transistors consisting of
n − M OS and p − M OS transistors. The size of p − M OS transistor is 8 µm/100 nm and
the size of n − M OS transistor is 4 µm/100 nm. C1 and C2 are implemented by utilizing
the inherent input capacitance of the map circuits which contributes to saving area on the
chip. The oscillator is made up of 12 transistors including the switches. If a more compact
design is required, the switches can be implemented with a single transistor.
In practical implementation of the chaotic oscillator, two major challenges can be the
frequency of operation and the power supply required to generate the chaotic signals. In
[80], Juncu et al. fabricated the chaos generator in 0.6 µm process. It was observed the
circuit gave a constant performance upto 2.5 M Hz and beyond this frequency the generator
was still chaotic but had less amplitude since the sample-and-hold circuits were not fully
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charged or discharged during the clock cycle. The reason for limited operating frequency
can be off-chip capacitances and bonding pads. The power consumption of the circuit is
another concern and depends on the current flowing from VDD to ground through transistors
M1 and M3 for large values of Vin .

3.2.1

Iterating through the Map

Fig. 3.5 demonstrates how the different values are generated from the chaotic map. In
iteration, n = 1, Vin ≈ 0.95 V and Vout ≈ 0.4 V . When n = 2, the previous output is the
new input to the map, thus Vin ≈ 0.4 V and the output Vout ≈ 1.18 V . The loop continues
until the desired number of iterations are completed.

3.2.2

Sensitivity to Initial Condition

The chaotic oscillator’s sensitivity to initial conditions is shown in Fig. 3.6 for Vc = 520
mV . The initial seed is changed from 600 mV to 601 mV and it can be seen that around
40th iteration, the output of the oscillator starts to diverge from each other. Sensitivity and
reconfigurability of the map means that there can be a huge number of initial conditions
and control parameters to generate random sequences which means that the key space will
be large and it will be able to withstand statistical attacks from the adversaries in case the
map is used to design pseudo-random number generators (PRNGs).

3.2.3

Ergodicity of the Chaotic Map

Ergodicity is defined in statistics as a random phenomena where the time average of one
sequence of events is the same as the average of the entire sequence. The ergodicity can be
expressed by the distribution of the state value of the chaotic map. The ergodicity of a map
can also be demonstrated by fixing the bifurcation parameter and choosing a random initial
value. The map will be iterated for a few thousand iterations and the distribution of the
map is plotted against the iteration number, n. The results in Fig. 3.7 shows the values
of Vc for which the map is chaotic and the ergodicity is better. When Vc = 180 mV , the
output oscillates between two values. As the value of Vc is increased, the periodicity of the
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oscillator increases and at one point, it enters into the chaotic region. The first 100 iterations
are discarded in order to avoid the transient phase.

3.2.4

Bifurcation Diagram

Bifurcation diagram helps in understanding the dynamics of nonlinear dynamical systems.
The bifurcation diagram of the chaotic oscillator is shown in Fig. 3.8. For small bias voltages,
Vc , the system displays periodic behavior. The number of functions that the circuit can
implement does not increase exponentially in the periodic region. As Vc increases, a perioddoubling cascade takes place and the system moves into chaotic region. In this region, the
number of logic functions that the system can implement exponentially increases. Further
increase in the bias voltage leads the system into periodic region again and the process of
chaotic and periodic region shifts continues. There are mainly two chaotic regions in the
bifurcation diagram. The first region starts at 527 mV and ends at 622.5 mV . The second
chaotic region lies between 890 mV and 952.5 mV . The bias voltage has been chosen from
the first chaotic region since the span of the output voltage is larger and ranges from 294
mV to 1.194 V . The initial value of the map is also chosen from this output range. The
delay of the circuit is higher for large values of bias voltage so the value of Vc is chosen from
the first region only. The first 1000 iterations are discarded to avoid the transient phase and
a total of 4000 iterations have been used to generate the bifurcation diagram.

3.2.5

Lyapunov Exponent

Lyapunov exponent (LE) is the average convergence or divergence of states due to small
changes in the initial conditions. A positive Lyapunov exponent means that the system is
in chaotic region and that the perturbations in initial conditions diverge the states by a
significant amount. It indicates that a chaotic system becomes more unpredictable if the LE
is more positive. If a nonlinear circuit is not sensitive to initial conditions, then the following
statements are true.
1. The nonlinear system is incapable of generating multiple logic functions.
2. The Lyapunov exponent is zero or negative.
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Figure 3.6: Sensitivity of the chaotic oscillator to slight change in initial condition.
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The equation for the Lyapunov exponent is given below:
n−1

1X
ln|f 0 (xi )|.
n→∞ n
i=0

λ = lim

(3.3)

The diagram of Lyapunov exponent is shown in Fig. 3.9. It can be seen that the values of
positive Lyapunov exponent correlates to the chaotic regions in the bifurcation diagram. The
perturbation value of the initial condition used in this work is 1 mV . In order to calculate
the Lyapunov exponent, 3000 iterations were considered out of which 300 iterations were
truncated in order to eliminate the transient phase.

3.3
3.3.1

Reconfigurable Chaos-based Logic Gates
Introduction

Chaos-based logic gates have many advantages over traditional logic circuits. A single chaosbased logic gate can implement all the universal logic functions such as AND, OR, XOR,
NAND, NOR and XNOR. In conventional reconfigurable logic gates such as look-up tables
(LUTs), the need for additional hardware grows exponentially with the increase in number
of inputs. Therefore, using chaos-based logic gates saves significant area for large number of
inputs. The apparent randomness of chaos-based logic gates helps to mitigate power analysis
based side-channel attacks [105, 104]. Implementation of chaos-based logic gates have a high
probability of useful functions but there will still exist a handsome number of unused or
“garbage” functions which can be utilized to obfuscate the desired computation.
Ditto et al. made the concept of chaos computing concrete by building logic gates called
chaogates. The gate utilizes a chaotic oscillator, C which can be Chua’s function or logistic
map to generate logic functions from the logic gate at a given time. The schematic of onedimensional chaogate is shown in Fig. 3.10. The initial condition of the chaotic oscillator
is made up of the summation of the analog control input, xg and the two inputs, A and B.
The digital inputs are converted to analog values by multiplying with the constant weighting
factor, δ. The digital output, Y is generated by using a comparator with threshold voltage,
Vth . The logic function generated from the chaogate can be altered by varying the parameters,
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Lyapunov Exponent,

Figure 3.8: Bifurcation diagram of the chaotic oscillator [148].
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Figure 3.9: Lyapunov exponent of the chaotic oscillator [148].

Figure 3.10: A basic 2-input chaogate using a single chaotic oscillator [139].
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control input, xg , weighting factor, δ and the threshold voltage, Vth . The chaotic oscillator
can be seen as a pseudo-random number generator where xg and δ make up the initial seed
and Vth converts the analog output into digital voltages, 0 or 1.
It is possible to generate 16 different logic functions from a 2-input reconfigurable chaosbased logic gate. The disadvantage of using the one-dimensional chaogate is that the logic
inputs {0, 1} and {1, 0} will produce the same initial condition for the chaotic oscillator.
As a result, the generated digital logic output will be the same. This limitation on the
outputs reduces the possible generated number of functions from 16 to 8. The generated
logic functions are: TRUE, AB, A + B, AB, A + B, A ⊕ B, A ⊕ B and FALSE.
Previous research in chaos-based systems demonstrated the existence of inherent
obfuscation available across multiple abstraction layers. Rose implemented a chaos-based
arithmetic logic unit (ALU) and displayed how each function can be obtained in multiple
ways by changing the control input, xg , weighting factor, δ, threshold voltage, Vth and
iteration number, n [139]. Moreover, since the ALU is designed with chaotic oscillators,
there is no pattern to relate the various ways a specific function is implemented.
The major design limitations of a chaos-based system is the probability of generation
of the desired function, circuit size and performance. Considering applications in hardware
security, it is imminent that a chaos-based circuit will generate huge number of garbage
functions which are not part of the desired instruction set. The two methods of changing
the probability of functions in a chaos-based system are:
1. Tuning the comparator threshold value.
2. Modifying the chaos-based logic circuit.

3.3.2

Design of Reconfigurable Chaos-based Gates

In Fig. 3.11, the digital inputs of a logic gate are encoded as initial conditions to the
dynamical system and the digital output are decoded from the final state to generate a
digital function. The encoder converts digital inputs to analog inputs and the decoder
converts the analog output of the map to binary outputs. There are four control inputs,
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Figure 3.11: Chaotic oscillator is shown in the dotted box. Two-input chaos-based logic gate
including digital encoding of the inputs and digital decoding of the outputs [86].

Figure 3.12: Two-input reconfigurable chaos-based logic gate demonstrating all the tuning
parameters in red circles.
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CB , Vc , Vth and n available in the design to tune the block diagram to generate different
functions as illustrated in Fig. 3.12.
The nonlinear dynamical system accepts data bits and control bits simultaneously and
control bits can be different in different clock cycles. As a result, different functions are
achievable at each clock cycle. The control input, CB changes the initial condition of the
dynamical system as a way of reconfiguring the block diagram. It is a known fact that small
changes in the initial condition of the nonlinear dynamical systems can change the final
state by a huge amount. However, this sensitivity to initial conditions puts a limit on the
maximum number of iterations on the iterated map so that random noise will not be able
to change the future state. The iteration number should be high enough so that the change
in the future states created by CB can take place but not so high that random noise can
change the final states of the system and make the computation unreliable.
The bifurcation parameter of a nonlinear dynamical system determines whether the
system is periodic or chaotic. The bifurcation parameter is typically an analog voltage
such as gate voltage of a transistor. The control input, Vc changes the qualitative behavior
of the map circuit. This control input can be tuned to change the way the map circuit
connects the inputs to the outputs. Additional auxiliary circuitry is required to convert the
digital input to analog value for application as bifurcation parameter.
Encoder/Digital-to-Analog Converter (DAC)
In the design of two-input reconfigurable chaos-based logic gate, two inputs, I1 and I2 along
with a control input, CB make up the initial condition for the map circuits. There are
various encoding schemes present in literature. Fig. 3.13 shows a simple 3-bit digital-toanalog converter (DAC) to convert the digital inputs to an analog value. The transistors are
turned on or off based on the data input values of I1 , I2 and CB . The transistors alter the
value of resistor ratio and hence produces a voltage proportional to the digital data applied
at the inputs. The 2-input reconfigurable chaos-based logic gate can be easily changed to
multi-input system by using the initial control bits as data bits. Extra input lines can also
be added to the encoder by increasing the input size of the DAC.
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Figure 3.13: Three-bit DAC for encoding digital inputs to analog values [86].

Figure 3.14: Decoder which converts final states to digital outputs [86].
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The initial condition, xn can be calculated by the DAC using data and control bits. Let
us consider a bits of data, D and b bits of control, C and the voltage span is between 0 and
VDD . The equation for calculating xn is given below:
Pb
xn = VDD ×

j=1

P
2j−1 Cj + ai=1 2i+b−1 Di
.
2a+b

(3.4)

Here, C1 and D1 are the least significant bits.
Decoder/Analog-to-Digital Converter (ADC)
In order to decode the analog state of the map circuit to digital output, the output state
space is divided into two parts. One partition decides if the digital output is 1 and the other
decides if it is 0. A simple thresholding circuit is shown in Fig. 3.14. The decoder circuit
either generates VDD or 0 V which represents a 1 or 0 bit respectively. The output depends
on the final state of the map circuit, either xn+1 or xn+2 depending on which map circuit
is sampled. Any threshold voltage, Vth could be chosen to divide the output state space
of the map. The critical point of the V-shaped transfer curve shown in Fig. 3.2 can be a
suitable choice for partition between 0 and 1. The main point to note is that the partitioning
should be able to retain the entropy in the system [33]. In order to ensure a quick transition
region at Vth and to reduce the decoder’s dependence on temperature variations, an analog
comparator circuit is used which compares the analog output of the map against an internally
generated threshold voltage.
The digital output from the final state of the map circuit is obtained by a simple
thresholding mechanism. The state space is partitioned in two parts. The equation for
the partition is given below:

On+1 =



1, if xn+1 /xn+2 > Vth

0, otherwise.
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(3.5)

Figure 3.15: Multi-input multi-output reconfigurable chaos-based logic gate [63].

The digital outputs produced by the two map circuits are usually different. The functions
change at each iteration if the map circuits are in the chaotic region. If the control inputs
put the map circuit in an unstable regime and the orbits are guided towards Vth , then the
binary output is more susceptible to noise because a small noise can now grow quickly until
it switches the final state to an incorrect region producing an incorrect digital output.

3.3.3

Complex Functions Obtained Using Single Chaotic Element

As discussed in section 2.2.5, chaotic oscillators can be used to build multi-input multi-output
functions such as adders, decoders etc. Flexibility which means different configurations to
achieve the same logic function can be achieved by tuning only a few parameters in the
chaotic system. Implementing complex functions by using a single digital system can reduce
area and power issues which arise due to technology scaling. The complex instructions
generated from chaos-based systems are more uniform than its traditional counterparts.
Presence of uniformity makes it difficult for adversaries to decode an instruction by power
analysis based side channel attack. This work has explored 3-input multiple output (1 - 8)
instructions using a single discrete-time chaos-based system [63]. The tuning parameters in
the circuit topology are control bit, threshold voltage of the comparator, iteration number,
initial seed value and bifurcation parameter.
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The number of functions that a single chaos-based logic gate can implement increases with
increasing the number of iterations. It is seen that when the system is operating in chaotic
region, a different function is generated in each iteration. Other circuit parameters can be
changed dynamically in order to implement different functionalities. It should be noted that
all the generated functions will not be reliable or usable due to noise or instability.
Fig. 3.15 shows the design of multi-input and multi-output reconfigurable chaos-based
logic gate. The dotted lines enclose the three-transistor map circuit, DAC, buffer and sampleand-hold circuits. A 3-input gate is designed whose inputs are 3-bit data (D), 6-bit control
(C) and bifurcation parameter, Vc . A 9-bit digital-to-analog converter (DAC) is required to
convert the data bits and control bits to the initial state of the map. The analog output
of the map circuit is sampled at each iteration, n and converted to digital voltage using a
threshold voltage, Vth in the comparator. The size of the transistors in the three transistor
map circuit are - M1 : 1.2 µm/60 nm and M2 , M3 : 0.12 µm/60 nm. The size of the transistors
are chosen after simulating with several different geometries and finding the optimum case
in regards to area, power, width of the chaotic region in the bifurcation diagram and delay.
In order to generate the chaotic signals, an oscillator is required so that the output of
the map circuit is fed back to the input. The feedback mechanism requires a buffer, two
capacitors and two transmission gates. φ1 is used to apply the initial input to the map
circuit. When φ2 is high, the analog output of the map circuit is sampled onto capacitor, C1
and when φ3 is high, the output is held at C2 .
The functionality generated from the chaos-based logic gate can be varied by changing
the threshold voltage, control bit, iteration number and bifurcation parameter. The three
transistor map has been designed in IBM 65 nm process. All the other blocks, DAC,
comparator, buffer, switches and clocking circuitry has been designed using Verilog-A. The
entire reconfigurable logic gate has been simulated using Cadence Spectre.
The input-output values for different values of Vc is obtained from Cadence Virtuoso. A
MATLAB code has been developed which varies the four tuning parameters of the design
and searches for the configuration of the instruction required. The number of iterations has
been contrained within 21 iterations. Higher iteration number might be distorted by noise
so it is wise to decide on a suitable limit for n. The evolution of 3-input 1-output AND
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Table 3.1: Evolution of chaotic oscillator output with number of iterations. (Vc = 690 mV ,
C = (111010)2 = 58, Vth = 1.03 V , n = 5) [63].
xn (V)
0.136(000)
0.287(001)
0.437(010)
0.587(011)
0.737(100)
0.888(101)
1.038(110)
1.188(111)

n=1
1.2(1)
1.19(1)
0.72(0)
0.24(0)
0.27(0)
0.34(0)
0.42(0)
0.51(0)

n=2
0.52(0)
0.51(0)
0.27(0)
1.2(1)
1.19(1)
1.13(1)
0.79(0)
0.39(0)

xn+1 (V)
n=3
0.36(0)
0.39(0)
1.19(1)
0.52(0)
0.51(0)
0.47(0)
0.3(0)
0.93(0)

n=4
1.06(1)
0.91(0)
0.51(0)
0.37(0)
0.38(0)
0.56(0)
1.18(1)
0.36(0)

n=5
0.43(0)
0.35(0)
0.38(0)
1.02(0)
0.96(0)
0.25(0)
0.51(0)
1.04(1)

Table 3.2: Different configurations for 3-input 1-output instructions [63].
Operation
AND
OR
XOR
NAND
NOR
XNOR

Vc
0.69
0.71
0.65
0.74
0.63
0.65

Configurations
Config.1
Config.2
C
Vth n Vc
C Vth n
58 1.02 5 0.74 63 1.17 3
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0.3 3 0.65 26 0.3 5
0.42 28 5 0.67 41 0.51 7
63 0.32 5 0.66 61 0.34 4
34 0.61 7 0.69 54 1.17 8
28 0.69 6 0.66 63 0.81 15

Vc
0.62
0.62
0.73
0.62
0.74
0.69

Config.3
C Vth n
0 0.69 4
46 0.27 8
63 0.5 15
0 0.4 3
63 1.19 1
63 0.82 13

Figure 3.16: 1-bit full-adder designed using chaotic oscillator [63].
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Table 3.3: Design of 1-bit full-adder using chaotic oscillator (Vc = 677.5 mV and C =
(011001)2 = 25).
Input (a, b, cin )
0.0587(000)
0.2090(001)
0.3593(010)
0.5096(011)
0.6599(100)
0.8102(101)
0.9605(110)
1.1108(111)

Vth = 497.5 mV n = 16 Vth = 502.5 mV n = 17
Sum
Carry
0.4954(0)
0.5023(0)
0.5095(1)
0.4394(0)
0.5146(1)
0.4170(0)
0.4287(0)
0.8044(1)
0.9574(1)
0.3767(0)
0.2458(0)
1.1961(1)
0.4153(0)
0.8636(1)
1.1962(1)
0.5148(1)

Figure 3.17: 3 × 8 decoder designed using chaotic oscillator [63].
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gate is shown in Table 3.1 column 5. Table 3.2 shows different configurations for generating
standard 3-input 1-output instructions using the chaotic oscillator.
Multi-output functions/instructions like adder, subtractor, decoder and encoder uses a
common pair of Vc and C for all the output functions. For example, a 3-to-8 decoder uses
the same Vc and C but changes Vth and n to generate the 8 possible outputs. This is how it
is possible to use a single chaotic element to generate multiple instructions. The schematic
of 1-bit full adder and 3 × 8 decoder is shown in Fig. 3.16 and Fig. 3.17 respectively. Table
3.3 shows one of the configurations for designing 1-bit full adder and the generated analog
voltages. Table 3.4 shows the configuration for the design of 3-to-8 decoder where Vc and C
has been kept constant.

Table 3.4: Design of 3 × 8 decoder using chaotic oscillator (Vc = 710 mV and C = (011001)2
= 25).
Configuration
Input (a1 , a2 , a3 )

Decoder Output

0.0587(000)

Vth (V )

n

d1

1.1875

11

0.2090(001)

d2

0.9150

19

0.3593(010)

d3

0.5150

3

0.5096(011)

d4

1.14

7

0.6599(100)

d5

1.1675

2

0.8102(101)

d6

0.7475

9

0.9605(110)

d7

0.4975

6

1.1108(111)

d8

1.18

4
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Chapter 4
Expansion of Functionality Space
Using Three Transistor Chaotic Map
**Portions of this chapter were published in:
[150] Aysha S. Shanta, Md Badruddoja Majumder, Md Sakib Hasan, Mesbah Uddin, and
Garrett S. Rose. “Design of a reconfigurable chaos gate with enhanced functionality space in
65nm cmos.” In 2018 IEEE 61st International Midwest Symposium on Circuits and Systems
(MWSCAS), pp. 1016-1019. IEEE, 2018.

4.1

Introduction

Despite its tremendous success, binary computers fail to meet the needs of today’s
requirements and specifications. A binary computer contains arrays of transistors which
acts as switches. In 1965, Gordon Moore predicted that the density of transistors in a
chip will double every two years [102]. The growth in the transistor count ensured that
computer hardware is able to meet the needs of the trending applications. Nowadays, it is
becoming increasingly difficult to increase the density of transistors as Moore’s law predicted.
Moreover, with increasing density of transistors in a chip, heat production and sink and power
consumption are becoming huge challenges. Mobile applications and embedded systems are
examples of applications that require low power consumption. Researchers have invented

45

new ways to improve the performance of computing systems without increasing the number
of transistors. One such alternative was to increase the amount of computation performed by
devices without adding more hardware [81]. Multi-valued digital circuits have been developed
to increase bit-handling capacity of each device [138].
Instead of studying transistors as binary switches, the nonlinear dynamics in the
transistor circuits and their ability to perform intrinsic computation should be analyzed.
Dynamics of a circuit can be defined as mapping initial states to future states. A nonlinear
circuit can have complex dynamics and contain many different functions. Each different
function generated means that the mapping of initial state to future state is different. It
is seen that the intrinsic functions present in a nonlinear system is able to generate many
logic functions using the same circuit. The data and the control bits are combined to make
the initial conditions of the system and finally the final state is converted to a binary value
using a comparator.
In [85], it has been shown that a simple nonlinear circuit contains an infinite number
of functions. The number of logic functions that a chaotic circuit can implement increases
exponentially with time. All the functions generated from the circuit are not accessible due
to issues such as noise and instability of the functions. The chaos-based computing system
opens up options for designing extremely low-power circuits that are capable of performing
multiple functions using the same system. The nonlinear dynamical system can be seen as
a reconfigurable computing system where different functions can be selected by changing
parameters in the circuit topology. The simplest way of selecting a new function is changing
the initial condition of the dynamical system which is made up of data and control bits.
Data bits are the logic inputs that is applied to the chaos-based logic gate and control bit
alters the internal mapping of the system to select a logic function. The output of the map
is fed to a threshold circuit which generates a 1-bit digital output.

4.2

Expansion of Design Space

A conventional CMOS logic gate requires less number of transistors compared to reconfigurable chaos-based logic gate. One possible way to compensate for this lacking is to make
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sure that the functionality space of the chaos-based gate is huge. This work proposes to
increase the design space by varying the threshold voltage of the comparator and using a
new bias voltage in each iteration. The total number of functions generated exponentially
increases compared to previous work found in literature which only demonstrates linear
growth. The number of individual functions such as OR, XOR and AND also increases with
the increase in design space.
The characteristics of the chaotic map and oscillator are discussed in sections 3.1 and
3.2 respectively. The characteristic of the map circuit can be changed by changing the bias
voltage, Vc as shown in Fig. 3.2. Fig. 3.4 represents the chaotic oscillator where clocks φ2
and φ2 , are two non-overlapping clocks to control the feedback in the loop containing the
two map circuits. Clock φ1 initializes the system to an initial condition and the map starts
iterating. When the map is in the long period regime or in chaotic region, at each iteration
a new set of outputs are produced and the generated sequence has a long period. Iteration
number is another method to tune the circuit to implement different logic functions. Since
there are two maps in the chaotic oscillator, two bias voltages can be applied to generate
different logic functions. Although, in this work, only one bias voltage has been used by
shorting the bias voltages together.

4.2.1

Comparison of Area and Power Overhead

This work has been simulated in 65 nm CMOS process [150]. The supply voltage used in this
technology node is 1.2 V . The chaotic oscillator has smaller area and power consumption
compared to previous work found in literature. The previously designed chaotic oscillator
was designed in 0.6 µm process and used a supply voltage of 5 V . The capacitors for sampleand-hold circuits are implemented using the internal capacitance of the map circuits. The
absence of capacitors in the design leads to huge saving in the chip area.
The total power consumption of the chaotic oscillator in this work is 18.4 µW whereas
the power consumption in the 5 V process was 7.85 mW . The consumption in the 5 V is
higher since huge amount of current flows from VDD to ground as the applied input voltage
increases. The consumed area of the proposed design is only 0.556 µm2 whereas the area
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Table 4.1: Overhead comparison of proposed work with previous work [150].
Technology
Supply Voltage
Area
Power

Previous Work [80]
This Work
0.6 µm
65 nm
5V
1.2 V
32 × 19 µm
0.556 µm2
7.85 mW (experimental) 18.4 µW (simulated)
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Figure 4.1: Transient response of the chaotic oscillator displaying that Vc is changed cycle
to cycle [150].
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in 0.6 µm process was 32 × 19 µm. The calculation of the area does not include the pass
transistors. Table 4.1 shows the comparison between the two designs.

4.2.2

Design Space Enhancement

It has been seen in literature that simple nonlinear dynamical systems are able to generate
infinite number of functionalities [85]. The term “functionality” does not only represent
particular logic functions but also considers multiple ways of achieving the functions. All
the functions generated by a dynamical system might not be usable due to instability of the
outputs or presence of noise. Kia et al. implemented the three transistor chaotic map to
produce a large functionality space where the authors mapped the control inputs and the
digital inputs using a digital-to-analog converter (DAC) (shown in Fig. 3.13) and converted
the analog output of the chaotic oscillator into digital output by using a comparator (shown
in Fig. 3.14). The output of the oscillator is compared to a threshold voltage in order to
compute the digital value using equation 3.5.
Kia et al. increased the functionality space by using 4 data inputs along with 16 control
bits. Different digital output can be obtained in different iterations since the output might
change from the previous one. Let c be the control input, n be the number of iterations and
b represent the bias voltage (Vc ). In previous work, the threshold voltage has been fixed to
2.5 V . The equation for representing the functionality space from [85] is as follows:

f (n) = b × 2c × n.

(4.1)

From equation 4.1, it can be seen that the functionality space increases linearly with the
increase in number of iterations, n. The space is limited by the number of control bits used
in the DAC and the number of bias voltage levels for a fixed number of iterations. Moreover,
the bifurcation diagram in Fig. 3.8 shows that not all bias voltages lead to chaotic behavior.
The number of possible bias voltages that can be used to increase the design space is limited.
The size of the DAC used in the design depends on the number of input and control bits.
Although, there is a limitation on the achievable resolution of the DAC due to signal to noise
ratio (SNR). This issue poses a limitation on the number of control bits, c that can be used
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in the design. The only option left is to have more number of iterations in the design for an
optimal choice of values of b and c. As shown by equation 4.1, the increase in n only has
a linear effect on the increase of functionality space. This means that the iteration number
has to be huge in order to gain larger design space.
In this work, new techniques have been implemented to increase the design space
exponentially. The bias voltage is randomly varied cycle to cycle in order to increase the
functionality space with increasing iteration number, instead of using a fixed bias voltage.
In this design, both the map circuits are connected to the same bias voltage, Vc . However,
applying different bias voltage might increase the design space significantly. We have chosen
three bias voltages in this design by partitioning 1.2 V into eight partitions. Three bias
voltages out of eight have displayed more chaotic behavior than others. The values of the
bias voltages used are: 525 mV , 675 mV and 825 mV .
Multiple threshold voltages are applied to the comparator to extract the digital output
from the system instead of using a fixed threshold voltage. Four threshold voltage values
have been chosen to expand the functionality space which are: 150 mV , 450 mV , 750 mV
and 1.05 V . The four analog voltages chosen to represent the inputs, (0, 0), (0, 1), (1, 0) and
(1, 1) are 150 mV , 450 mV , 750 mV and 1.05 V respectively.
The transient response of the chaotic oscillator with varying bias voltage is shown in Fig.
4.1. Whenever clk1 is high, a new analog input, Vin is applied to the chaotic oscillator. When
clk1 is low, clk runs through different iterations to generate the analog output voltages.
As can be seen in the figure, Vc changes randomly in each cycle and the final output, Y
demonstrates a chaotic behavior.
The equation for representing the functionality space of the proposed design is as follows:

f (n) = bn × NVth × n.

(4.2)

where b is the number of bias voltage levels, NVth is the number of threshold voltage levels
and n is the number of iterations.
Fig. 4.2 displays the entire functionality space with increasing number of iterations in
the proposed and existing work ([85]). The increase in functionality space with respect to
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Figure 4.2: Comparison between the functionality space of the proposed work with existing
work for varying number of iterations [150].
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Figure 4.3: Number of individual functions increases linearly with the total functionality
space [150].
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iteration number is linear for the existing work and represented by the blue curve. On the
other hand, the increase in functionality space of the proposed system is exponential and
represented by red curve. It can be seen that the functionality space for the first six iterations
is higher in existing work. After the 6th iteration, the proposed work picks up and in the 8th
iteration, the functionality space has reached almost three times the existing work.
It is important to ensure that the individual functions also increase with the increase
in functionality space. In Fig. 4.3, it can be seen that the individual functions, AND, OR
and XOR increases with the enhanced design space. This result ensures that the individual
functions grow linearly with the increase in iteration number. In order to generate Fig. 4.3,
SKILL file has been written where the circuit output has been probed in total of 2000 times
for four inputs representing (0,0), (0,1), (1,0) and (1,1). Each input has 10 iterations each.
New sequence of Vc has been applied 500 times and a total of 2000 (= 500 × 4) sequences
are generated. The file is imported into Matlab where four different threshold voltages are
applied at least 20 times after the sequence is varied and the average result of the total
functions is plotted.

4.3

Application

Security is an important design consideration in modern digital systems. Side channel
attack is an attack mounted on a system where the attacker collects information about
the power profile of several instructions and tries to learn the content of the processor data.
Researchers have proposed several strategies to mitigate against side channel attack. Chaosbased systems can help to mitigate power analysis based side channel attack due to the
enhanced design space. Chaotic computations generates a random power signature which is
difficult to decipher by the attacker.
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Chapter 5
Four Gate Transistor Negative
Differential Resistance (NDR) Based
Discrete-Time Chaotic Map
5.1

Background

It is becoming very difficult to integrate more transistors on a chip as technology scaling has
slowed down in the past decade. Researchers have dived into producing new solutions to
achieve higher performance without increasing the transistor count. One possible solution
is to develop a system or a device that can perform multiple computations [86]. G4 FET
is a silicon-on-insulator (SOI) four gate device that has been utilized in various digital and
analog applications since it requires less number of transistors [8]. SOI technology mitigates
a lot of issues associated with bulk silicon scaling. The advantages of using SOI technology
are reduced parasitic capacitance, increased switching speed, ideal device isolation, resolved
latch-up issue, excellent sub-threshold slope and reduced leakage current [65].
Some of the traditional chaotic maps are logistic map, tent map and sine map. These
maps incur a lot of hardware overhead since they are represented by ideal mathematical
equations. This is why researchers have dived into discovering new transistor level maps
with good chaotic behavior. A large functionality space is available from the transistor level
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chaotic maps and these functions can be leveraged in the field of hardware security. Most of
the chaotic maps in literature which require less hardware can only provide one bifurcation
parameter. The functionality space is mainly extended by increasing the iteration number
which was seen in section 4.2.2. However, there is a limitation on how much the iteration
number can be increased. As the number of iterations increase, the reliability of the system
reduces and it becomes more susceptible to noise. It has become essential to develop a
discrete-time chaotic map with simple hardware whose functionality space can be increased
by utilizing the various control knobs in the designed system. In this work, a G4 NDR based
chaotic map is proposed whose transfer characteristics is similar to that of logistic map. The
map demonstrates excellent chaotic property and has wider chaotic region in the bifurcation
diagram compared to the three-transistor map used in previous chapters 3 and 4.

5.2

Four Terminal Transistor (G4FET)

G4 FET is a multiple terminal SOI device which is used in applications where less transistors
are required. The designed circuits are able to produce more functionality [23, 9, 8]. The
device can be fabricated in partially/fully depleted SOI process. The channel conductance
can be altered using four terminal gates that can be independently biased [47]. A traditional
inversion-mode p-channel SOI MOSFET with two body terminals on the opposite sides of
the channel can be used to construct an accumulation/depletion mode n-channel G4 FET.
The symbol and structure of the n-channel G4 FET is shown in Fig. 5.1. The cross-section
of the G4 FET device displaying all the four terminals is shown in Fig. 5.2. The junction
gates of G4 FET are formed from the p+ doped source and drain of the traditional MOSFET.
The channel width can be controlled using the two lateral gates whose functionality is similar
to JFET gates. The channel width can be decreased by reverse-biasing the junction gates.
The top gate (T G) is similar to the conventional accumulation-mode MOSFET gate. The
substrate or bottom gate (BG) imitates a fourth MOS gate and can be biased using the
bottom gate terminal due to the presence of buried oxide. The vertical gates are used to
change the accumulation/inversion/depletion of free carriers in the silicon epi layer near the
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(a)

(b)

Figure 5.1: Four gate transistor (G4 FET) (a) Structure (b) Symbol [7].

Figure 5.2: Cross-section of the G4 FET device [64].

Figure 5.3: Traditional 2-terminal JFET NDR [163].
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top/bottom oxide interfaces [62]. The body contacts are highly doped to make ohmic contact
with the channel.
The function of G4 FET is controlled by two JFET gates and two MOSFET gates that
can be biased independently. The conductive path in original MOSFET relates to the gate
length whereas the JFET channel length is altered by adjusting the width of the MOSFET.
In G4 FET, the gate length is the width of the original MOSFET and gate width is defined by
MOSFET’s gate length. The drain current comprises of majority carriers flowing from one
body contact to the other (here, the body contacts of the MOSFET are used as drain and
source) and it is inversely proportional to the length of the G4 FET. The current in G4 FET
flows in perpendicular direction to that of an inversion-mode MOSFET. G4 FET combines
both MOS and JFET characteristics by allowing both surface and volume conduction. The
top and bottom gates work like MOSFET while the lateral gates work as JFET. The
threshold voltage of the vertical gates are influenced by the lateral gates. There are three
conduction paths in G4 FET. They are:
1. Top surface conduction near gate-oxide interface.
2. Bottom surface conduction near buried-oxide interface.
3. Volume conduction away from vertical oxide interfaces.
G4 FETs provide the flexibility to design multiple input systems with reduced transistor
count in comparison to its CMOS counterparts. CMOS technology scaling should enhance
the performance of the G4 FET transistor as MOS gate length shrinks. This means that the
channel will be easier to pinch-off if body doping is optimized [23]. Moreover, it does not
require special fabrication steps to manufacture the device.

5.2.1

G4 FET Operation

The G4 FET works as an accumulation mode MOSFET and it has two junction gates on
opposite sides of the channel. The junction gates act as JFETs by altering the potential
distribution within the body by utilizing the induced lateral depletion regions. In a partiallydepleted body, if the amount of reverse-bias voltage (|VJG |) applied to the junction gates
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is high, it can switch the transistor operation from normally-on to normally-off. If |VJG | is
increased further, it can modulate the threshold voltage associated with T G.
When VJG = 0 V , the transistor is normally-on because the electron concentration
(depends on the doping level) in the body enables conduction of carriers. As VJG is decreased
from 0 V to a negative value, e.g. −1.5 V , depletion region in the junction gates increase
in width and start suppressing the flow of carriers in the body which in turn reduces the
current. If VJG = −2 V , the G4 FET becomes normally-off. At this point, the body is fullydepleted and the drain current depends only on the electrons accumulated at the front gate
which is controlled by the voltage, VT G . If VJG < −2 V , the body potential reduces and
charge coupling occurs between front gate and junction gates making it harder to accumulate
electrons at the front-interface. This phenomenon results in an increase in threshold voltage.
In an n- channel G4 FET, when the top gate is biased negatively relating to a maximum
depth of the depletion region, the conductive channel shrinks and repelled towards the back
gate. The front interface is depleted of carriers and the conductive path reduces gradually.
At a certain point, the path vanishes and the device turns off completely.
When the back-gate is in strong accumulation-mode, the device will not be turned-off
even when large negative voltages are applied at the junction gates and the front gate.
However, the lateral gates and the top gate have control on the current level. The G4 FET
can be used in this mode for high current applications. When negative voltage is applied
to back-gate, the back interface is depleted of carriers and the channel thickness decreases.
The device can be easily turned off even when moderate values of voltages are applied to
the lateral gates and top gate [34]. When the back interface and lateral gates are depleted,
the conductive path will not be able to cover the whole body of the transistor, even if the
top gate is accumulated.
In a partially depleted SOI MOSFET, it is not possible for the vertical gates to achieve
full depletion. The current can only be switched off by adding the lateral junctions and
keeping the body narrow in a G4 FET. The coupling of depletion and vertical regions allow
for full depletion even before the lateral or vertical depletion regions merge.
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(a)

(b)

Figure 5.4: Tunable NDR made with n- channel and p- channel G4 FETs (a) Circuit (b)
Symbol [9].
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Figure 5.5: Transfer characteristics of G4 NDR.
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5.3

G4FET Based Negative Differential Resistance

Resistance is always present in electronic devices. The resistance of materials change with
varying temperatures. Most materials obey Ohm’s law at ambient temperature but some
tend to show a negative resistance. Ohms’s law states that in order to determine the
resistance of a component, voltage should be applied across it and current is measured
flowing through it. The resistance equals to the voltage divided by the current as shown in
the following equation:

R = V /I.

(5.1)

Many objects have a constant resistance and the current tends to display a linear
relationship with changes in the applied voltage. The linear relationship holds true only
if the temperature is kept constant. If the temperature is varied slightly, obtained resistance
values will be different. All the devices do not seem to portray a linear relationship. For
example, a diode made with silicon dioxide has very high resistance for applied voltages
below 700 mV . It is possible for devices to demonstrate different values of resistance as the
applied voltage is altered. The Ohm’s law holds true for these cases because the resistance is
measured with constant circuit parameters. This is an example of static resistance because
the voltage is kept constant while current is measured [42].
Dynamic resistance refers to a resistance that is measured due to changes in circuit
parameters. Therefore, dynamic resistance is defined as the change in voltage divided by
the resulting change in current. In a resistor, the dynamic resistance and static resistance
are equal but in a diode the dynamic resistance is a function of the applied voltage. Most of
the devices have positive dynamic resistance but there are devices which display a negative
dynamic resistance. Negative dynamic resistance happens when the current starts decreasing
with increase in the applied voltage although the measured static resistance will be positive
for a given voltage.
Tunnel diode might be the only device whose physical characteristics display negative
resistance due to its physical mechanism.

The traditional lambda diode consists of

complementary JFETs and it exhibits a region with negative differential resistance [163]. The
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(a)

(b)

Figure 5.6: G4 NDR based discrete-time chaotic map which has three bifurcation parameters
(a) Circuit (b) Symbol.
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Figure 5.7: Transfer curve of the G4 NDR map circuit for varying µ1 .
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peak currents and peak voltages are dependent on the pinch-off voltage and transconductance
of the transistors. The current in lambda diode approaches zero as voltage increases until
it reaches a breakdown point of the FET. At this point, the current starts increasing again.
The conventional two-terminal NDR is shown in Fig. 5.3. The n- channel JFET is fabricated
using two types of diffusion, n+ diffusion for the source and drain contacts and p diffusion for
the gate contact. Similarly, the p-channel JFET has n+ diffusion for the gate and back-gate
contact while the p diffusion forms the source and drain contacts.
A voltage-controlled negative differential resistance (VC-NDR) circuit using n-channel
and p-channel G4 FETs was first proposed in [9]. G4 NDR has been developed using the same
idea but the JFETs are replaced with complementary G4 FETs. The circuit and symbol
of G4 NDR is shown in Fig. 5.4. The resulting current changes with applied voltage is
shown in Fig. 5.5. The junction gates of the G4 FETs are tied together and act as a single
gate in the NDR. The back-gate is connected to ground and not shown for simplicity. The
resulting G4 NDR is a four-terminal device which is made up of the top gates and the tied
junction gates. The top gate voltages are denoted by VN and VP respectively. In G4 NDR,
the transconductance and pinch-off voltage vary with the applied voltage on the MOS front
gates. This is why G4 NDR properties can be tuned using both VN and VP . If VP increases,
the peak current and valley voltage of the G4 NDR decreases since the pinch-off voltage of
the G4 FET is reduced. VN controls the conductance of n- channel G4 FET and modulates
the peak current since the front gate oxide interface changes from accumulation to depletion.
The sizes used for G4 FETs are p- channel: 0.35 µm/1.2 µm and n- channel: 0.35 µm/3.4
µm. All the simulations have been performed using the MOS-JFET macromodel in [65].

5.4

G4NDR Based Chaotic Map

A novel chaotic map has been designed by implementing a voltage-controlled negative
differential resistance (VC-NDR) circuit consisting of two G4FETs and a transimpedance
amplifier which converts the generated current to voltage using a variable gain, R. The
transfer characteristics of the G4 NDR map is very similar to the behavior of logistic map. The
map circuit and symbol are shown in Fig. 5.6. G4 NDR map is better than traditional chaotic
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maps such as tent map, sine map or logistic map. Traditional maps require high overhead
to implement the idealized mathematical equations in hardware. Moreover, G4 NDR map
has three independent bifurcation parameters (µ1 , µ2 , µ3 ) instead of one parameter provided
by the conventional maps and the three transistor map. The proposed chaotic map shows
excellent chaotic property and the bifurcation diagram shows wider chaotic regions. Fig.
5.7 shows the transfer characteristics of the proposed map where µ1 is varied from 0.2 M Ω
to 1 M Ω and µ2 and µ3 are fixed at 0 V . The differentiable unimodal characteristic of the
transfer curve is ideal for chaotic operation.

5.4.1

Design of Chaotic Oscillator Using G4 NDR Based Map

Fig. 5.8 shows the chaotic oscillator with sample-and-hold circuits and a buffer in the
feedback whereas the oscillator in Fig. 5.9 utilizes another G4 NDR map in the feedback
path. When the chaotic oscillator is in chaotic region, it is capable of generating a new
analog voltage in every iteration. The oscillator in Fig. 5.8 works by applying an initial
input through clock, φ1 . After application of the initial value, φ1 is disabled and clocks,
φ2 and φ3 are used to apply the generated output of the G4 NDR map to the input of the
forward path map. Only one output can be sampled in each iteration. The oscillator in Fig.
5.9 works in a similar way but the second map in the feedback path is able to generate a
new chaotic value which can be sampled as well.

5.4.2

Bifurcation Diagram and Lyapunov Exponent

The importance of bifurcation diagrams and Lyapunov exponent in chaotic systems has been
discussed in detail in section 3.2. As mentioned earlier, the G4 NDR chaotic map has three
bifurcation parameters, µ1 , µ2 and µ3 . The bifurcation diagrams for the three parameters
are shown in Fig. 5.10a, 5.11a and 5.12a. In Fig. 5.10a, the bifurcation diagram has been
simulated for changing µ1 . The first 1000 iterations are ignored because the values are in
transient state. The three bifurcation diagrams clearly demonstrate the periodic and chaotic
regions. The corresponding Lyapunov exponent diagrams are shown in Fig. 5.10b, 5.11b
and 5.12b. It can be seen from the figures that the Lyapunov exponent has a positive value
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whenever the chaotic oscillator is in chaotic region. Lyapunov exponent demonstrates zero
or negative value for periodic regions.

5.5

Design of Logic Gates Using G4NDR Based Map

Previously in section 4.2.2, the design space has been increased by varying the bifurcation
parameter in each iteration and changing the threshold voltage of the comparator. The
procedure to design reconfigurable chaos-based logic gates has been discussed in section
3.3.2. The schematic for the design of chaos-based gate is shown in Fig. 5.13 where the DAC
is used to convert the digital input to analog voltage which is the initial seed (x0 ) for the
chaotic oscillator. A control bit, Cb is used to change the initial value of the seed slightly in
order to generate a different chaotic sequence. Data, Ib is the digital input applied to the
logic gate. At each iteration, the analog voltage from the chaotic oscillator is converted to a
digital output by using a comparator with threshold voltage, Vth .
This work focuses on designing a 2-bit chaos-based logic gate with 1-bit control.
Therefore, a 3-bit DAC is needed to convert the initial digital voltage to an analog value.
The chaos-based logic gates are reconfigurable and are capable of implementing all the 16
functions. The functions are numbered in decimal starting from 0 (0000) to 15 (111). Table
5.1 demonstrates the evolution of analog voltages from the chaotic oscillator with changing
iteration number. The values of the tuning parameters are µ1 = 0.95 M Ω, µ2 = 0 V , µ3 = 0
V , Vth = 1.25 V and Cb = 0. The table shows that the functions vary with each iteration. For
example, when iteration number , n = 4, the generated function is NAND and the decimal
value is 14 (1110). Multiple configurations are possible in order to obtain the logic functions
from the chaotic oscillator. Three different configuration for six different functions (AND,
OR, XOR, NAND, NOR and XNOR) are shown in Table 5.2.

5.6

Expansion of Design Space Using G4NDR Map

The benefits of expanding the design space has already been discussed in chapter 4.
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Figure 5.8: G4 NDR based chaotic oscillator using buffer in the feedback.

Figure 5.9: G4 NDR based chaotic oscillator using another G4 NDR map in the feedback.
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(a)

(b)

Figure 5.10: (a) Bifurcation diagram and (b) Lyapunov exponent of the chaotic oscillator
for varying µ1 ; µ2 = 0 V , µ3 = 0 V .
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(a)

(b)

Figure 5.11: (a) Bifurcation diagram and (b) Lyapunov exponent of the chaotic oscillator
for varying µ2 ; µ1 = 1 M Ω, µ3 = 0 V .
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(a)

(b)

Figure 5.12: (a) Bifurcation diagram and (b) Lyapunov exponent of the chaotic oscillator
for varying µ3 ; µ1 = 1 M Ω, µ2 = 0 V .

Figure 5.13: G4 NDR based reconfigurable logic gate.
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In [80], the parameters that are changed to enhance the design space are control bit,
c, number of iterations, n and bifurcation parameter, µ. Let Nµ be the available number
of voltage levels in the bifurcation diagram where the system is chaotic. The functionality
space, F1 (n) in [80] can be expressed as:
F1 (n) = n × 2c × Nµ .

(5.2)

In [150], control bit is not used but the threshold voltage is varied. The functionality
space was extended by varying the bifurcation parameter in each iteration. Let Nvth be the
number of threshold voltage levels. The functionality space, F2 (n) in [150] can be expressed
as:

F2 (n) = n × Nvth × Nµn .

(5.3)

The three transistor chaotic map shown in Fig. 3.1 has one bifurcation parameter. On
the other hand, the proposed G4 NDR based chaotic map has three independent bifurcation
parameters which can be leveraged to increase the functionality space. There are two types
of oscillator that utilizes G4 NDR based chaotic map. The oscillator in Fig. 5.8 has only one
chaotic map in the forward path. There are 6 tuning parameters in the design, bifurcation
parameters (µ1 , µ2 and µ3 ), control bit (c), iteration number (n) and threshold voltage (Vth ).
The bifurcation parameters are varied cycle to cycle. The functionality space, F3 (n) for the
chaotic oscillator in Fig. 5.8 can be expressed as:

F3 (n) = Nvth × 2c × Nµn1 × Nµn2 × Nµn3 × n.

(5.4)

The functionality space can be further expanded if the chaotic oscillator in Fig. 5.9 is
used which utilizes another chaotic map in the feedback path. The forward path map and the
feedback path map each has three independent bifurcation parameters. The functionality
space, F4 (n) for the chaotic oscillator in Fig. 5.9 can be expressed as:
F4 (n) = Nvth × 2c × Nµ2n1 × Nµ2n2 × Nµ2n3 × n.
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(5.5)

The functionality space for the four equations 5.2 - 5.5 is shown in Fig. 5.14. The
functionality space is significantly larger for G4 NDR based chaotic map due to the presence
of multiple bifurcation parameters. The bottom gates of the G4 FET can be utilized to
further extend the design space instead of connecting them to ground terminal. It is highly
desirable to have a large design space so that multiple reliable functions can be chosen to
implement a single logic function. This feature can be utilized to mitigate power analysis
based side channel attacks [105].

69

Table 5.1: Evolution of analog output from chaotic oscillator with different iterations (µ1 =
0.95 M Ω, µ2 = 0 V, µ3 = 0 V , Cb = 0, Vth = 1.25 V ). Functions are represented in decimal
value.
xn (V)
0.1(00)
0.757(01)
1.414(10)
2.071(11)
Func (dec)

xn+1 (V)
n=2
n=3
n=4
n=5
1.62(1) 0.63(0)
1.89(1)
0.31(0)
0.24(0) 1.02(0)
1.84(1)
0.35(0)
1.86(1) 0.34(0)
1.33(1)
1.2(0)
0.82(0) 1.98(1)
0.24(0)
1.01(0)
10
1(AN D) 14(N AN D)
0

n=1
0.46(0)
1.98(1)
1.01(0)
0.19(0)
4

Table 5.2: Three different configurations for six logic functions.
Operation

Functionality Space

AND
OR
XOR
NAND
NOR
XNOR

Configuration 1
µ1 (M Ω) µ2 (V ) µ3 (V ) Cb Vth (V )
0.97
0
0
0
1.1
0.94
0
0
1
1.2
0.95
0
0
1
0.6
0.95
0
0
0
1.4
0.93
0
0
1
1.4
0.98
0
0
1
1.6

1030
1020

Configurations
Configuration 2
n µ1 (M Ω) µ2 (V ) µ3 (V ) Cb Vth (V )
3
0.94
-0.3
0
1
1.5
7
26
0.96
-0.3
0
0
4
41
0.97
-0.3
0
0
6
61
0.95
-0.3
0
1
6
54
0.9
-0.3
0
0
3
63
0.92
-0.3
0
1

Configuration 3
n µ1 (M Ω) µ2 (V ) µ3 (V ) Cb Vth (V ) n
5
0.99
-0.3
0.3
0
1.4
7
0.7
0.99
-0.3
0.3
0
0.7
5
0.7
0.99
-0.3
0.3
0
0.7
1
0.5
0.99
-0.3
0.3
1
1.1
5
1.4
0.99
-0.3
0.3
1
1.6
7
1.4
0.99
-0.3
0.3
0
1.6
6

[1]
[2]
proposed1
proposed2

1010
100
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

Iteration number, n
Figure 5.14: Comparison of functionality space among proposed and previous works.
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Chapter 6
Pseudo-Random Number Generation
(PRNG) Using Three Transistor
Chaotic Map
**Portions of this chapter were published in:
[148] Aysha S. Shanta, Md Sakib Hasan, Md Badruddoja Majumder, and Garrett S. Rose.
“Design of a Lightweight Reconfigurable PRNG Using Three Transistor Chaotic Map.” In
2019 IEEE 62nd International Midwest Symposium on Circuits and Systems (MWSCAS),
pp. 586-589. IEEE, 2019.

6.1

Introduction

Intel incorporated a random number generator (RNG) in their motherboards, desktop
systems and chipsets. The RNG was introduced in 1999 and it was the first of Intel’s family
of primitives which was used for hardware security [79]. In order to define randomness, it is
important to get a grasp on the idea of unpredictability. The simplest idea of randomness
states that the sequence is non-deterministic, uniformly distributed and has independent bits
over an infinite length of data set. In statistical definition, it means there is no correlation
between the numbers. Random numbers find its applications in many areas such as games of
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chance, simulations, secure communication systems, diagnostics and sampling. The security
of cryptographic systems relies on the true randomness of the numbers used. Random
numbers are intrinsic to some algorithms such as Digital Signature Algorithm (DSA) or
protocols such as zero knowledge. In smart card based applications, good quality random
numbers might be required for protection against side-channel attacks [134]. Cryptographic
key exchange mechanisms and integrity mechanisms require good quality random numbers
[20]. Random numbers can also protect against traceability attacks on RFID systems [98].
Random number generators are classified into two classes:
1. True random number generator (TRNG)
2. Pseudo-random number generator (PRNG)

6.2

True Random Number Generator (TRNG)

TRNGs generate random numbers by leveraging the real physical systems that exhibit
unpredictable and uncontrollable behavior such as quantum effects, timing user process,
electronics noise, shot noise, thermal noise and radioactive decay.

TRNGs have good

statistical properties for use in cryptographic systems and prevents attack from adversaries.
TRNGs were first developed using continuous-time chaotic systems and now they are
designed using discrete-time systems [170, 119]. However, chaotic map based TRNGs are
vulnerable to process variations that are inherent in the IC fabrication. These non-ideal
effects can severely degrade the performance of the chaotic oscillator rendering it useless.
The trajectories of the chaotic oscillator can diverge after a certain number of iterations
or may converge to stable points in the orbit. Research has shown that the most compact
hardware implementation and sufficient randomness can be obtained from piece-wise linear
1D maps. Researchers have developed ways to make the design robust and proposed ideas to
mitigate unwanted effects due to process variation by improving design techniques [179, 111].
True random bit generators can also be implemented with continuous-time mathematical
models but the challenge is the bit rate is slow. In this regard, discrete-time models are
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preferred due to their inherent rich and complex behavior. Discrete-time chaotic maps can
be easily implemented in hardware using field-programmable gate arrays (FPGAs) [167].
The disadvantage of using TRNGs is that they are expensive, slow and susceptible
to external synchronization. They require complex designs and hardware is essential for
random number extraction. Moreover, the sequence from the TRNG is uncontrollable since
it is hugely vulnerable to environmental noise. Hence, the bitstream is not applicable for
applications where strong stable randomness quality is desired. These challenges motivated
researchers to develop and design pseudo-random number generators.

6.3

Pseudo-Random Number Generator (PRNG)

PRNGs require an initial seed value to start the random number generation. PRNGs are
deterministic state transitions f : x → x mapping between values in a finite state space
if a new seed value is not applied. The seed is usually selected randomly. The generated
sequence is called “pseudo-random” since the same sequence can be generated from the
PRNG if the same initial conditions are applied. The generated sequence of a PRNG is
periodic which means the sequence will repeat itself after a certain number of cycles. There
are many advantages of PRNGs, such as, easy and fast implementation, cheap and it does
not require any hardware. The numbers produced by the PRNG can be predicted if the
underlying function is not complex or if the seed is known [38]. Shannon’s entropy states
that the entropy of the output depends on the entropy of the seed [56]. In many cases, the
seed of the PRNG is generated using a TRNG.

Figure 6.1: 4-bit linear feedback shift register [151].
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PRNGs can be used for key generation, initialization vectors for encryption algorithm
and produce random sequences for cryptographic challenge-response pairs [74]. Recently,
PRNGs are implemented on FPGAs but the disadvantage is that the generated sequence
need to pass all the NIST tests by utilizing few resources and at the same time achieve a
desirable throughput of random bits.

6.3.1

Linear PRNG

Linear feedback shift registers (LFSRs) have been used for producing pseudo-random
sequences for applications in stream cipher and are suitable for high speed and low power
specifications [151]. The schematic of LFSR is shown in Fig. 6.1. The design of LFSR is
based on shift registers whose input is a linear function of the previous state and input bit
is generated by XORing some bits of the overall value of the shift register. The operation of
the registers are deterministic so the sequence generated by the register is dependent on the
current or previous state. After an initial value is applied to the LFSR, it can be clocked
to produce the bitstream. LFSRs are less expensive to implement, have low complexity,
high speed and good statistical properties [66]. However, the LFSR is easily breakable by
attackers using Berlekamp-Massey algorithm [19].

6.3.2

Nonlinear PRNG

Literature review brought into light that metastable [172], jitter [121] and chaotic systems
[50, 18, 180] can be used as entropy sources in the design of TRNG. Chaotic systems are
preferred for random number generation due to characteristics such as unpredictability,
random behavior, vulnerability to initial conditions and tuning parameters. Shanon states
that chaotic systems are relatable to cryptographic systems because they provide confusion
and diffusion properties of encryption algorithms [118].
Nonlinear PRNGs can be implemented using nonlinear recurrence equations. Nonlinear
feedback shift registers (NLFSRs) have long period and high throughput [53].

Blum’s

nonlinear generator uses modulus operation and square function in order to increase
unpredictability [24]. Other methods include digitizing a chaotic map which suffers from
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truncation error and high hardware complexity [15, 58]. There exists a trade-off between
randomness and hardware cost which depends on the desired precision in operation. If the
precision is reduced to increase the throughput of the system, the truncation would harm
the entropy of the sequence which is not desirable for security applications.
An important feature that PRNGs should possess is long cycle length, i.e. the number
of outputs after which the sequence starts to repeat itself. If the generated sequence has a
short cycle then different portions of the data might be encoded with the same key [107].
In order to alleviate this problem, researchers have proposed different techniques such as
reseeding method which masks the last 5 least significant bits at a specified time and tries to
induce noise sensitivity [90]. In [92], the period is made long by coupling linear generators
with nonlinear generators. Yang et al. introduced noise such as Gaussian and uniform
distribution to make the sequence unpredictable [181]. In [4], the period of the sequence has
been increased by utilizing nonlinear truncation.

6.4

Proposed Lightweight and Reconfigurable PRNG

Chaotic systems can be extremely useful for encryption and secure communication purposes
since it requires two properties: good statistical feature and sensitivity to initial conditions.
In encryption algorithms, the chaotic system is the main component that generates the
pseudo-random sequences. The American mathematician, Shannon who is known as the
founder of information theory stated that if a random sequence is used to generate a secret
key then a slight change in key should result in considerable change in the output value.
Nonlinear dynamical systems possess this exact quality and is thus ideal for encryption
purposes [147]. In [75], researchers have used the output of one chaotic map to control the
parameters of another chaotic map. This method improves sensitivity to initial conditions,
randomness, produces wider chaotic region and possesses more complex chaotic phenomenon.
It is important that the right kind of chaotic system is chosen for pseudo-random number
generation such as piecewise linear chaotic map [158, 159], tent map [5] and Henon map
[162]. Common chaotic maps can be used for PRNG design such as logistic map [126, 83].
Researchers have also used oscillators with frequency dependent negative resistances (FDNR)
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element to achieve a simple and fast RNG. In [145], researchers have designed a hyperchaotic
system to design PRNG. A method to generate binary sequence from real number sequence
using logistic map has been proposed by Biance [21]. In order to achieve high speed, the
chaotic map is iterated to generate the pseudo-random sequence. Chaos-based PRNGs are
generated by sampling the trajectory of the map.
There are disadvantages to the chaos-based PRNG as well. Chaotic systems are based
on dynamical systems which require s set of real numbers as input and output. The system
designed from chaos can require considerable storage space, they are usually slow and it is
possible that the chaotic properties are disturbed during the computation procedure [60].
Theoretically, chaotic states in very close proximity to each other should never overlap with
each other, but in practice due to finite precision of the computing systems, it is possible
they might coincide with each other [125]. The finite precision issue also creates a problem
when the rounding method at the sender and receiver side are different. In cryptographic
applications, it is important that the sender and receiver side have the same set of data. In
order to avoid this problem, the generators can be integrated with fixed finite precision of
N bits. For example, in [181] the precision of the system has been chosen to be 43 bits.
However, this fix can lead to problems of its own such as short cycles and degradation of
chaotic behavior [39].

6.4.1

Chaotic Oscillator for PRNG Design

In this work, two one-dimensional chaotic maps have been connected in cascade to design the
chaotic oscillator. 1-D systems are mathematical systems which evolve in time as iteration
number increases. The analog sequence generated from the chaotic oscillator is sensitive to
small changes in the initial condition which is an essential characteristic of a good PRNG. A
conventional approach of generating random sequences is using two discrete-time maps and
comparing the obtained sequences. Common chaotic maps such as logistic map are able to
produce only 1 bit per iteration but in this design since two chaotic maps are utilized, it is
possible to extract 2 bits per iteration.
The chaotic oscillator is shown in Fig. 6.2. It can be seen that two map circuits are used,
one in the forward path and the other in the feedback path. Non-overlapping clocks (clka
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and nclka ) are used to sample-and-hold the outputs of the chaotic oscillator. The initial
input, also known as the seed, is applied when clkinit is high. The first sampled output is
out1 . Out1 reaches the input of the map circuit in the feedback path when clka is high. The
feedback map circuit produces an output called out2 . Out2 is the second sampled output
from the circuit and when nclka becomes high out2 becomes the input of the map circuit in
the forward path. This cycle continues until the required amount of data is generated.
There are multiple tunable voltages in the proposed system such as input seed, Vin and
two bias voltages Vc1 and Vc2 . The bias voltages can be tied together or different voltages
can be applied in order to generate new sequences. The proposed system is reconfigurable
because slight change in bias voltage produces a brand new sequence. In order to ensure
that the design produces pseudo-random sequences, the bias voltage should be chosen from
the chaotic region. The chaotic region can be estimated from the bifurcation diagram and
Lyapunov exponent from Fig. 3.8 and Fig. 3.9 respectively. In this work, a single bias
voltage, Vc is used where the Lyapunov exponent has the most positive value i.e. 592.5 mV .
The proposed pseudo-random number generator is shown in Fig. 6.3. The sequence
generated from a single chaotic oscillator is not random enough to pass all the NIST tests.
In order to generate good pseudo-random sequence, two chaotic oscillators, COA and COB
are used. COA produces 2 million analog values and COB produces 1 million values. In
Fig. 6.3, clk1 has double the frequency of clk2 so that Sel pin of the analog MUX (same
frequency as clk1 ) can choose the output of the chaotic oscillator to transfer to the input of
the analog-to-digital converter (ADC). The proposed scheme uses a single ADC in order to
reduce area and power overhead.
Every other analog value is sampled from oscillator, COA starting at the 2nd position
until 1 million data is sampled. The first 1 million values are sampled from COB . The ADC
converts the analog voltages from the oscillators into digital values and stores only the 10th
bit in the 2-bit shift register (SR). The 10th bit from the ADC is used to create the random
sequence because it provides the highest entropy. When two values are available in the shift
register, the values are XORed to enhance the randomness of the sequence and the final
sequence from the output pin is saved.
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Figure 6.2: Chaotic oscillator. The dotted lines represent the chaotic map [148].

Figure 6.3: Proposed pseudo-random number generator [148].
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An analog seed is applied to the proposed PRNG where inA = inB . The seed is chosen
from the output span of the oscillators. In this case, the range is from 310 mV to 1.194
V . The same bias voltage has been used for both chaotic oscillators, i.e. Vc1 = Vc2 = 592.5
mV . The value of Vc has been chosen using the help of bifurcation diagram and Lyapunov
exponent. After the sequences are generated, correlation and NIST tests are performed on
the sequences to validate their quality and usage in security applications.

6.4.2

Correlation Coefficient

Correlation coefficient measures the statistical relationship and dependence between two or
more random sets of data [176]. If two data sets, x and y are considered, the equations for
the correlation coefficient is as follows:

cov(x, y) = E{(x − E(x))(y − E(y))}

rxy = p

cov(x, y)
p
D(x) (D(y)

M
1 X
E(x) =
xi
M i=1

D(x) =

M
1 X
(xi − E(x))2
M i=1

(6.1)

(6.2)

(6.3)

(6.4)

In order to test the correlation coefficient of the data generated from the proposed PRNG,
10 sequences of length 10100 were generated. The first 100 data has been ignored to avoid
transient response. 10 sequences can be combined in 45 ways if sets of 2 are formed. The
seed has been changed to generate a new sequence. The seed values start from 350 mV to
800 mV with increments of 50 mV . Ideally, the correlation coefficient of two random data
sets will be zero. Fig. 6.4 shows the distribution of correlation coefficient of the generated
sequences. It can be seen from the figure that all the coefficients are either 0 or close to 0.
It indicates that the PRNG has good correlation features.
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Figure 6.5: Seed sensitivity of the PRNG for slight changes in the seed.
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6.4.3

Seed Sensitivity

Seed sensitivity is essential in the design of PRNG because a tiny difference in the seed should
cause the output to change significantly. In order to test the sensitivity, four different seeds
are applied to the PRNG with very close values, 0.35 V , 0.350001 V , 0.35001 V and 0.3501
V . Fig. 6.5 shows the seed sensitivity of the proposed PRNG for the first 15 iterations. It
can be seen that the sequences start deviating within the first few iterations.
The correlation coefficient has also been calculated comparing the slightly changed seeds
with the original seed. 10000 iterations have been considered in order to calculate the
correlation coefficient. Table 6.1 shows the correlation coefficient of the three cases and as
expected all the values are close to zero. Thus, the proposed PRNG has high seed sensitivity.
In some cases, the sequence generated from the map does not possess enough randomness
and unpredictability to be used in cryptographic applications. Post-processing of data might
be required such as bit counting redundancy reduction technique [36].

6.4.4

National Institute of Standards and Technology Tests

National Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST) tests measure the contingency of the
PRNG sequence obtained from the generator. Each test in the suite measures the statistics of
the features that the generated sequences possess. High value of statistics means an absence
of contingency in the sequence. The test result is positive when the calculated probability of
the obtained statistics is compared with the statistical significance value, α which is usually
equal to 0.01. If the value of the probability is greater than 0.01, then the sequence passes
the test. The sequence that has at least one negative test result is not random. If the
p-value of a sequence is 1, then the sequence is perfectly random and p-value of 0 indicates
that the sequence is not random. There are 15 tests in the NIST 800.22 test suite to test the
randomness of sequence for applications in cryptography. The minimum pass rate for each
test is in the tolerance range calculated by equation 6.5.
p
T olerance = (1 − α) ± 3 α(1 − α)/T .
where T = number of sequences to be tested.
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(6.5)

Table 6.1: Correlation coefficient between the original sequence and the three cases.
Case 1 Case 2 Case 3
Correlation coefficient

0.0043

0.0040

0.0169

The sequence of values that do not pass the tests are not suitable for security applications
since the lack of certain statistical properties might help the attacker to predict future values
of the sequence. However, algorithms that do pass the tests does not necessarily provide
enhanced security features for use in cryptographic algorithms. NIST tests help in designing
new PRNGs, identifying weak binary sequences, studying standard PRNGs, verifying that
the PRNG has been implemented properly and analyzing the degree of unpredictability of
the current PRNGs.
All the tests in the NIST suite [1] are described briefly.
1. Frequency Monobit Test: This test measures whether the proportion of ones and
zeroes is the same in the generated sequence. The test calculates if the number of ones
is close to 0.5.
2. Frequency Test within a Block:

This test measures whether the frequency of

ones in an M -bit block is M/2. The default value of M is 128.
3. Cumulative Sums Test: This test calculates the partial sum of the sequence under
test and compares it to the expected cumulative sum of a random sequence.
4. Runs Test:

Runs test determines the total number of runs of identical bits where

run means an uninterrupted sequence. A run of length, n means that the sequence has
n identical bit bounded by different bits before and after. Basically, this test calculates
whether the switching between zeros and ones are too slow or too fast.
5. Serial Test:

The purpose of the test is to find out all possible overlapping m-bit

patterns in the overall bit stream. Random sequences are uniform in manner so every
m-bit pattern has the same chance of occurring as every other m-bit pattern.
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6. Rank Test: Rank test looks for linear dependence among fixed length strings of the
sequence under test.
7. DFT Test: DFT test can indicate if there are periodic features i.e. repetitive patterns
in the sequence.
8. Longest Run of Ones Test:

This test checks if the longest run of ones of the

generated sequence is similar to a random sequence.
9. Non-overlapping Template Matching Test:

This test finds the number of

occurrences of non-periodic patterns and fails the test if the sequence has too many of
these patterns.
10. Overlapping Template Matching Test: This test fails those sequences that lack
the expected number of runs of ones of a given length.
11. Maurer’s Universal Statistical Test:

This test measures whether the sequence

can be reduced in size significantly without losing valuable information.
12. Approximate Entropy Test:

This test compares the number of occurrences of

overlapping blocks in two adjacent lengths with the expected result of a random
sequence. The default length of each chunk of data is 10 bits.
13. Random Excursions Test: This test calculates the number of visits to a particular
state in a random walk and checks if it exceeds the expected value.
14. Random Excursions Variant Test:

This test checks if there are deviations from

the expected number of occurrences of different states in the random walk.
15. Linear Complexity Test: This test determines if the generated sequence is complex
enough to be considered random. The complexity is measured by using BerlekampMassey algorithm.
In this work, the generated pseudo-random sequence passes 15 out of 15 NIST tests. 100
1 million sequences have been generated in order to validate the NIST tests. 100 different
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sequences have been generated using 100 different initial seeds. Table 6.2 shows the results
of the NIST tests. Asterisk(*) means that average of multiple results are shown.

6.5

Overhead Analysis

PRNGs have been designed based on popular chaotic maps such as logistic map, tent map and
piecewise linear map. CMOS implementations of these maps can have huge area overhead.
In many cases, in order to reduce area consumption only one value of bifurcation parameter
is chosen in the chaotic map. The proposed design retains all the control parameters which
makes the design reconfigurable and helps to generate new sequences. Different bias voltage
combination in the chaotic oscillators can generate more sequences. The body bias voltage
of the transistors can also be used as an added control parameter.
The generated pseudo-random sequences need to pass the NIST test so that it can be
used in security applications. There are multiple post-processing schemes discussed in the
literature but they add more complexity to the design. Post-processing schemes can add to
the delay of the system on top of being area and power hungry. This work proposes a simple
post-processing technique for the generated data. After the analog data is generated from
the two chaotic oscillators, the analog MUX selects which data gets to reach the input of
the ADC for digital conversion. The least significant bit (LSB) of the digital data is stored
in a two-bit shift register and XORing is carried out on the stored bits. This technique adds
very little power and area overhead.
The PRNG has been designed in 65 nm CMOS process with a supply voltage of 1.2
V . The area of the chaotic oscillator is 0.556 µm2 . A low area and power consuming SAR
ADC can be used for digital conversion [101]. The ADC only consumes 0.132 mm2 of area
and 1.6 mW of power. The overhead of the entire system including the chaotic oscillators,
analog MUX, 10-bit ADC and 2-bit shift register is approximately 0.132 mm2 and the power
consumption is 2.12 mW . Table 6.3 demonstrates that the proposed system consumes less
area and power compared to prior work.
The throughput of the chaotic oscillator is 330 M S/s but the throughput of the ADC is
only 100 M S/s. The throughput of the entire system is limited by the ADC’s throughput.
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Table 6.2: NIST test results of the proposed PRNG [148].
NIST test
P-value Pass-rate
Frequency
0.0966
0.99
Block frequency (m = 128)
0.3838
0.98
Cumulative sums*
0.4356
0.99
Runs
0.7792
1
Longest runs of ones (M = 10000)
0.8832
1
Rank
0.4190
1
DFT
0.8514
0.99
Non-overlapping template* (m = 9) 0.4994
0.98
Overlapping template (m = 9)
0.0329
1
Universal (L = 7, Q = 1280)
0.6371
0.99
Approximate entropy (m = 10)
0.2368
0.99
Random excursion*
0.2558
0.99
Random excursion variant*
0.2213
0.99
Serial* (m = 16)
0.52155
0.99
Linear complexity (M = 500)
0.3191
0.98

Table 6.3: Overhead comparison of established PRNGs with the proposed design [148].
Technology (nm) Supply Voltage (V )
[124]
350
3.3
[124]
180
1.8/3.3
[91]
180
1.8
[181]
180
1.8
This work
65
1.2
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Area (mm2 )
0.752
0.126
0.275
0.767
0.132

Power (mW )
56
22
13.9
37
2.12

Throughput (M S/s)
40
100
6400
120
100

If 10 bits from the ADC are used, then the throughput of the system can be increased to
1000 M S/s. A more complex post-processing scheme need to be used in order to pass all
the NIST tests. If only the 10th bit of the ADC is utilized, then a Flash ADC can be used
to increase throughput but it comes at a cost of more area and power consumption.

6.6

Application Lies in Security of IoT Devices

In 1999, Keven Ashton introduced the term Internet of Things (IoT) when he was working at
MIT’s AutoID [16]. IoT devices became increasingly popular due to the rapid advancement
in technology and standardized communication protocols. These objects can communicate
amongst each other and are managed by computers. It has been anticipated that by the year
2020, there will be 20 billion connected devices in the IoT domain. One of the major concerns
of IoT devices is the security threat on all the connected devices. The security concerns can
range from threat of cyber-theft, financial transactions and personal privacy. IoT devices can
communicate with each other without human interaction and absence of human control. Such
devices typically have area and power consumption limitations so traditional cryptographic
security schemes will be expensive given the constraints. Therefore, the proposed lightweight
PRNG will be perfect for security applications in IoT devices due to its lightweight nature
and inherent dynamics.
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Chapter 7
Physically Unclonable and
Reconfigurable Computing System
(PURCS)
**Portions of this chapter is to be published in:
[149] Aysha S. Shanta, Md Badruddoja Majumder, Md Sakib Hasan, and Garrett S. Rose.
“Physically unclonable and reconfigurable computing system (PURCS) for hardware security
applications .” IEEE Transactions on Computer-Aided Design of Integrated Circuits and
Systems (TCAD), (accepted).

7.1
7.1.1

IC Counterfeiting and Logic Locking
IC Counterfeiting

Counterfeit ICs include remarked, recycled, tampered and overproduced ICs and the
estimated annual loss due to these ICs is over $169 billion dollars. The counterfeit ICs sold
in the market can have national security implications. Semiconductor Industry Association
(SIA) estimated that 15% of the replacement and spare semiconductors purchased by the
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Pentagon are counterfeit chips [52]. IC and Intellectual Property (IP) designers are reevaluating their trust on hardware due to globalization of the supply chain. The hardware
is prone to new attacks everyday such as IP piracy and reverse engineering [10].
The are multiple entities involved in the IC design and fabrication process such as the
foundry, the designer and the end-user [184]. The designers can use third-party IP blocks
in their systems. The foundry is untrusted because it is located outside the company
and rouge people in the foundry can reverse engineer the design from the mask, steal IP
design or produce extra chips to illegally sell in the market. End-users are also untrusted
because they can try to reverse engineer the contents of the chip to gain technology or design
information. Reverse engineering can help in obtaining design details by using IC imaging
and probing. The process of reverse engineering includes multiple steps such as depackaging
the IC, delayering and imaging layers and finally analyzing the bundle of extracted images
to find design details [166].
The trend of IC piracy and reverse engineering to produce counterfeit ICs have raised
severe concerns in the industry. The counterfeiting can happen in several forms such as:
1. Design houses can sell IPs to third parties without vendor’s knowledge.
2. IPs being used without paying the appropriate fees to the IP vendor.
3. Fabrication houses can sell illegally cloned copies of the design without the designer’s
knowledge in the market.
4. Companies can perform reverse engineering of a fabricated IC to decode the contents
of GDS-II files.
5. Adversaries in the supply chain can insert malicious hardware into the design without
the designer knowing about it.
All the countries involved in the IC design flow does not have strict laws against IP theft
except USA and Japan. Hence, it becomes, IC/IP designer’s responsibility to protect their
designs. IP/IC piracy affects IP vendors, chip designers and system designers by depriving
them of the generated revenue. Several countermeasures have been introduced in order to
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mitigate the consequence of counterfeiting, reverse engineering and insertion of malicious
content into the design such as IC metering [10], watermarking [82], split manufacturing
[76], IC camouflaging [131] and logic locking [127, 132]. Watermarking is a passive technique
that can help detect piracy but fails to protect against it.

Metering utilizes a set of

protocols, either active or passive, which assigns a unique ID for each chip after fabrication.
Split manufacturing and IC camouflaging protects only against the untrusted foundry and
untrusted user respectively. Logic locking has gained the most attention amongst all the
techniques because it can lock the functionality of the IC while it is being passed through
different phases of production and the attacks such as overbuilding, IP piracy and reverse
engineering can be mitigated.

7.1.2

Background of Logic Locking

One possible method to protect the functionality of the IC is by inserting additional gates
to lock the IC such that the circuit will only produce correct outputs when a specific input
is applied at these gates. The IC will be locked when it passes through the untrusted design
flow in order to conceal its contents. The claim of logic locking concept is that if the key
and input space is large, the adversary will have to spend exponential time in figuring out
the secret key. Logic locking prevents cloning, Trojan insertion, reverse engineering and
overbuilding of ICs. The designer provides the correct key to the end-user so that the circuit
produces correct outputs on application of the valid key. The keys can be stored in a tamper
proof memory or physical unclonable functions (PUFs) can be used to generate keys so that
the attacker cannot gain direct access to the secret key value. If the key values are unavailable
to the attacker, the netlist of the design obtained by stealing or reverse engineering is useless.
In an encrypted IC, wrong key should generate wrong output for the entire space of input
patterns. In case a wrong key produces correct output, then the logic locking method is not
strong and the adversary will gain advantage. If an invalid key only changes a few of the
output bits, then the adversary can tolerate the wrong outputs. If a wrong key affects or
flips all the output bits, then the wrong output is an inverted version of the correct output.
Therefore, an invalid key should alter half of the output bits, which is why the Hamming
distance between correct and wrong outputs should be 50%. 50% Hamming distance should
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provide sufficient obscurity to the attacker. It is also important that fewer gates need to be
inserted in order to reach 50% Hamming distance [128].

7.1.3

Threat Model for Logic Locking

• The end-user and foundry are untrusted.
• The designer is trusted.
• The adversary knows about the logic locking algorithm and the location of the key
gates. The only unknown piece of information is the secret key.
• The adversary has access to a reverse engineered netlist and a functional IC. The
netlist is obtained from the IC design or by reverse engineering the mask, layout
or manufactured IC. The adversary uses simulation tools on the locked netlist and
generates the output patterns from the functional IC for specific input patterns.

7.1.4

IC Design Flow

The IC design flow is shown in Fig. 7.1. The designer and IP provider are trusted in logic
locking threat model. The foundry is not trusted since there might be rouge agents who can
steal or reverse engineer the design. The designer encrypts the design and after synthesizing
sends the layout masks to the foundry. The key has not been loaded into the tamper-evident
memory at this stage since it can be recovered by the adversary in the foundry. The foundry
manufactures the chip and sends it back to the design house. The designer then loads the
key into the memory to enable correct functionality of the IC. After the key is loaded, the
designer blows out the fuses in the read/write circuit in order to disable access to the memory
contents by the user. The designer performs validation tests on the functional IC and if the
ICs pass the test, the chips are packaged and sold in the market.
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Figure 7.1: IC design flow with logic locking capabilities [132].

7.1.5

Issues Mitigated by Logic Locking

Hardware Trojans
Logic locking prevents the adversary from inserting malicious circuitry into the design
because it is harder to find a location to insert Trojans. The key gates change the propagation
of the signals in the design in a different manner which is unknown to the attacker.
Overbuilding
The foundry can produce extra chips without the knowledge of the design house. Their
intent is to sell the ICs to the market. However, the ICs cannot be unlocked without the
secret key and will be useless.
Reverse engineering and IP piracy
If the adversary steals the netlist or gains access to it by reverse engineering, the netlist will
be useless without information about the secret key.

7.1.6

Types of Logic Locking

Logic locking can be classified into two types: combinational and sequential.
Sequential Logic Locking
Sequential logic locking requires additional black states to be inserted in the state transition
graphs [10, 28]. The modified state transition graph is designed in such a way that a valid
state is reached only on application of valid key sequence. If the key is withdrawn from the
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design, the system transitions into a black state again. Examples of sequential primitives are
obfuscated finite state machines [28]. Another sequential logic locking approach is to replace
parts of the design using programmable logic such as look-up tables (LUTs) [17]. In this way,
the IP owner hides the design from rouge agents in the fabrication stages. The concealed
design is later configured into programmable logic and the circuit will only function correctly
if these replaced elements are configured properly.
Combinational Logic Locking
In combinational logic locking, XOR/XNOR gates, AND/OR gates and multiplexers are
inserted into the design to hide the functionality of the design. One of the inputs of the key
gates act as the ‘key’ input. The user can configure these key gates as buffers or inverters
depending on the value of the key inputs. An example of unlocked and locked circuit is shown
in Fig. 7.2. The correct key input for the circuit to be functioning properly is 1, 0, 0 for K1,
K2 and K3 respectively which is loaded by the user in the chip’s memory. The locked IC
can be activated either prior or post-fabrication test. If the keys are loaded remotely into
the chip, then secure communication infrastructure is necessary.
Memory elements can also be used for logic locking in addition to combinational and
sequential elements [17]. The circuit will produce correct outputs only when the memory
element is programmed correctly. Although, usage of memory elements will lead to significant
performance overhead.

(a)

(b)

Figure 7.2: (a) Unlocked circuit (b) Locked circuit with three XOR/XNOR gates [132].
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7.1.7

Techniques of Inserting Key Gates

There are several techniques to insert key gates into the IC design such as random (RLL)
[140], strong interference based logic locking (SLL) [183] and fault analysis based (FLL)
[132]. In order to insert key gates, the position of the node inside the design needs to be
determined. When an incorrect key is applied, it should be able to alter most of the output
bits for most of the input patterns. Key gates can be inserted randomly but it does not
necessarily produce wrong output for the wrong key since the effect of wrong key might be
damped in the propagation path to the primary outputs. Fault analysis based logic locking
assumes that if an incorrect key is applied it activates a fault in one of the nodes. When
a wrong key is applied, a stuck-at-1 (s-a-1) or a stuck-at-0 (s-a-0) fault will be activated
when XOR/XNOR gates are used for logic locking. Sometimes, a wrong key can result in
generation of the correct output. Therefore, it is important that the effect of an excited fault
is propagated to primary outputs by using non-controlling inputs at the key gates. All the
inputs cannot guarantee the presence of non-controlling values on the propagation path, so
an incorrect key will not always corrupt the output. Care should also be taken when multiple
key gates are inserted or replaced in the design since the effect of one gate can nullify the
effect of the other gates.

7.1.8

Types of Key Gates

XOR/XNOR based
XOR/XNOR gates can be inserted in a design to hide the functionality of the circuit. The
gates are inserted into the design after logic synthesis and before physical synthesis. One
of the inputs of the key gate is part of the ‘secret key’ and the other one is part of the
original circuit design. If the key gate is an XOR gate, then the key value is 1 and if it
is an XNOR gate then the value is 0 for the circuit to perform correctly. Keys are stored
in tamper-evident memory by the trusted party and the circuit will not function correctly
unless a valid key is loaded in the on-chip memory.
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If the key gates are left in the design without further improvements, then the attackers
can extract the key value by finding the XOR and XNOR gates in the design by reverseengineering the layout.

The effort of the attackers can be increased by replacing the

XOR/XNOR gates with other gates such as AND, OR and NAND. Another method could
be to change the position of the inverters so that the polarity of the key gates are altered
[183]. However, the latter method suffers from significant area and power overhead in order
to realize De Morgan’s rules.
MUX based
Multiplexers (MUXs) are inserted in the logic paths of a system in MUX based logic locking
[132, 127, 177]. One input to the MUX is the original logic signal, the other input is an
arbitrary internal node and the select pin of the MUX is the key input. The original signal
can be connected to either the first or the second input of the MUX. This offers the flexibility
that the key bit can be 0 or 1. If the applied key is not correct, the MUX selects a random
node for determining the primary output. However, the output might not be corrupted
since the original node might have the same value as the random node. Designers should
also consider that a combinational loop is not formed between the original node and the
random node. MUX based logic locking requires more gates to be inserted to reach 50%
Hamming distance.
In [175], camouflage connectors and multiplexers are connected to design a ‘configurable
logic unit’ which can be used to replace logic gates in the design. An m-input 1-output
m

‘configurable logic unit’ can perform 22 functions using 2 × 2m camouflage connectors and
2m -to-1 MUXs. Hence, a 4-to-1 MUX can be tuned to produce all the possible 16 Boolean
functions that a 2-input 1-output gate can perform. It is better than configurable CMOS
gates which are able to perform only 3 functionalities: NAND, NOR and XOR [131].
LUT based
An n-input look-up table requires 2n memory cells and 2n -1 2-to-1 MUXs. In [17, 96],
researchers have proposed using look-up table (LUT) based logic locking and established
methods for replacing gates in the netlist. The scheme is secure because the contents of
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the LUTs are unknown after reverse engineering. In LUT based obfuscation, the selected
standard logic gates are replaced by LUTs. The functionality of the gates remain concealed
from the manufacturer. LUTs are then configured in a trusted facility after the fabrication
process is over.
After fabrication, the foundry can perform tests on the circuit on any mode (any logic
out of 16 possible functions) of the reconfigurable logic. The end-user will determine the
final usage or logic implementation of the reconfigurable block. Personnel in the designing
and manufacturing phase does not have to know the desired function of the LUT and cannot
tamper with the reconfigurable blocks. The reconfigurable block will act as a black-box to
the supply chain attacker. He knows the function of the LUT but does not have knowledge
about the final implementation. Therefore, he cannot perform tests, probing, and reverse
engineering because the LUT content has not been finalized [95]. Reconfigurable logic block
possesses three important qualities:
1. virtual “black-box”
2. polynomial slowdown
3. preserves the functionality
LUTs are better as key gates compared to XOR/XNOR gates for several reasons. First,
when XOR gates are used as key gates, they violate the outputs for wrong key application
but they are just gates added to the design. The entire layout is sent to the foundry for
fabrication so the rouge agent in the foundry can reverse engineer the layout to learn the
entire contents of the design and learn the location of the XOR gates. The XOR gates can
simply be removed from the design or attackers can use a FIBing technique where additional
wires are added to bypass the locking scheme. LUTs lock the design and replace gates in
the design with generic memory structure. The contents of the memory are unknown to the
manufacturer. Second, each XOR gate addition to the circuit adds 1-bit key to the design
whereas LUTs provide a larger key space which increases the attacker’s work.
There are disadvantages to using LUTs. The use of RAMs will increase the performance
overhead since additional mask layers are required. Utilizing LUTs for obfuscation purposes
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can result in huge area and delay overhead. The area overhead of the LUTs exponentially
increases with the increase in input size. The area overhead constraint limits the number of
gates that can be replaced with LUTs. Moreover, the timing or delay requirements limit the
placement of LUTs in critical paths.

7.2

Authentication and Physical Unclonable Functions
(PUFs)

7.2.1

Authentication of Devices

Nowadays, the emergence of smart devices along with embedded memories is affecting our
daily lives. It has opened opportunities for great applications such as smart city and home
automation. The security of the devices is a huge challenge and opened a field for security
researchers to dive into. An illegitimate or unauthenticated device will be able to share false
information to disturb the functions of cyber-physical systems. If the security of these devices
are not handled or taken care of, then these devices can potentially distribute confidential
information to untrusted parties. Since these systems are mobile, the threat model should
include special cases where the devices will be operating in untrusted environment and the
attacker has physical access to the device. As a result, authentication is important for data
protection and to prevent man-in-the-middle attacks.
The solution is to install a secret key unique to each device in order to secure the
communication. Previously, the norm was to save the secret key in a non-volatile memory
such as electrically erasable programmable read-only memory (EEPROM) or battery-backed
static random access memory (SRAM) and perform cryptographic algorithms such as
encryption or digital signature to authenticate a device to ensure protection of confidential
information. New techniques were necessary to be developed because of shortcomings in the
previous methods such as huge amount of area and power consumption. Moreover, batterybacked RAMs can be read after storing keys for a long time and non-volatile memories are
prone to invasive attacks since the keys are stored in digital format [13, 14, 26]. In order
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to secure the key, expensive tamper-proof circuits need to be installed which needs to be
battery powered continuously.

7.2.2

Types of Authentication Architectures

Two-types of authentication architectures exist and these can be classified as: hardware and
software-aided architectures.
Software-aided Architectures
Software security methods are more flexible and easier to implement, update and manage
but they are built on the assumption that the underlying hardware is secure which
is not guaranteed in most cases.

The software architectures utilize the conventional

cryptographic algorithms but the strength of the algorithm can be adjusted to fit the
operating requirements.
The disadvantage of software based architecture is that they require huge amount of
computation and consumes a lot of space in the memory. Moreover, they are susceptible
to hardware cloning attacks. Software implementations require less resources to reverseengineer and the source codes stored in the memory of the system can be easily accessed
and tampered by attackers. When the codes with timing and power traces are compiled
into assembly language instructions, they become susceptible to power and delay analysis
based side channel attacks. The aim of the researchers in sensor networks is to build a
lightweight and feasible but computationally less intensive cryptographic algorithms. It is
also mandatory to ensure that key distribution overhead is within a tolerable limit and
solutions have been proposed by reducing the key size [94, 120]. From a security perspective,
the dilemma between computation overhead and security level will always persist.
Hardware-aided Architectures
Hardware based cybersecurity utilizes secure hardware to protect the system while managing
to keep the performance overhead minimum. The problem arises because the security of the
system relies on the assumption that a “safe” key exists. The secret keys are stored in the
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non-volatile memories in order to use in cryptographic primitives. Cryptographic keys are
long digital bit strings of data with truly random and entropy features. The vulnerabilities
arise because of insecure storage and transmission of personal identifiable information and
the lack of strong encryption and authentication schemes. A system that does not require
the key to be stored in a memory and generates a signature due to the physical disorder of
the system and provides tamper-resistance as an innate property is required for the security
of systems. This is why hardware-based architectures utilize Physical Unlconable Functions.

7.2.3

Process variation

The inevitable random fluctuations in silicon fabrication process results in random deviations
in interconnect and device properties. This random fluctuations lead to deviation of circuit
parameters from nominal values. The process variation can be divided into types: die-to-die
and within-die [186]. The radius of die-to-die variation is larger than the die size and includes
wafer-to-wafer, within-wafer, lot-to-lot and fab-to-fab. All the circuits in the die are affected
equally. The variation that exists between circuits of the same die is known as within-die
variation. The variations can occur due to reasons such as, manufacturing instrument or
layout technique of the designer. Random variations can also occur due to changes in device
length, doping concentration variation and fluctuations in oxide thickness.
Let the varied process parameter be denoted by X and this can represent the threshold
voltage or the channel length. The sources of variation can be represented by an equation:
X = X0 + ∆X = X0 + Xg + Xs + Xr .

(7.1)

where X0 represents the mean value of X, Xg represents the global variation, Xs represents
the intra-chip variation and Xr represents random fluctuations.

7.2.4

Background of Physical Unlconable Functions (PUFs)

PUFs use process variation in the fabrication procedure to generate unique signature for
each chip [161]. The input to a PUF is called a “challenge” and the output is called a
“response”. The PUF can be modeled if all the challenge-response pairs (CRPs) are known.
98

The response of the PUF is dependent on its physical structure and is difficult to clone. Even
the original manufacturer with the same photolithography masks cannot create an identical
device because of the unpredictable and uncontrollable nature of process variation. A PUF
circuit is inherently noisy due to the time dependent variations of the physical characteristics
of the system. While using PUFs, the noise is eliminated by applying the same challenge
multiple times and using only those response bits that remained stable.
Modern cryptographic implementations in hardware is facing increasing number of
attacks [173]. Side-channel attacks (SCAs) are able to retrieve secret information from
memories where the cryptographic keys are stored [157, 165]. There is continuous challenge
to keep the memory safe from adversaries. There is an increasing demand for cryptography
in resource-constrained devices such as IoT, implantable medical devices and wearables.
Researchers are putting in more effort into building PUFs for developing secure electronics
because PUFs provide keys without the need of a storage element (memory) for secret keys.
One of the earliest works related to PUFs was proposed by Lofstrom et al. in the year
2000 where mismatch in silicon devices were used for identification of ICs [99]. The process
variation in PUFs can lead to intrinsic and random alterations in the characteristics of CMOS
circuits such as changes in threshold voltage of the MOSFETs, metal resistivity and effective
channel length of the transistors. The PUF outputs are not only dependent on the applied
inputs but also on the internal characteristics of the circuit. The secret key generated by
PUF is only available for usage when the chip is turned on and running. Since the IC probes
into the random variations caused by the manufacturing process, the secret is difficult to
clone [161]. The adversary has to put in more work since they have to mount an attack
while the IC is running, making sure that they don’t disturb the internal characteristics of
the chip, otherwise, the secret key will be changed or lost. Tapping into the device might
cause a capacitance change which in turn causes the output of the PUF to change. Another
advantage of PUF is that extra steps in the fabrication process, or testing or programming
is not required. PUF technology uses simple digital circuits which are easy to manufacture
and consume less area compared to EEPROMs or RAMs that require anti-tamper circuits to
protect the hardware. The fabrication cost of EEPROM is expensive since it needs additional
mask layers and RAMs require an always-on power source.
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In addition to studying silicon PUFs which rely on delay and timing information,
researchers have also dived into PUFs that exploit physical characteristics of devices to
generate unique responses. For example, acoustic PUFs measure the acoustic reflections of
an item and coating PUFs measure the capacitance of the coating layer that covers the chip
[156, 169]. Pappu et al. developed an optical PUF that uses speckle patterns of medium for
laser light [122].
As technology is scaling, it is becoming increasingly difficult to control power and
performance dependent parameters. Variability is now an unavoidable characteristic of
CMOS processes [25]. The unique responses generated by PUFs finds its applications in
device authentication, encrypted storage, active metering of ICs to prevent overproduction,
trusted configuration of FPGAs and secure software execution on processors [130]. Guajardo
et al. used the PUF for remote service authentication, protection of intellectual property
(IP) and secret key storage [59].

7.2.5

Classification of PUFs

PUFs can be classified into two types: weak PUF and strong PUF [68]. The weak PUF has
limited number of CRPs and portrays a linear relationship with the number of components
whose behavior depends on process variation whereas strong PUFs have a huge number
of CRPs and displays an exponential relationship with the components that exhibit PUF
characteristics. PUFs provide a hardware aided architecture for authentication of devices
which makes the computation efficient and reduces the usage of memory. Weak PUFs
are usually used for key storage and strong PUFs are used for authentication purposes.
A disadvantage is that the PUF characteristics are susceptible to external environmental
conditions such as temperature and supply voltage variation.
Weak PUF
Weak PUFs, also known as Physically Obfuscated Keys (POKs), can directly digitize
the unique fingerprint of the circuit and then the digital value is used for cryptographic
applications. The PUF will replace the secure non-volatile memory that would contain the
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secret key. Once the key is extracted from the weak PUF, it is stored in a volatile memory
during operation. The key must be kept secret since weak PUF can generate only a small
number of responses. The responses are unpredictable and are dependent on the process
variation. If the attacker gets access to the key, then the attacker can use it to mimic the
operation of the PUF. If the physical size of the PUF is finite then all the CRPs can be
measured within polynomial time. As a result, the peripheral parts of the PUF are designed
with a fuzzy extractor (FE) which limits direct access to the original PUF response [29].
In [89], Layman et al. proposed a weak PUF called Static Random Access Memory
(SRAM PUF) which is composed of symmetric cross-coupled inverters. Once the power
of the SRAM PUF is turned on, the cells in memory will randomly be pushed towards a
logical 1 or 0 due to process variation in the manufacturing procedure. The response space
is the number of cells in the SRAM and the challenge is turning on the SRAM. SRAM
PUF generates only one CRP which can be used for key generation rather than device
authentication. Other examples of weak PUF include latch PUF [61], butterfly PUF [88], D
flipflop PUF [171] and bus keeper PUF [153].
Weak PUFs are ideal for key generation purposes because ideally they have fixed
“challenge bits”. The PUF provides secure key storage facility and the secret key is never
revealed during usage. The key generated by the PUF usually requires post-processing
through error-correction codes (ECC) for cryptographic applications. ECC is needed because
the digital bits of the PUF output might flip due to noise and other environmental factors.
Once a stable set of output bits are obtained from the PUF, they can be used for many
cryptographic applications.

Weak PUFs can also be used for authentication purposes

even though they are unable to generate a huge pool of CRPs. The PUF can be used
in conjunction with HMAC/AES implementation to achieve authentication at the cost
of additional hardware required for the cryptographic protocol which in turn makes this
technique area and power hungry.
Strong PUF
Strong PUFs differ from weak PUFs because strong PUFs have a large pool of CRPs and
devices can be authenticated directly without the need of cryptographic hardware. The
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benefit is that the adversary cannot cover the entire challenge-response space in order to
model the PUF and mimic the outputs. The output of the PUF does not reveal information
about the internal characteristics or behavior of the circuit. The output of the strong PUF
does not need to be kept secret as the weak PUF. The strong PUF should have readout
access and readout time limitations so that the attacker cannot enumerate through the
entire challenge-response space in polynomial time. Since a strong PUF does not need
cryptographic hardware to provide authentication, the system should be able to prevent
unauthorized access to the internal circuitry.
Gassend et al. proposed a strong PUF called Arbiter PUF which utilizes the delay due
to process variation between identical paths to generate responses. The schematic of Arbiter
PUF is shown in Fig. 7.3. Arbiter PUF uses multiplexers to switch between the paths
[54]. Arbiter PUF is designed in the layout level to eliminate bias in the delay paths. The
select signal of the multiplexers is the challenge to the PUF. The delay paths are fed into an
arbiter which can be a D flipflop or SR latch. When the input of the PUF changes, the signals
propagate through two different delay paths. The arrival times of the two input signals will
vary due to process variation. The response is one if the signal arrives at input D of the
flipflop first, otherwise the signal is zero. This interpretation holds true as long the setup
time of the latch is negligible compared to the delay difference. This type of PUF is known
as a strong PUF because it can generate many CRPs and can be used for authentication
purposes. Arbiter PUF is appropriate for applications in resource-constrained platforms such
as RFIDs. Ring oscillator (RO) PUF is another example of a strong PUF which is easier for
implementation in ASIC and FPGAs compared to Arbiter PUFs. However, RO PUFs are
slower, more area consuming and power hungry. RO PUF are applicable for secure processor
designs [144]. Other examples of strong PUFs are optical PUF [122], lightweight secure PUF
[106] and XOR arbiter PUF [71].
Although weak PUFs are typically used to generate secure keys due to their small number
of CRPs. Strong PUFs can also be used to generate keys but the challenge is correcting
the bit errors in the responses obtained from the PUF. Pappu et al. proposed a “pattern
matching” technique to correct the output errors of the PUFs [123].
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Figure 7.3: Arbiter PUF [54].

Figure 7.4: Generic strong PUF based authentication protocol [161].
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7.2.6

Chaos-based PUFs

As previously discussed, the definition of chaos applies to deterministic nonlinear systems
whose outputs are susceptible to small changes in initial conditions. If the initial conditions
stem from physical conditions in the hardware, the system can be used as a PUF.
Deterministic circuits can be very easy to design and the chaotic system produces time
series which is unpredictable due to dependence on initial conditions which in turn changes
the circuit’s state in time.
A chaotic system is vulnerable to the tolerances of different parameters of the components
in the design.

The sensitivity arises from all the physical parameters affected by

manufacturing process. Any change in the circuit’s structure influences the characteristics of
the chaotic system and opens the doorway to expand the challenge space. The same reason
can be extended to explain why some circuits with same placement and routing behaves
differently. After a certain number of iterations, it is possible for chaotic systems to display
random behavior which can be used to design random number generators.
It has already been discussed that PUFs are vulnerable to attacks such as man-inthe-middle, emulation, reconfiguration and reverse engineering. In order to prevent these
susceptibilities, the chaotic signals generated from logistic map are applied as challenges
to the RO-PUF [168] to generate random numbers for cryptographic applications. In [57],
researchers have used switchable chain ring oscillators to generate cryptographic keys. Miura
et al. introduced a chaos PUF for mitigating counterfeit attacks where inductive coupling
introduces wireless electromagnetic interactions between the package or board and chip into
a PUF [110]. Chen demonstrated a way to mitigate machine learning based modeling attacks
on PUFs by integrating an arbiter PUF with a converter and chaotic circuit [30]. In [97],
modeling attack of CRPs are alleviated by using a CNT PUF with Lorenz chaotic circuit
which enhances the difference in responses for similar challenges.

7.2.7

Authentication Protocol

Since the PUF acts as a “black-box”, the verifier only has access to a set of CRPs and cannot
determine the response to a brand new challenge. A typical authentication protocol is shown
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in Fig. 7.4. The client side has a strong PUF that can generate many CRPs. The verifier
has a database of the CRPs generated from the same strong PUF. The process of creation
of the database is known as enrollment which is typically done by a trusted third party.
The second phase is called verification where the client requests to be authenticated and the
verifier chooses a random CRP from the database. The verifier sends the selected challenge
to the client and keeps the corresponding response to be verified later. The client generates a
response from the PUF by using the challenge it received from the verifier. The client sends
back the generated response to the verifier and the verifier now matches the two responses,
one received from the client and the other stored in the database. If the two responses match
(i.e. the response bits are close enough), the device is authenticated. PUF authentication
allows an error threshold which decreases the stringency on the stability requirement and
eliminates the need for error correction. In low-cost authentication schemes, the verifier
allows an error tolerance threshold or multiple attempts to authenticate the device before
rejecting it as a fake. Error tolerance is a much preferred technique. As an example, the
authentication method can set a threshold of 32 bits for verification of 128 bit response [40].
A strong PUF contains an exponential number of CRPs with respect to components
whose characteristics depend on process variation. The verifier cannot allocate enough
memory to save the entire CRP space of the strong PUF. A CRP cannot be used twice in
an authentication protocol, since the attacker can send a previously authenticated response
to decipher the CRP model. Periodic refreshing of the CRP database is mandatory. It is
also necessary to ensure that the PUF produces the same response for a given challenge and
is not affected by environmental conditions. It is important to keep in mind that each client
will have a unique PUF so they can be authenticated individually. The verifier can store
CRP tables for each client that connects to the system or network.
It is assumed that the attacker will only have read-only access to the data being
transported between the client and the verifier. In order to prevent the adversary from
impersonating the valid client, acknowledgments of the transported information through the
public channel must be verified in a time bounded private channel before the information
can be used for further authentication steps.
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7.2.8

PUF Metrics

There are several metrics in order to evaluate the PUF design. Some of the most commonly
used metrics are described below.
Uniqueness
Uniqueness is the ability of the PUF to generate unique signatures on different ICs for the
same design. In order to measure uniqueness, the inter-chip Hamming distance is calculated
between two responses generated from the same PUF on different chips while the applied
challenge is fixed. Ideally, the uniqueness should be 50% which means each PUF generates
a unique response. It is not an estimation of the actual probability of inter-chip process
variation. The equation is given below for k chips:
k−1 X
k
X
2
HD(Ri , Rj )
U niqueness =
× 100%.
k(k − 1) i=1 j=i+1
n

(7.2)

where Ri and Rj are n-bit responses of chips i and j for a given challenge.
Uniformity
Uniform distribution of the number of ones and zeros is required in a PUF response. Ideally,
the value of uniformity should be 50%. The equation for uniformity is defined as the
percentage Hamming Weight (HW) of the response:
n

U nif ormity =

1X
ri,l × 100%.
n l=1

(7.3)

where i represents the PUF instance and ri,l represents the lth bit of an n-bit response.
Hamming Weight is the Hamming distance from an all-zero string of the same length.
Bit-aliasing
Bit-aliasing occurs when different PUFs produce nearly identical responses which is an
unwanted phenomena. Ideally, the value of bit-aliasing should be 50%. The equation for
bit-aliasing is as follows:
106

k

1X
Bit − aliasing =
ri,l × 100%.
k i=1

(7.4)

where bit-aliasing of the lth bit of an n-bit PUF response is measured by calculating the
Hamming Weight (HW) across k devices and ri,l is the lth bit of a response from chip i.

7.3

Proposed Computing System (PURCS)

In this work, a physically unclonable and reconfigurable computing system is proposed which
provides both device authentication and mitigates IC counterfeiting via logic locking. The
main component of the system is a three transistor chaotic map. In order to generate chaotic
signals, a chaotic oscillator has been designed which has a map circuit in the forward path as
well as the feedback path. The oscillator can be used to produce logic functions by altering
four tuning parameters called the iteration number, control bit, bifurcation parameter and
threshold voltage. The computing system is not built entirely with reconfigurable chaosbased logic gates but is a hybrid of standard CMOS logic gates and chaos-based logic gates.
The purpose of using reconfigurable logic gate is that a single system can implement multiple
functions. Replacing some of the logic gates in a system will allow the system to observe
logic locking and the tuning parameters in the oscillator can act as the secret key. Each
chaos-based logic gate has a 10-bit key. The key size increases with the number of replaced
chaos-based gates in the system. The key space is large if sufficient gates are replaced and
the attacker will have to spend exponential time in figuring out the secret key.
The computing system is called physically unclonable since process variation can be used
to generate unique keys for each chip. The same system can be used to generate challengeresponse pairs to authenticate devices. The obtained responses needs post-processing to
achieve ideal PUF metrics such as uniformity, uniqueness and bit-aliasing. The computing
system can be used for authentication where the key and primary input bits make up the
challenges and primary outputs are the responses. Process variation in the manufacturing
process ensures that different ICs will have different CRPs.
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In this work, ISCAS’85 benchmark circuits are used to demonstrate that logic obfuscation
and authentication can be performed using the same system. Hamming distance is calculated
between the correct output and wrong outputs to ensure that 50% of the bits are corrupted
on application of wrong key. The proposed design has low overhead compared to conventional
circuits that contains both logic locking and authentication circuits.

7.3.1

Design of Chaotic Oscillator for PURCS System

In this work, the same chaotic map as shown in Fig. 3.1 has been used to produce chaotic
signals. The reconfigurable 2-input chaos-based logic gate is designed using chaotic oscillator,
DAC and comparators as shown in Fig. 7.5. Digital inputs made up of 2-bit data and 1-bit
control are converted to analog voltage using a 3-bit DAC in order to apply to the input of
chaotic map in the forward path. The map circuit produces two analog voltages as outputs
from the two map circuits. Therefore, two comparators are used to convert the analog output
to digital voltage so that the system can be used to generate Boolean functions. The system
produces two outputs per iteration since two chaotic maps are used.
Fig. 7.6 shows the transient response of the chaotic oscillator where the applied bias
voltage, Vc is 564 mV . An input, Vin of 750 mV is applied to the map when φ1 is high.
When φ1 is low, φ2 and φ3 starts oscillating producing outputs On+1 and On+2 . A total of 10
output values of On+1 and On+2 can be obtained since φ2 and φ3 have five iterations each.

7.3.2

Bifurcation Diagram

The bifurcation diagram of the chaotic oscillator represents the periodic and chaotic regions
as shown in Fig. 3.8. The x − axis is the bifurcation parameter, Vc and y − axis is the
output voltage Vout of the chaotic oscillator which is the combination of On+1 and On+2 . The
bifurcation diagram is obtained by applying an input voltage of 750 mV . The bifurcation
parameter, Vc is swept from 0 V to 1.2 V with 2 mV increments. The bifurcation diagram
has been plotted for 900 iterations.
The circuit has a period of two for initial values of Vc . The circuit can implement two
functions in this region if all other tuning parameters are unchanged. The chaotic oscillator
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Figure 7.5: Reconfigurable 2-input chaos-based logic gate designed using chaotic oscillator,
comparators and DAC [149].

Figure 7.6: Transient response of the chaotic oscillator [149].
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enters into the chaotic region after period-doubling cascade. The first chaotic region occurs
when the value of Vc is between 470 mV and 566 mV . The second chaotic region occurs
between 906 mV and 948 mV . In this work, the values of Vc has been chosen from the first
chaotic region because the delay of the oscillator increases as Vc increases. Sixteen values of
Vc has been chosen and the values are 486 mV , 488 mV , 490 mV , 506 mV , 510 mV , 512
mV , 518 mV , 520 mV , 524 mV , 526 mV , 528 mV , 538 mV , 540 mV , 546 mV , 556 mV
and 564 mV . The 16 values represent 4 bits in the secret key of the chaos-based gate.

7.3.3

Chaos-Based Logic Gate Implementation

It has been discussed already that a chaos-based system can be implemented to design logic
gates in section 3.3. The chaos-based logic gate is reconfigurable because of the multiple
tuning parameters available in the circuit topology. Nonlinear system can be used to build
logic gates that can implement multiple Boolean functions using the same building block.
In this work, the chaos-based system is used as 2-input reconfigurable digital block which is
capable of implementing all the possible 16 Boolean functions. The different functions can be
achieved by changing the tuning parameters: bifurcation parameter, control bit, threshold
voltage and iteration number.
The digital inputs are converted to analog values by using a DAC for applying to the
chaotic oscillator. The oscillator in turn produces analog outputs and they are converted
to digital values using comparators which utilizes a thresholding mechanism. The threshold
voltage, Vth is chosen to be 625 mV by taking the median of the values obtained from 65
different ICs. The logic gate has a digital value of “1” if the analog voltage is greater than
Vth and “0” otherwise.
Chaotic systems are sensitive to small changes in the initial conditions. The digital input
to the chaos-based logic gate is represented by Ib and the control bit by Cb . The control bit
perturbs the analog voltage going into the map, called Vin , to a slightly different value. The
range of the output voltage is between 193.2 mV and 1.2 V . When Cb is equal to 0, the
values of Vin are 193.2 mV (00), 480.9 mV (01), 768.5 mV (10) and 1.056 V (11). When
the value of Cb is 1, the values of Vin changes to 337 mV (00), 624.7 mV (01), 912.3 mV
(10) and 1.2 V (11).
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Table 7.1: Evolution of chaotic oscillator output with number of iterations. (Vc = 552 mV ,
Cb = 1, Vth = 625 mV ) [149].
xn (V)
0.337(00)
0.625(01)
0.912(10)
1.2(11)
Function (dec)

n=1
1.11(1)
0.35(0)
0.49(0)
0.63(1)
9 (XNOR)

xn+1 (V)
n=2
n=3
0.58(0)
0.54(0)
1.18(1)
0.62(0)
0.91(1)
0.44(0)
0.39(0)
1.16(1)
6 (XOR) 1 (AND)

n=4
0.72(1)
0.42(0)
1.08(1)
0.62(0)
10

n=5
0.34(0)
1.13(1)
0.55(0)
0.41(0)
4

Table 7.2: Characterization table of the 2-input reconfigurable chaos-based logic gate for Vth
= 625 mV [149].
Key (dec)
1
17
55
91
141
478
625

Control
Vc (mV )
486
524
538
546
518
556
524

inputs
n Cb
19 1
19 0
20 0
21 0
23 0
33 1
38 0
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Function (dec)
7 (OR)
6 (XOR)
15 (1111)
1 (AND)
10 (1010)
0 (0000)
12 (1100)

In a chaos-based system, the system evolves in time with increasing number of iterations.
The functions obtained from one iteration can be different from the next iteration. As
a result, iteration number is another tuning parameter that can be used to change the
functionality of the logic gate. In this work, a total of 50 analog voltages were generated
from 25 iterations. The first 18 values are not used since they represent values in the
transient period. The last 32 iterations are used to make digital gates. Two-bit chaos-based
2

reconfigurable logic gate can implement 22 = 16 different functions. The generated functions
are numbered in decimal starting from 0 (0000) to 15 (1111).
Table 7.1 shows the evolution of the chaotic oscillator for different iterations. All the
other parameters are fixed such as Vc = 552 mV , Vth = 625 mV and Cb = 1. In the first
iteration, an XNOR (9) gate is generated and in the second iteration an XOR (6) gate is
produced. Five different iterations produce five different functionalities.

7.3.4

Characterization of the Chaos-based Logic Gate

The different tuning parameters are converted to digital values in order to use the chaotic
oscillator as a digital system. 16 values of Vc were chosen in section 7.3.2 using the bifurcation
diagram. The threshold voltage of the comparator was chosen to be 625 mV by taking the
median value of all the analog voltages across the different chips. The chaos-based logic gate
has one control bit which changes the initial condition of the chaotic oscillator to generate a
new pattern of voltages. The output of a chaotic oscillator evolves in time with increasing
number of iterations. The last 32 out of 50 iterations are considered to design the logic gate.
The digital configuration key of the chaos-based logic gate is made up of 10 bits where Vth
has 0 bits, Cb has 1 bit, Vc has 4 bits and iterations number has 5 bits. The key has the
following configuration:

key(10) = Vc (4), n(5), Vth (0), Cb (1).

(7.5)

Table 7.2 shows a part of the characterization table for the 2-input reconfigurable chaosbased logic gate in a single chip. It can be seen that changes in tuning parameters changes
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the functions implemented by the logic gate. The first column in the table represents the 10bit key in decimal value. There are 1024 possible combinations of key for each chaos-based
logic gate. The table shows that when key = 1, the generated function is an OR gate.

7.3.5

Functions Generated by the Logic Gate in Different ICs

Process variation in deep sub-micron technologies like 65 nm is a major concern. It is
possible that characteristics of a transistor will vary significantly in different ICs due to
process variation. Monte Carlo simulations have been performed across 65 chips to study
the effect of process variation on the functionality generated by the chaos-based logic gate.
Chaotic oscillators are susceptible to minute changes in the initial condition because of
which the functions produced in different chips vary significantly. Table 7.3 demonstrates
how the functions vary in different chips for the same tuning parameters. When key =
20, the functions generated in three different ICs are 9, 2 and 8. It means that different
chips will have different key to execute the same functionality. Therefore, each chip must
be characterized individually to configure the correct key. Monte Carlo simulations showed
that mismatch variation in each IC is negligible. Therefore, characterizing one chaos-based
logic gate from one chip should be sufficient to obtain the characterization table.
The reconfigurable chaos-based logic gates are built for use in logic locking. It is essential
that each chaos-based logic gate can implement the necessary functions such as AND, XOR
and OR. Fig. 7.7 shows the number of AND, OR and XOR functions for 10 different ICs.
The number of obtained functions vary in each chip but it is possible to implement all the
necessary Boolean functions using chaos-based logic gate.

7.3.6

Reliability of the Functions Generated from Logic Gate

The most important feature of chaotic systems are that they are sensitive to small
perturbations in initial conditions. It has been evaluated that a mere 3 ◦ C increase in
temperature results in different functionality from the same chip. The effect of temperature
variation is shown in Fig. 7.8. The key combinations become unreliable and implementing
logic functions utilizing the chaotic system becomes a challenge. Logic functions are realized
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Table 7.3: Characterization table of the reconfigurable chaos-based logic gate in different
chips for Vth = 625 mV [149].
Key (dec)
20
73
112
151
259
412

Control
Vc (mV )
528
510
520
538
488
546

inputs
n Cb
19 1
21 0
22 1
23 0
27 0
31 1

Function (dec)
IC 1 IC 2 IC 3
9
2
8
10
6
0
9
3
11
8
0
13
2
4
0
11
2
10

3

5

7

Number of functions

100
80

AND
OR
XOR

60
40
20
0

1

2

4

6

8

9

10

Chip number
Figure 7.7: Number of AND, OR and XOR functions in 10 chips [149].
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from the oscillator by applying a digital value at the input of DAC which converts it to an
analog voltage. The analog voltage acts as the seed to the oscillator. As discussed earlier
in section 3.3.2, a comparator with threshold voltage Vth is required to convert the analog
output of the oscillator to digital value. The analog voltages that are in close proximity
to the threshold voltage can lead to potential unreliable functions. Outputs that have high
noise margin from Vth generate reliable functions.
A study has been performed on the reliability performance of the proposed chaos-based
logic gate due to changes in supply voltage and temperature. Ideally, the functions should
be the same for the same key for varying environmental conditions. The temperature has
been altered from 0 ◦ C to 100 ◦ C and the supply voltage (1.2 V ) has been changed by 4%.
The effect of slight supply voltage variation is shown in Fig. 7.9. The characterization table
in Table 7.2 has been re-simulated for random temperature and supply voltage variations
in the chosen range. 50 new characterization tables are generated and compared against
the original table to check the number of functions that remain stable for the same key
configuration. The reliability test shows that 211 out of 1024 functions are stable for 4%
supply voltage fluctuation and 10% voltage variation leads to 206 stable functions. The
reliable key size for each chaos-based logic gate is almost 8 bits. When the chaos-based logic
gate is characterized, only the reliable key configurations should be chosen to generate the
desired function.

7.3.7

Creating the Characterization Table

In order to create the characterization table, a separate chaos-based logic gate will be placed
in the manufactured chip. The characterization will be performed by a trusted manufacturer
or designer. Each chaos-based logic gate has 12-bit input in total including the 10-bit key
and 2-bit digital input. The 2-bit input has 4 combinations and the 10-bit key has 1024
input combinations. A total of 4096 (4 ∗ 1024) combinations need to be explored to make
one characterization table for a specific supply voltage and temperature pair. Standard scan
chain based mechanism can be used to apply the inputs serially to the logic gate.
The same number of input vectors should be applied for a separate voltage and
temperature pair in order to create a new characterization table. After generating at least
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Figure 7.8: Effect of temperature variation on the oscillator output (Vin = 193.2 mV and Vc
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Figure 7.9: Effect of supply voltage variation on the oscillator output (Vin = 193.2 mV and
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50 different characterization tables for 50 different voltage and temperature pairs, the tables
will be compared to find the functions which remained stable. These stable functions are
the reliable functions for that particular chip. Monte Carlo simulations revealed that the
intra-chip variation is insignificant and does not affect the functions of the logic gate so one
block needs to be characterized in each chip. Each chip must be characterized separately due
to the effects of process variation. After characterization of each chip is complete, access to
the chaotic block is disabled ending further characterization attempts. This can be achieved
by burning supporting fuses or laser burning the access wires [67].

7.3.8

Replacement Algorithm

In a computing system, if all the logic gates were replaced by chaos-based logic gates, then
the overhead will be significantly large. The aim of this work is to design a system which is
a mixture of standard CMOS logic gates and 2-input reconfigurable chaos-based logic gates.
There are two types of key gate inclusion method: insertion and replacement. It is desirable
to use an efficient algorithm to insert/add the chaos-based logic gates. Conventional logic
obfuscation techniques uses different insertion techniques such as fault-analysis based (FLL),
random (RLL) and strong interference based (SLL). The fraction of gates that needs to be
inserted is determined by calculating the Hamming distance between correct and wrong
outputs. The most popular technique for replacement based logic locking is by calculating
the controllability and observability of the nodes. Controllability and observability are two
important characteristics of a logic design.
Controllability: Controllability measures how easily the inputs of a logic gate can
be controlled. The input patterns that are never produced at the input of the node are
determined and if the number is high, it means that the gate is less controllable. If the node
only has primary inputs connected to it, it means that the gate is very controllable and all
the input pattern combinations can be applied to the gate. However, if a node is buried
inside the logic network, it is possible that the node might not encounter all the possible
input patterns even though all the input patterns have been applied to the primary inputs.
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Controllability is measured by calculating the probability of different input combinations
occurring at the inputs of the gate. Each of the input combinations should occur with equal
probability for a gate to be controllable. The equation for controllability is given below:

C = log4

p20

+

p21

1
.
+ p22 + p23

(7.6)

where p0 , p1 , p2 and p3 is the probability of occurrence of (0,0), (0,1), (1,0) and (1,1) at the
inputs of the selected gate and if the probability is equal for all possible input combinations,
then the gate has a controllability of 1.
NOT gates can be replaced in a circuit in two ways. They can be implemented using
XOR gates where one of the inputs is tied to the supply voltage or ‘HI’. If a buffer needs
to be replaced, then one of the inputs of the XOR gate is connected to the ground node or
‘LO’. Another way to implement a NOT gate is to tie the inputs of NAND/NOR gates. In
the latter case where the inputs are tied, the equation for controllability will be changed to
the following:

C = log2

p20

1
.
+ p21

(7.7)

where p0 and p1 is the probability of (0,0) and (1,1) at the input of the selected gate.
Observability:

Observability measures how easy it is to propagate the values of

inaccessible gates to the primary outputs. Gates that are near the primary outputs are
highly observable but they are less controllable. Similarly, gates near the primary inputs are
more controllable rather than observable. Observability is also defined by values where the
certain output values do not occur. If the node is connected to primary outputs, then the
node is very observable since every output value can be observed at the primary outputs. If
the output of a gate does not alter other nodes, then the node is not observable.
Observability ensures that the output value of internal nodes are propagated to the
primary outputs without being blocked by outputs of other gates.

For example, an

AND/NAND blocks the propagation of the other signal if one of the inputs is 0. Similarly,
OR/NOR should have a value of 0 in order to propagate the value of the other input to the
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primary output. Observability is measured independently for each primary output and the
average value is calculated at the end.
Testability:

In replacement based algorithm, each node is ranked based on the

controllability of the input nodes and observability of the output nodes. Controllability
and observability is measured by applying 1000 random input patterns to the system under
consideration. Each gate in the system is sorted from high to low based on the testability of
the gates which is the product of controllability and observability. The most testable gates
are replaced by chaos-based logic gates in order to create the hybrid system. The algorithm
for replacement is shown in Fig. 7.10.
Example of Replacement Algorithm on C17 Benchmark Circuit
Fig. 7.11 shows a circuit from the ISCAS’85 benchmark suite. This circuit is used as an
example to demonstrate replacement based algorithm using testability. Gate 3 from Fig.
7.11a is chosen for testability calculation. The circuit has 5 inputs so there are 32 possible
input combinations. Probability of input combinations are evaluated for nodes, d and n3 .
The probability of occurrence of (0,0), (0,1), (1,0) and (1,1) are calculated to be 81 , 38 , 18 ,
3
,
8

respectively. The value of controllability is calculated to be 0.84 using equation 7.6.

Observability is calculated by measuring the probability of propagation of the value of node,
n2 to the primary outputs. The output of n2 will propagate to primary output, out1 if
node, n1 is 1. Probability of n1 being 1 is the observability of gate 3 to out1 which is 34 .
Similarly, the probability of node, n4 being 1 is the observability of gate 3 to out2 which is 78 .
Observability is calculated by averaging the observability of the individual primary outputs.

7.3.9

Configuration Key of the Hybrid Circuit

The functionality of the reconfigurable chaos-based logic gate depends on the application of
a valid key. Due to process variation, the correct key will be different for different chips.
Post-manufacturing characterization is required to find the correct key for a particular chip.
The keys for AND, OR, XOR, NAND, NOR and XNOR gates are represented by Kand ,
Kor , Kxor , Knand , Knor and Kxnor . The secret key for each chip will be a combination of the
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Figure 7.10: Algorithm for replacing gates using testability method [149].

(a)

(b)

Figure 7.11: (a) Unobfuscated circuit from ISCAS’85 benchmark suite (b) Obfuscated circuit
where two NAND gates are replaced with reconfigurable chaos-based logic gates and the
secret key is 20 bits long [149].
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keys of individual gates that are replaced. Fig. 7.11b shows the logic locked circuit where two
NAND gates have been replaced by 2-input reconfigurable chaos-based logic gates. Knand
is the key for each gate which is made of Vc , Vth , Cb and n. The secret key of the entire
circuit is 20 bits. The circuit will produce incorrect functionality if wrong key is applied.
The correct key is made up of two Knand and can be written as:

Kcorrect = {K1 , K2 } : K1 , K2 ∈ Knand .

7.4

(7.8)

Simulation and Results

Eight circuits have been chosen from ISCAS’85 combinational benchmark suite. The circuits
are C17 (6 gates), C432 (231 gates), C880 (462 gates), C1355 (590 gates), C1908 (1087 gates),
C3540 (2050 gates), C5315 (2981 gates) and C7552 (4056 gates). All the gates have been
converted to 2-input and 1-output since the reconfigurable chaos-based logic gates have the
same configuration.

7.4.1

Logic Locking Results

Application of wrong key should produce incorrect output for all input patterns in a
logic locked circuit. An invalid key should change half of the output bits so that the
calculated Hamming distance between the correct output and the wrong output is 50%. The
reconfigurable chaos-based logic gates have been replaced using two methods: calculating
the testability of all the nodes in the circuit and random replacement. Random replacement
might not alter the output bits when wrong key is applied.

When testability based

replacement algorithm is used, fewer gates are required to achieve 50% Hamming distance.
The testability of all the nodes are calculated and sorted from high to low. The gates with
the highest testability values are replaced with chaos-based logic gates.
Fig. 7.12 shows the plot of Hamming distance with 5% increments in the replacement
percentage of the gates. Correct and random keys were applied to the logic locked circuit
in order to measure the Hamming distance. The two replacement methods, random and
testability based techniques are compared. The slope of the lines indicate the performance
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Figure 7.12: Hamming distance vs. percentage of gates replaced in ISCAS’85 benchmark
circuits (a) Gates replaced randomly (b) Gates replaced by measuring testability [149].

Table 7.4: Percentage of gates replaced to reach almost 50% Hamming distance in ISCAS’85
benchmark circuits [149].
Benchmark Random Replacement (%) Testability Based Replacement (%)
C17
70
55
C432
80
20
C880
85
55
C1355
55
25
C1908
70
30
C3540
95
30
C5315
95
25
C7552
100
30
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difference of the techniques. If the line is steep, 50% Hamming distance is reached with fewer
amount of replaced gates and the performance overhead will be smaller as seen in Fig. 7.12b.
Once a circuit reaches, 50% mark, the Hamming distance value does not deviate much even
though more gates are inserted in testability based replacement method. The advantage is
that the key size can be increased without ruining the 50% Hamming distance.
Table 7.4 compares the percentage of gates that need to be replaced to reach 50%
Hamming distance. The second column displays the percentage of total gates that need
to be replaced by using random replacement technique whereas the third column displays
the percentage required for testability based replacement technique. It can be clearly seen
that random replacement technique requires more percentage of gates than testability based
technique. The results in the table also indicate that the percentage of gates that need to
be replaced to achieve 50% Hamming distance depends on the circuit topology.

7.4.2

Authentication Results

This work demonstrates that any system that has reconfigurable chaos-based logic gates can
be used for authentication purposes. The benchmark circuits display PUF characteristics as
there are significant changes to the outputs of the system due to process variation. Different
key and input combinations are considered as challenges and the outputs are responses. Fig.
7.13 represents the post-processing scheme required for a benchmark circuit to reach ideal
PUF metrics. The response is calculated for 10 random input patterns applied to the circuit.
When clk1 is high, the initially generated output bits are XORed with 0. When clk1 stops,
clk2 starts and the result of the first iteration are XORed with the newly generated output
by applying a second set of inputs. This process continues until 10 outputs are XORed and
the result is stored in a register. The output stored in the register has the same number of
output bits as the original circuit. After completion of 9 cycles, clk2 stops and clk3 starts in
order to calculate the final response. The final response bits are half in number compared to
original number of bits due to XORing amongst each other. For example, if the immediate
result stored in the register has 4 bits, then bit 1 is XORed with bit 3 and bit 2 is XORed
with bit 4. The final response will be 2 bits.
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Figure 7.13: Post-processing scheme for authentication [149].

Table 7.5: Results of standard PUF metrics for the benchmark circuits using testability
based replacement method [149].
Benchmark Uniqueness (%) Uniformity (%) Bit-Aliasing (%)
C17
50.01
49.93
50.13
C432
49.99
50.03
50.03
C880
50.01
49.99
49.87
C1355
50.01
50.05
50.05
C1908
49.99
49.82
49.82
C3540
50.03
50.01
50.01
C5315
49.85
49.52
48.71
C7552
49.99
50.04
49.07

124

The post-processing scheme is required to ensure that the outputs of the benchmark
circuits meet the ideal PUF metrics described in section 7.2.8. The three PUF metrics
uniqueness, bit-aliasing and uniformity are calculated after the final response is generated
from the post-processing scheme. Table 7.5 displays the results of the PUF metrics after the
circuit gates have been replaced using testability based replacement algorithm. Percentage
of gates replaced in the circuits is the same as the third column of Table 7.4. The results are
obtained after post-processing scheme in Fig. 7.13 has been applied. All the metrics have
the ideal value of 50% which means that the circuits can also be used for authentication of
devices. The circuits with large number of outputs can be considered a strong PUF since
they will have a large CRP space.

7.5
7.5.1

Security Performance
Security of Logic Locked Circuits

The main aim of using logic locking is to hamper the adversary’s ability to change the
contents or reverse engineer the functionality of an IC. The foundry can attempt to produce
extra ICs without the owner’s permission, but the chip will not function properly without
the knowledge of the correct key. The adversary can make an educated guess about the key
but the key space is extremely large and it would take exponential time and resources to
decipher the valid key. Moreover, when standard gates are replaced with chaos-based logic
gates, each IC will have a different valid key due to the effect of process variation. The
innate complexity of a chaos-based system can be leveraged to suppress information leakage
to the attackers.
Reconfigurable chaos-based logic gates look similar to the attacker in the layout-level
geometry. It will be difficult for the adversary to learn the functionality of each block. If
XOR/XNOR gates are used, the attacker can easily learn the entire netlist using reverse
engineering techniques. XOR/XNOR gates provide only 1-bit key after insertion whereas
each chaos-based logic gate provides 10-bit key. Chaos-based logic gates are able to generate
all the possible functions which poses a huge burden on the attacker. If 10 gates are replaced
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with chaos-based logic gate, then the secret key will be 100 bits long. In practice, the chip
will have billions of transistors and a considerable amount of gates will be replaced by the
chaos-based logic gates. The key size increases with increase in number of gates replaced.
The key can be stored in a tamper-proof memory. After characterizing each IC, the designer
can blow out the fuses of read/write circuitry which provides access to the memory.
Some of the common attacks against logic locked circuits are discussed below.
Side Channel Attack (SCA)
This procedure utilizes side channel information such as timing and power in order to break
security primitives. When gates are replaced in an obfuscated netlist, the attackers look for
power signatures when the replaced gate tries to perform a different functionality. Chaosbased reconfigurable gates can successfully mitigate power analysis based side channel attack.
The attacker is not able to distinguish between different functionalities by applying popular
machine learning algorithms [105, 104].
Brute Force Attack (BFA)
The attacker can directly try all the possible combinations of functionality that an obfuscated
gate can perform [129].

The attacker iterates through each possible combination and

simulates the locked IC to generate the output and compares the generated output with
a functional IC bought from the market. If the generated output matches the output of the
functional IC, then the secret key is revealed.
The functionality of each chaos-based reconfigurable logic gate appears as 16 different
functionalities for the attacker. The brute force effort of the attacker will be 16N = 24N
where N is the number of gates replaced in the design except the gates that are directly
connected to the primary output. Such an attack poses an exponential effort on the part of
the attacker especially if the value of N is large.
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Figure 7.14: Circuit to determine distinguishing input patterns (DIPs) [182].

(a)

(b)

Figure 7.15: Logic locking example (a) Original circuit (b) Locked circuit [160].
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Boolean SAT Attack
It is essential that the proposed computing system is resistant against Boolean SAT attack
for the logic locking scheme to be successful [160]. The SAT attack model assumes two
things:
1. The attacker has access to the mask information and layout. The gate-level netlist can
be reverse-engineered from the available information [165].
2. Random input patterns can be applied to the IC and there is a golden IC (bought from
the open market) from which the outputs can be compared to the outputs obtained
from the locked IC.
The attacker can only apply a certain number of input patterns to the activated chip
and determine the correct key based on these results. If a set of input-output patterns are
given, a SAT solver will be able to find a key that satisfies the applied patterns only. The
key might generate correct output for the observations made but the problem is that the key
needs to fulfill all the possible input-output pairs. Moreover, verifying that the correct key is
extracted might require application of all possible input patterns. For example, if there are
M input patterns in a system then 2M input patterns must be applied in order to verify the
correctness of the key. This method seems impractical since the number of input patterns
can be significantly high depending on the size of the system.
SAT attack finds distinguishing input patterns (DIPs) by comparing two outputs
generated from two different keys. The generated outputs are matched with the output
from a golden IC. If the output is wrong, the key is eliminated [160]. A single DIP is
capable of eliminating multiple incorrect keys [182]. The algorithm continues until all the
DIPs are evaluated. After the program converges, the keys that are not eliminated are the
probable correct keys for the locked chip being considered. The correct key satisfies all the
possible input-output patterns of the locked IC. SAT attack needs only a small amount of
observations from the golden IC in order to extract the secret key.
The DIPs are found by utilizing a circuit shown in Fig. 7.14. The same primary inputs
are applied to the two copies of the locked circuit for different set of keys. The outputs
from the two locked circuits are XORed and then Ored to generate the diff signal. The
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Conjunctive Normal Form (CNF) of the resulting system is created and passed to the SAT
solver. The SAT solver then finds an input (DIP) that outputs diff = 1 where the outputs
of the two circuits are different. The DIP is then applied to the activated IC to find the
correct output. The correct output is used to eliminate the incorrect keys. In this manner,
more DIPs are generated in order to eliminate more key values. A new value is passed on to
the SAT solver in every iteration and the formula is updated. The SAT attack stops when
new DIPs are not found and all the incorrect keys have been discarded [182].
An example of original circuit and locked circuit is shown in Fig. 7.15. Suppose the SAT
solver generates a DIP of (a, b, c) = (1, 0, 1) in the first iteration for which the output, y is
evaluated to be 1 from the original circuit. Initially, the key used is (k1 , k2 ) = (0, 1) which
yields an output, y = 0 from the locked chip. The key pair (0, 1) does not represent the
correct key pair. In the second iteration, the DIP is equal to (a, b, c) = (0, 0, 0) for which
y is equal to 0. The SAT solver terminates because the only key pair that satisfies the
original output value is (k1 , k2 ) = (1, 1). The fault-analysis attack cannot be carried out on
the locked circuit in Fig. 7.15b because the key values cannot be propagated to the primary
output. In earlier days, the only way to retrieve the secret key from the given locked circuit
was brute-force attack by searching the entire key space. Now, it can be seen that Boolean
SAT attack is able to extract the secret key.
Another example of SAT attack on a logic locked circuit is shown in Fig. 7.16. Table
7.6 represents the output of the original circuit, y shown in Fig. 7.16a. The output of the
locked circuit for different key values are also shown in the following columns. There are 3
key inputs so there are 8 possible combinations of the key. The key values are represented as
k0 , k1 , k2 ...k7 . The SAT solver takes four iterations to decipher the correct key. In iteration
1, (a, b, c) = (0, 1, 1) which helps in eliminating key, k4 since the output is wrong. In the
second and third iteration, key values, k1 and k7 are also eliminated for DIPs with values
(a, b, c) = (1, 1, 1) and (a, b, c) = (1, 0, 1) respectively. The DIP, (a, b, c) = (1, 0, 0) used in the
fourth iteration eliminates all the incorrect keys and identifies the correct key, k6 = 110. The
attack would been much faster if the first DIP chosen was (a, b, c) = (1, 0, 0). The execution
time is dependent on the order of the DIPs applied to the SAT solver. The DIPs are chosen
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(a)

(b)

Figure 7.16: Logic locking second example (a) Original circuit (b) Locked circuit [182].

Table 7.6: SAT attack on a logic locked circuit shown in Fig. 7.16b. [182].
No.
0
1
2
3
4
5
6
7

a b c

y

0
0
0
0
1
1
1
1

0
0
0
1
0
1
1
1

0
0
1
1
0
0
0
1

0
1
0
1
0
1
1
1

Output y for different
k0 k1 k2 k3 k4 k5
1 1 1 1 1 1
1 1 1 1 1 1
1 1 1 1 1 1
1 1 1 1 0 1
1 1 1 1 1 1
1 1 1 1 1 1
1 1 0 1 1 1
1 0 1 1 1 1

key values
k6
k7
0
1
0
1
0
1
1
1
0
1
1
0
1
1
1
1

Eliminated keys

iteration 1: k4
iteration 4: all correct
iteration 3: k7
iteration 2: k1

Figure 7.17: SAT attack implemented on C432 benchmark circuit for varying percentage of
gates and key sizes [149].
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randomly. If the selected DIP can eliminate more incorrect key values per iteration, then
the attack time will be much faster.
Researchers have proposed multiple solutions in literature to make the locked chip
resistant against SAT attack.

SARLock proposed a lightweight technique to increase

the number of DIPs required to extract the secret key which increases the attack time
exponentially [182]. Anti-SAT is another lightweight circuit block that aims to mitigate the
SAT attack by increasing the total number of iterations required to obtain the correct key
[178]. In Anti-SAT, the execution time of the attack is an exponential function of the key size
in the circuit. Unfortunately, SAT attack mitigation techniques are vulnerable to ”removal”
attacks. Therefore, researchers have proposed a solution that creates densely populated cyclic
circuits that are obfuscated. Cyclic obfuscation is achieved by adding dummy gates and wires
to the original circuit and creating logical loops that cannot be solved by the SAT solver
since a directed acyclic graph (DAG) does not exist [146]. Double DIP is another technique
that eliminates two wrong keys per iteration ensuring that it does not take exponential time
to retrieve the correct key by using SAT attack [152].
In traditional logic locking schemes, insertion based method is utilized and each key gate
adds only a single key bit. This poses a restriction on the number of key size that is required
to make the attack computationally infeasible for an adversary. Even the look-up-table
(LUT) based logic locking scheme fails to provide the desired flexibility in terms of key size
since the memory required increases exponentially with the increase in number of key bits.
Chaos-based logic gates provide the flexibility of increasing the key size without adding a
substantial hardware cost.
The complexity of the logic locking scheme, discussed in section 7.3.8, has been analyzed
by implementing SAT attack. The attack tool is available online at [2]. The machine used
for carrying out the attack on the proposed computing system is Intel Xeon E5-2660 CPU
with 2.6 GHz clock frequency and 125 GB memory. The attack complexity is measured
by the time it takes to recover the secret key for different percentage of chaos-based logic
gates replaced in the system. Chaos-based logic gates are capable of generating multiple
functionality for varying input key bits. The key space of the chaos-based logic gates can
be increased by replacing more gates. SAT attack has been performed on C432 benchmark
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circuit for varying percentage of chaos-based gates present in the system and varying key
sizes. The results are displayed in Fig. 7.17.
It is seen from the results that the attack complexity increases by increasing the number
of chaos-based gates used in the system for a given key size. Attack complexity can also be
enhanced when the number of key gates replaced is fixed but the key size of each chaos-based
logic gate is increased. The proposed computing system is vulnerable to process variation so
the secret key is different for each chip. If an adversary is able to extract the secret key by
utilizing SAT attack, the key is only valid for that particular chip. The attacker will have
to perform the time intensive procedure of deciphering the key for each individual chip.
Reconfigurable chaos-based logic gates have a non-uniform functionality space which adds
to the SAT attack complexity. Most of the generated functions from each chaos-based logic
gates are either ones or zeros. The desired functions such as OR, NOR, AND, NAND, XOR
and XNOR have less probability of existing in the entire functionality space. For example,
if a 2-input chaos-based logic gate with 10-bit key has uniform functionality space, each
logic function will occur 64 times and will have a distribution of 1/16. In reality, the average
probability of finding a desired function is much less than 1/16 as can be seen in Fig. 7.7. As
a result, discovering the correct key by eliminating all the wrong keys might take additional
effort from the attacker’s side.
Chaos-based logic gates also have unreliable functions in the functionality space which
are affected by change in temperature and supply voltage. This undesired feature can be
utilized to prevent SAT attack from extracting the right key. It is significantly important
that the generated functions from the chaos-based logic gates remain stable under varying
environmental conditions. Reliable functions should only be considered while characterizing
the proposed computing system. While executing the SAT attack on the system, it is highly
probable that the SAT attack will converge to an unreliable key. A similar work is found in
literature where researchers have used functions that have morphing feature and the SAT tool
converges to the wrong key [133]. SAT solvers need to be modified in order to accommodate
the morphing/unreliable functions that is an inherent quality of dynamic circuits.
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7.5.2

Security of PUFs

The large benchmark circuits can be used for authentication purposes in the PURCS system
when appropriate amount of gates are replaced by chaos-based logic gates. The generation
of responses depends on the intrinsic characteristic of the chaotic oscillator. Physical attacks
by the adversary will be difficult to execute without hindering the operation of the system. It
has already been shown in literature that chaos-based logic gates can mitigate power analysis
based side channel attacks [105]. Common machine learning attacks have been executed on
the PURCS system to test its immunity against modeling attacks.
Classification Algorithm
Classification algorithms are used to classify test data based on the training data that is built
from the data sets. The training data set in supervised learning usually has a x, y format.
Here, x represents an instance and y represents its class. A class is determined by the
classifier based on the training data for a random instance of x. Several classifiers are used
in machine learning algorithms and their performance is judged based on implementation
cost, speed, accuracy and the nature of the problem. Some of the classification algorithms
are described briefly.
Logistic Regression (LR): Logistic Regression is a statistical method for analyzing
the data set and it helps in predicting a double branched outcome [22]. It performs the job
of a binary classifier but is closely related to a regression model. It analyzes the data set
and assigns a probability to each data point so that it belongs to one of the two classes. LR
utilizes signum or logit function to perform the classification. LR is a powerful algorithm
since it has a small feature set and is used widely due to its easy-to-implement algorithm
and fast convergence.
K-Nearest Neighbor (K-NN): K-NN is a non-parametric lazy supervised algorithm
and one of the fundamental tools used for classification [51]. The algorithm is called nonparametric because data generalization is not needed and it does not make any assumptions
about the data. The entire training data set needs to be stored for the classification algorithm
to work. This feature makes the algorithm computationally expensive. A sample is identified
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based on its distance from each of the training sets. The test samples are assigned to the
most common class among the K closest training samples. Different values of K can be
chosen based on the application. It is also possible to choose different distance measurement
methods for multi-dimensional data sets. Some of the algorithms used for calculating the
distances in K-NN are Correlation, Euclidean and Cosine distance functions [174, 112, 41].
In this work, Euclidean distance has been used and it is measured as the distance between
two instances x1 and x2 . The equation for calculating the distance is as follows:
v
u L
uX
deuc (x1 , x2 ) =t (x1i − x2i )2 ,

(7.9)

i=1

where x1 and x2 have L features and x1i and x2i are the i-th sample points.
Decision Tree (DT): A decision/classification tree is a simple representation for
classifying data sets. Each internal node of the tree is labeled with an input feature. The arcs
coming from a node labeled with an input feature are labeled with each of the possible values
of the output feature. Otherwise, the arc leads to a subordinate decision node on a different
input feature. Each leaf of the tree is labeled with a class or a probability distribution over
the classes. In order to predict a response, the decisions in the tree must be followed from
the root node down to a leaf node which contains the result of the classification [143].
Support Vector Machine (SVM): SVM is a very commonly used classification
algorithm [77]. It performs binary classification by using two classes to categorize training
sets. One category belongs to a specific class and the other category combines all the other
classes. It is a non-probabilistic classifier where the test sample falls into one of the two
classes. The SVM classifier works by drawing a line into the 2D space which contains the
training samples and makes a clean partition between them. New samples are classified
based on the side of the line it falls into. SVM is also capable of classifying multi-class
data sets by utilizing kernel functions such as Gaussian radial basis function [73]. There
are multiple binary classifiers in SVM such as ’onevsall’, ’onevsone’, ’denser random’ and
’binary complete’. For a K-way multiclass problem, ‘onevsall’ and ‘onevsone’ train k and
k(k−1)
2

binary classifiers, respectively.
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Naive Bayes (NB): Naive Bayes is a conditional probability model based on Bayes’
theorem with additional simplifying assumptions. Given a problem instance to be classified,
represented by a vector x = (x1 , . . . , xn ) representing some n features (independent
variables), it assigns probabilities to the instance, p(Ck |x1 , . . . , xn ) for each of k possible
outcomes. It labels the data as belonging to the class with the highest probability. The
combination of Bayes’ theorem and very simplistic conditional independence assumptions
Q
leads to the problem boiling down to calculating the value of p(Ck ) ni=1 p(xi |Ck ) for each
class. Finally, the class with maximum value is chosen [135].
AdaBoostM2 Ensemble: AdaBoost is short for Adaptive Boosting and is a machine
learning meta-algorithm. It can be used in combination with various types of learning
algorithms in order to enhance performance. The output of other learning algorithms (weak
learner) is converted into a weighted sum and this value is the final output of the classifier.
AdaBoost is an adaptive algorithm because weak learners can be altered for those instances
which were wrongly classified by previous classifiers. The disadvantage is that the algorithm
is susceptible to outliers and noisy data sets. Although, the individual learners can be weak,
if the performance of each one is better than a random guess, then the final model will be
forced to converge to a strong learner [49].
Machine Learning Based Modeling Attack on the PURCS System
Attacks on PUFs depends on many factors such as skills of the attacker, cost, speed, accuracy
of the tolls and instruments used, knowledge about the PUF behavior and information
leakage of the devices. Due to increased speed, precision and affordability of advanced tools,
side channel analysis is becoming more executable in order to decipher the secret key of the
PUF. The security of PUFs lies in the assumption that the PUF cannot be modeled and
that the attacker does not have access to the entire challenge-response space. Researchers are
able to model PUFs using machine learning techniques [141]. If the PUF circuit is simple,
attackers can construct an accurate timing model and learn the behavior of the PUF after
collecting many CRPs [93]. In Arbiter PUF, delay of the two paths could be linearly added
to determine the response bit [55]. These limitations led to the discovery of more “nonlinear”
effects to make the modeling attacks non-executable. Studies have shown that previously
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resilient strong PUFs were susceptible to a combination of side-channel attacks and machine
learning attacks [103, 142]. Post-processing the PUF responses might be required to scramble
the output bits in order to mitigate the attacks but it comes at a cost of reduced effectiveness
in an authentication protocol. The post-processing scheme helps in reducing the accuracy
of the machine learning attacks but it also increases the intrinsic PUF error resulting in
reduced stability.
The immunity of the proposed hybrid system has been tested against common machine
learning attacks such as Logistic Regression, AdaBoostM2 Ensemble, K-Nearest Neighbor,
Decision Tree and Support Vector Machine. The machine learning toolbox from MATLAB
has been used [3]. The modeling attack has been implemented on all the combinational
benchmark circuits and the results are shown in Table 7.7. 5000 challenge-response pairs are
collected from the PURCS system. 80% of the data has been used for training the classifiers
and remaining data has been used for testing. If the PUF is robust against modeling attacks,
then a new response from an unknown challenge should be close to a random guess. The
testing accuracy of a new data point should be 50% ideally. The results demonstrate that
the testing accuracy is close to 50% for the eight benchmark circuits which proves that the
system is immune to ML attacks.

7.6

Overhead Analysis

Reconfigurable chaos-based logic gates are comparable to reconfigurable barrier based or
look-up table based logic locking.

Look-up tables require SRAMs and MUXs which

significantly add to the area and power consumption. The size of LUTs increase if the
input size increases. Each reconfigurable chaos-based logic gate performs multiple functions
similar to LUTs. The advantage of using chaos-based logic gates is that they can be easily
transformed into multi-input gates with a slight increase in the overhead.
Table 7.8 gives an estimation of the number of transistors with the increase in key size.
When XOR/XNOR based logic locking is performed, XOR/XNOR gates are added to the
system in addition to the existing circuitry whereas LUTs or chaos-based logic gates are
replaced into the original design. It is approximated that XOR gates require 8 transistors
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and provides a 1-bit key for each additional XOR gate inserted in the design. In order to
obtain a 50 bit key, 400 additional transistors are inserted into the original design. For the
purpose of comparison, we are assuming that chaos-based logic gates and LUTs are actual
overheads to the design. The overhead for a single 10-input LUT which uses 2 : 1 MUXs (4
transistors), SRAM cells (6 transistors) and inverters (2 transistors) is 10256 transistors. The
chaos-based logic gate has 10-bit key and uses 68 transistors which includes the 3-bit DAC (3
transistors), comparators (9 transistors in each comparator), clocking circuit (35 transistors)
and the chaotic oscillator (12 transistors including the pass gates in the sample-and-hold
circuit). It can seen from the table that XOR based and LUT based systems require more
transistors compared to chaos-based logic gate in order to achieve the same key size.
The core of the system is an analog circuit which portrays different characteristics in
different chips due to process variation. The functionality of LUTs does not vary in different
chips unless different values are configured post-fabrication by the trusted designer. The
chaotic oscillator provides ideal PUF characteristics which allows the same system to be
used for device authentication.

The proposed circuit is area and power efficient since

EEPROM/RAMs are not required to store the key bits for authenticating connecting devices.
Table 7.9 shows the transistor count for the C17 benchmark circuit for a 30-bit
key/challenge. The table shows a comparison of transistor count if both logic locking and
authentication circuits are present in a system. Table 7.4 states that 55% of gates need to
be replaced in C17 benchmark circuit which means three gates. Three NAND gates in the
circuit are replaced and the key/challenge size is 30 bits. The circuit produces 1 response bit
after post-processing. The results in the table shows that the proposed chaos-based system
utilizes significantly less number of transistors compared to a system which incorporates
traditional logic locking and PUFs in the same system.

7.7

Modes of Operation

There are two modes of operation of the proposed computing system: logic locking mode
and authentication mode.
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Table 7.7: Result of machine learning based modeling attacks on PURCS system using
testability based replacement method [149].
Benchmark
C17
C432
C880
C1355
C1908
C3540
C5315
C7552

LR
KNN (k=1)
Train Test Train Test
54.57 49.7 84.97 50.4
63.01 49.5 84.75 50.67
64.51 50.11 85.1 50.33
58.28 50.49 85.04 49.4
61.21 49.69 84.85 49.88
64.19 50.02 85.07 50.45
51.79
50
85.14 50.5
51.63 50.07 85.05 49.79

DT
SVM
NB
AdaB. Ensem.
Train Test Train Test Train Test Train
Test
79.27 50.3 60.45 50.3 58.95 49.5
79.3
51
81.57 50.3 85.11 49.63 78.18 50.33 93.03
51.07
82.76 50.12 85.08 50.07 84.88 49.8 96.83
50.02
82.46 49.58 84.86 50.02 84.2 50.18 96.04
50.45
82.86 49.9 84.98 48.53 84.99 48.83 97.38
50.53
83.14 50.57 84.8 49.63 84.74 49.85 98.11
50.76
83.93 50.44 85.02
50
83.9 49.91 88.49
49.96
84.05 49.94 84.85 49.94 84.77 49.98 90.05
49.66

Table 7.8: An estimate of transistor count in different logic locking schemes [149].
Key Size
50
100
200

Transistor count
XOR based 10-input LUT based 10-bit Chaos-based
400
51280
340
800
102560
680
1600
205120
1360

Table 7.9: Estimation of transistor count for both PUF and logic locking in a system with
30-bit key/challenge [149].
Transistor count
Arb + XOR Arb + LUT Ring + XOR Ring + LUT
518
31022
1452
31956
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Chaos-based
240

7.7.1

Logic Locking Mode

In logic locking mode, the main goal is to obfuscate the design to avoid IC counterfeiting. Fig.
7.18a shows the schematic of logic locking mode. The secret key of the system is stored in
tamper-proof memory and it is the combination of the configuration key of the reconfigurable
chaos-based logic gates. Each chaos-based gate has 10-bit key and the key space increases
with increase in number of chaos-based gates in the system. Hamming distance has been
calculated between correct and wrong outputs in order to ensure that half of the bits are
flipped. After post-fabrication characterization, the correct keys are stored in a tamper-proof
memory for correct operation of the system.

7.7.2

Authentication Mode

In authentication mode, the design exploits the fact that chaos-based gates are susceptible
to small changes in the initial condition. Process variation in the manufacturing process
changes the internal characteristics of the gates slightly which in turn changes how the
inputs are mapped to outputs in the chaos-based gates. This feature ensures that the key
is unique to each IC. The input is kept fixed and the challenges are applied based on the
authentication protocol discussed in section 7.2.7. After post-processing, the responses from
the systems demonstrates almost ideal PUF characteristics. Fig. 7.18b shows the schematic
of the system in authentication mode.

(a)

(b)

Figure 7.18: (a) Logic locking mode (b) Authentication mode.
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Chapter 8
Contribution and Future Work
8.1

Original Contribution

The goal of this work is to utilize discrete-time chaos-based systems for various hardware
security applications. The following points demonstrate the contributions of this dissertation.
• The three transistor chaotic map has been redesigned and simulated in 65 nm
process to optimize the power and area consumption. Multi-input and multi-output
reconfigurable chaos-based logic gates have been designed. It has been demonstrated
that simple as well as complex functions can be generated from a single chaos-based
system which aids in reducing the number of transistors used in a chip.
• The functionality space of chaos-based system using three transistor map has been
increased by varying the bias voltage in each iteration. Three different bias voltages
has been chosen from the chaotic region and four different threshold voltage levels
has been chosen to obtain different Boolean functions. Results show that the entire
functionality space increases exponentially with iteration number. The number of
individual functions such as AND, OR and XOR seem to portray an upward rise with
increase in design space. This huge functionality space helps to mitigate power analysis
based side channel attack.
• A novel G4 NDR based discrete-time chaotic map has been developed.

The map

has three independent bifurcation parameters which can be biased separately. The
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bifurcation diagram and Lyapunov exponent demonstrates excellent chaotic property
and wider chaotic regions. The functionality space of the G4 NDR based logic gate is
significantly large compared to the three transistor map based gate. This limitation is
mainly due to the presence of only one bifurcation parameter in three transistor chaotic
map. Reconfigurable chaos-based logic gates has been designed using the novel map
circuit and different configurations are demonstrated for implementing the standard
logic gates.
• A lightweight and reconfigurable pseudo-random generator has been designed using the
three transistor based chaotic oscillator. The analog output of the chaotic oscillator
is converted to a digital value by using a 10-bit ADC where the 10th bit is used for
random number generation. The output generated from a single chaotic oscillator is
not random enough to pass all the NIST tests. The output from two chaotic oscillators
are XORed and the final output passes all the tests. This proves that the sequence is
random and can be used for cryptographic applications.
• A physically unclonable and reconfigurable computing system has been designed which
can mitigate IC counterfeiting by replacing original CMOS gates in the circuit with
chaos-based logic gates. The gates are replaced using testability based method in order
to ensure that fewer gates needs to be replaced to achieve 50% Hamming distance. Each
chaos-based logic gate has 10-bit key. The same system can be used for authentication
of devices since chaos-based logic gates are vulnerable to process variation which can
be utilized to generate a unique signature in each chip. The challenges are made up of
the key and primary inputs and the responses are the primary outputs of the system.
The system has to be large enough so that the CRP space is large in order to be used
for authentication. After post-processing of the responses, the system demonstrates
near ideal PUF characteristics. It has also been shown that the system is resistant
against Boolean SAT attack and common machine learning based modeling attacks.
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8.2

Future Work

Chaos-based system can be a huge asset for mitigating hardware security issues. There is a
lot of scope for expanding this work for future research purposes. Some of the future research
directions are:
• A new PRNG design can be explored where two different chaotic maps will be coupled.
The output of one map can be used as a bifurcation parameter for the other map.
This technique should help in increasing the entropy of the generated sequence. The
chaotic region in the bifurcation diagram is expected to be larger than the current three
transistor chaotic oscillator which makes the PRNG more tunable. The final chaotic
oscillator will be more sensitive to initial conditions and have more complex behaviour.
• The PURCS system must be resistant against SAT attack for the logic locking scheme
to be successful. This work has shown that the system is resistant against SAT attack
using only one benchmark circuit. The SAT attack tool needs to be modified so that it
can work for reconfigurable/morphing logic. The SAT tool is not equipped to handle
systems which might have unreliable functionality space.
• Extensive analysis should be performed on the chaos-based systems to improve the
reliability of the generated output voltages from the chaotic oscillator. In this work,
some preliminary simulations have been performed to determine the stability of the
functions due to temperature and supply voltage variations.
• The entire PURCS system can be fabricated and an exhaustive testing methodology
can be developed in order to characterize the functionality of the entire system. It is
important to know the effects of surrounding environment on the chaotic system and
calculate the reliability of the functions under different conditions.
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[156] Škorić, B., Tuyls, P., and Ophey, W. (2005). Robust key extraction from physical
uncloneable functions. In International Conference on Applied Cryptography and Network
Security, pages 407–422. Springer. 100
[157] Skorobogatov, S. P. (2005). Semi-invasive attacks: a new approach to hardware security
analysis. 99
[158] Stojanovski, T. and Kocarev, L. (2001). Chaos-based random number generators-part
i: analysis [cryptography]. IEEE Transactions on Circuits and Systems I: Fundamental
Theory and Applications, 48(3):281–288. 75
[159] Stojanovski, T., Pihl, J., and Kocarev, L. (2001).

Chaos-based random number

generators. part ii: practical realization. IEEE Transactions on Circuits and Systems
I: Fundamental Theory and Applications, 48(3):382–385. 75
[160] Subramanyan, P., Ray, S., and Malik, S. (2015). Evaluating the security of logic
encryption algorithms. In 2015 IEEE International Symposium on Hardware Oriented
Security and Trust (HOST), pages 137–143. IEEE. xvi, 127, 128
[161] Suh, G. E. and Devadas, S. (2007).

Physical unclonable functions for device

authentication and secret key generation. In 2007 44th ACM/IEEE Design Automation
Conference, pages 9–14. IEEE. xvi, 98, 99, 103
160

[162] Suneel, M. (2009). Cryptographic pseudo-random sequences from the chaotic hénon
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A

Random Number Generator

A.1

SKILL Code for Modeling the Chaotic Oscillator

The value of Vc has been partitioned by 2 mV in the range of 0 V to 1.2 V . Two SKILL
files are required to complete the modeling due to the limitation on the size of .csv file.
File 1
declare(Vc[241])
;For two new VCs, exploring chaotic behavior, VC=0.625, 0.65
declare(in[1201])
declare(out[1201])

for(p 0 length(in)-1
;in[p]=p*0.1;
in[p]=p*0.001;
;fprintf(myport2 "%d," RN[p])
)
for(p 0 length(Vc)-1
;in[p]=p*0.1;
Vc[p]=p*0.0025;

;fprintf(myport2 "%d," RN[p])
)
myport1=outfile("/home/ashanta1/seneca/PRNG new analysis/
Lookup_table_generation_skill/lookup_mwscas_ckt_trans_first_geo6_1.csv")

for(i 0 length(Vc)-1
simulator( 'spectre )
design(
"/data1/aysha/simulation/map_ckt_with_trans_gate_geo6/spectre/schematic
/netlist/netlist")
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resultsDir( "/data1/aysha/simulation/map_ckt_with_
trans_gate_geo6/spectre/schematic" )
modelFile(
'("/data1/IBM_PDK_MOD/cmos10lpe/V1.5.0.0RF/Spectre/models/design.scs"
"")
)
stimulusFile( ?xlate nil
"/data1/aysha/simulation/map_ckt_with_trans_
gate_geo6/spectre/schematic/netlist/_graphical_stimuli.scs")
;analysis('tran ?stop "20n" ?errpreset "moderate" )
analysis('dc ?param "Vin" ?start "0" ?stop "1.2"
?step "1m" )
desVar( "Vin" 0 )
desVar( "Vc" Vc[i] )
envOption(
'firstRun t
'analysisOrder list("dc" "tran")
)
temp( 27 )
run()
for(j 0 length(in)-1
out[j]=value(VDC("/out") in[j] )
;print(xinit)
fprintf(myport1 "%e," Vc[i])
fprintf(myport1 "%e," in[j])
fprintf(myport1 "%e," out[j])
fprintf(myport1 "\n")
;plot(getData("/net10") )
)
)
close(myport1)
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File 2
declare(Vc[240])

;For two new VCs, exploring chaotic behavior, VC=0.625, 0.65
declare(in[1201])
declare(out[1201])

for(p 0 length(in)-1
;in[p]=p*0.1;
in[p]=p*0.001;
;fprintf(myport2 "%d," RN[p])
)

for(p 0 length(Vc)-1
;in[p]=p*0.1;
Vc[p]=p*0.0025+0.6025;

;fprintf(myport2 "%d," RN[p])
)

myport1=outfile("/home/ashanta1/seneca/PRNG new analysis/
Lookup_table_generation_skill/lookup_mwscas_ckt_trans_first_geo6_2.csv")

for(i 0 length(Vc)-1
simulator( 'spectre )
design( "/data1/aysha/simulation/map_ckt_
with_trans_gate_geo6/spectre/schematic/netlist/netlist")

resultsDir( "/data1/aysha/simulation/map_ckt_
with_trans_gate_geo6/spectre/schematic" )
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modelFile(
'("/data1/IBM_PDK_MOD/cmos10lpe/V1.5.0.0RF/Spectre/models/design.scs"
"")
)
stimulusFile( ?xlate nil
"/data1/aysha/simulation/map_ckt_with_trans
_gate_geo6/spectre/schematic/netlist/_graphical_stimuli.scs")
;analysis('tran ?stop "20n" ?errpreset "moderate" )
analysis('dc ?param "Vin" ?start "0" ?stop "1.2"
?step "1m" )
desVar( "Vin" 0 )
desVar( "Vc" Vc[i] )
envOption(
'firstRun t
'analysisOrder list("dc" "tran")
)

temp( 27 )
run()

for(j 0 length(in)-1
out[j]=value(VDC("/out") in[j] )
;print(xinit)
fprintf(myport1 "%e," Vc[i])
fprintf(myport1 "%e," in[j])
fprintf(myport1 "%e," out[j])
fprintf(myport1 "\n")
)
)
close(myport1)
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A.2

Matlab Code for Plotting the Bifurcation Diagram

M1=csvread('lookup_mwscas_ckt_trans_first_geo6_1.csv');
M2=csvread('lookup_mwscas_ckt_trans_first_geo6_2.csv');

count=0;
res=1201;
start=1000;
iter=4000;

Vc1=0:2.5e-3:0.6;
for i=1:length(Vc1)

Vc_ta_1{i}=M1((i-1)*res+1:(i-1)*res+res,2:3);
%Vc_ta_4{i} =round(Vc_ta_4{i},3);
end

Vc2=602.5e-3:2.5e-3:1.2;
for i=1:length(Vc2)

Vc_ta_2{i}=M2((i-1)*res+1:(i-1)*res+res,2:3);
%Vc_ta_4{i} =round(Vc_ta_4{i},3);
end

for i=1:length(Vc1)
ta=Vc_ta_1{i};
%vc=0.375;
Vin=ta(:,1);
Vout=ta(:,2);

in=0.6;
for j=1:iter
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%vout(j)=Vout(in_ind);
vout(j)= interp1(Vin,Vout,in);
%[val in_ind]=min(abs(vout(j)-Vin));
in=vout(j);
end
vout=vout(start:end);
bi_fur{i}=vout;

%figure
%plot(vout,'ro')
vc_plot=ones(1,length(vout))*Vc1(i);
plot(vc_plot,vout,'ro','markersize',2)
hold on
end

for i=1:length(Vc2)
ta=Vc_ta_2{i};
%vc=0.375;
Vin=ta(:,1);
Vout=ta(:,2);

in=0.6;
for j=1:iter

%vout(j)=Vout(in_ind);
vout(j)= interp1(Vin,Vout,in);
%[val in_ind]=min(abs(vout(j)-Vin));
in=vout(j);
end
vout=vout(start:end);
bi_fur{i}=vout;
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%figure
%plot(vout,'ro')
vc_plot=ones(1,length(vout))*Vc2(i);
plot(vc_plot,vout,'ro','markersize',2)
hold on
end

xlabel('Bifurcation Parameter, V_{c} (V)',
'fontweight','bold','fontsize',55)
ylabel('Output, V_{out} (V)', 'fontweight','bold','fontsize',55)

set(gca,'FontWeight','Bold','FontSize',45, 'LineWidth', 3)
ylim([0 1.2])

A.3

Matlab Code for Plotting the Lyapunov Exponent

%set up the number of data and control bits
n_data=2;
n_control=1;
n_bit=n_data+n_control;
iter=3000;
trun=300;

in=0.2;
%in2=in+0.01;
delta=0.001;
%csv files with transmission gate
M1=csvread('lookup_mwscas_ckt_trans_first_1.csv');
M2=csvread('lookup_mwscas_ckt_trans_first_2.csv');
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%finding range
vout1=M1(:,3);
vout2=M2(:,3);
[val1 ind1]=min(vout1);
[val2 ind2]=min(vout2);
if val1<val2
ind=ind1;
Vcmin=M1(ind,1);
vin_min=M1(ind,2);
vout_min=val1;
else
ind=ind2;
Vcmin=M2(ind,1);
vin_min=M2(ind,2);
vout_min=val2;
end

Vc1=0:2.5e-3:600e-3;
for i=1:length(Vc1)

Vc_ta_1{i}=M1((i-1)*1201+1:(i-1)*1201+1201,2:3);

end

Vc2=602.5e-3:2.5e-3:1.2;
for i=1:length(Vc2)

Vc_ta_2{i}=M2((i-1)*1201+1:(i-1)*1201+1201,2:3);

end
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%%%%%%%%%%%%% first table
vo_a=[];
Vc_plot=[];
LE_plot=[];
for i=1:length(Vc_ta_1)

ta=Vc_ta_1{i};
Vc_plot=[Vc_plot;Vc1(i)];
Vin=ta(:,1);
Vout=ta(:,2);

vi=in;
%vi2=in2;
sum=0;
for ii=1:iter
vo= interp1(Vin,Vout,vi);
vo2= interp1(Vin,Vout,vi+delta);
if ii>trun
sum=sum+log(abs((vo2-vo)/(delta)));
end
vi=vo;
%vi2=vo2;
end
if vo2˜=vo
%LE=log(abs((vo2-vo)/(in2-in)))/iter;
LE=sum/(iter-trun);
else
LE=-5;
end
%LE=log(abs((vo2-vo)/(in2-in)))/iter;
LE_plot=[LE_plot;LE];
%vo_a=[vo_a;vo];
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end

%%%%%%%%%%%%% second table
for i=1:length(Vc_ta_2)
ta=Vc_ta_2{i};
Vc_plot=[Vc_plot;Vc2(i)];
Vin=ta(:,1);
%[val ind]=min(abs(Vin-0.1932));
Vout=ta(:,2);

vi=in;
sum=0;
for ii=1:iter
vo= interp1(Vin,Vout,vi);
vo2= interp1(Vin,Vout,vi+delta);
if ii>trun
sum=sum+log(abs((vo2-vo)/(delta)));
end
vi=vo;
%vi2=vo2;
end
if vo2˜=vo
%LE=log(abs((vo2-vo)/(in2-in)))/iter;
LE=sum/(iter-trun);
else
LE=-5;
end
LE_plot=[LE_plot;LE];
end

figure
ind=find(LE_plot>0);
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chaotic_points=Vc_plot(ind);
stem(chaotic_points)

figure
plot(Vc_plot,LE_plot,'ro','markersize',1.2, 'Linewidth',6)
hold on
plot(Vc_plot,zeros(length(Vc_plot),1),'Linewidth',4.5)

xlabel('V_{c}(V)', 'fontweight','bold','fontsize',60)
ylabel('Lyapunov Exponent, \lambda', 'fontweight','bold','fontsize',55)
set(gca,'FontWeight','Bold','FontSize',40,'LineWidth', 6)
ylim([-5 1])

A.4

Matlab Code for Generating the Random Numbers

M1=csvread('lookup_mwscas_ckt_trans_first_1.csv');
M2=csvread('lookup_mwscas_ckt_trans_first_2.csv');

count=0;
res=1201;
seq_len = 2*10ˆ6;
%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%
start=10000; %start is the number of extra sequences generated
iter=seq_len+start; %total number of binary values generated is iter +
start
%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%
seed= [0.35:0.008:1.2]; %initial seed value, Vin
seed = seed(1:100);
%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%
num_Vc=1; %no. of different Vc(s) to be applied to the map circuits
%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%

175

num_seq = length(seed);
bin_seq_tot_fh = zeros(1, num_seq*seq_len/2);
bin_seq_tot_alter = zeros(1, num_seq*seq_len/2);
bin_seq_tot_xor = zeros(1, num_seq*seq_len/2);
bin_seq_tot = zeros(1, num_seq*seq_len);
anal_seq_tot = zeros(1, num_seq*seq_len);
starting1 = 1;
ending = seq_len;
starting_half1 = 1;
ending_half1 = seq_len/2;
starting_half2 = 1;
ending_half2 = seq_len/2;
for p = 1:num_seq
initial = seed(p)

%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%% Single Vc is considered
if num_Vc==1
Vc_app=0.575; %applied Vc

%ADC set up
vmin=0.31;
vmax=1.195;
nb=10; %no. of bits in ADC
nlev=2ˆnb;
resol=(vmax-vmin)/nlev;

Vc1=0:2.5e-3:0.6;
for i=1:length(Vc1)
Vc_ta_1{i}=M1((i-1)*res+1:(i-1)*res+res,2:3);
end

Vc2=602.5e-3:2.5e-3:1.2;
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for i=1:length(Vc2)
Vc_ta_2{i}=M2((i-1)*res+1:(i-1)*res+res,2:3);
end
Vc_ta=[Vc_ta_1 Vc_ta_2];
Vc_a=[Vc1 Vc2];
[val, ind]=min(abs(Vc_a-Vc_app));
ta=Vc_ta{ind};
Vin=ta(:,1);
Vout=ta(:,2);

in=initial;
for j=1:iter
vout(j)= interp1(Vin,Vout,in);
temp=ADC(resol,vout(j),nb,vmin);
vout_bin(j)=temp(end);
in=vout(j);
end
anal_seq=vout(start+1:end); %analog values
bin_seq=vout_bin(start+1:end); %binary sequence
end

%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%% Double Vc is considered
if num_Vc==2
Vc_app_1=0.575;
Vc_app_2=0.615;

%ADC set up
vmin=0.29; %minimum of the two values
vmax=1.2; %maximum of the two values
nb=10; %ADC bits
nlev=2ˆnb;
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resol=(vmax-vmin)/nlev;

Vc1=0:2.5e-3:0.6;
for i=1:length(Vc1)
Vc_ta_1{i}=M1((i-1)*res+1:(i-1)*res+res,2:3);
end

Vc2=602.5e-3:2.5e-3:1.2;
for i=1:length(Vc2)
Vc_ta_2{i}=M2((i-1)*res+1:(i-1)*res+res,2:3);
end
Vc_ta=[Vc_ta_1 Vc_ta_2];
Vc_a=[Vc1 Vc2];

[val, ind_1]=min(abs(Vc_a-Vc_app_1));
ta_1=Vc_ta{ind_1};
Vin1=ta_1(:,1);
Vout1=ta_1(:,2);

[val, ind_2]=min(abs(Vc_a-Vc_app_2));
ta_2=Vc_ta{ind_2};
Vin2=ta_2(:,1);
Vout2=ta_2(:,2);

in= initial;
for j=1:iter
if mod(j,2)==1
vout(j)= interp1(Vin1,Vout1,in);
else
vout(j)= interp1(Vin2,Vout2,in);
end
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temp=ADC(resol,vout(j),nb,vmin);
vout_bin(j)=temp(end);
in=vout(j);
end

anal_seq=vout(start+1:end); %analog values
bin_seq=vout_bin(start+1:end); %binary sequence
end

bin_seq_tot(starting1:ending) = bin_seq;
anal_seq_tot(starting1:ending) = anal_seq;
starting1 = starting1 + seq_len;
ending = ending + seq_len;

bin_seq_alter = bin_seq(2:2:seq_len);
bin_seq_tot_alter(starting_half1:ending_half1) = bin_seq_alter;
starting_half1 = starting_half1 + seq_len/2;
ending_half1 = ending_half1 + seq_len/2;

bin_seq_fh = bin_seq(1:seq_len/2);
bin_seq_tot_fh(starting_half2:ending_half2) = bin_seq_fh;

bin_seq_xor = zeros(1,seq_len/2);
a = 1;
b = 2;
for i = 1:seq_len/2
bin_seq_xor(i) = bitxor(bin_seq(a),bin_seq(b));
a = a+2;
b= b+2;
end
bin_seq_tot_xor(starting_half2:ending_half2) = bin_seq_xor;
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starting_half2 = starting_half2 + seq_len/2;
ending_half2 = ending_half2 + seq_len/2;

end

prob_alter=(sum(bin_seq_tot_alter)/length(bin_seq_tot_alter))*100
%probability of ones in the sequence
prob_fh=(sum(bin_seq_tot_fh)/length(bin_seq_tot_fh))*100
%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%
%writing to a file
str = [' ', ' ', ' ' ];
filename = 'ds_fh_100mil.txt';
studID = fopen(filename,'wt');
bin_seq_tot_fh = dec2bin(bin_seq_tot_fh);

temp = bin_seq_tot_fh(1:24);
fprintf(studID, str);
fprintf(studID,'%s\n',temp);
temp = zeros(1,25);
start = 25;
ending = 49;
for i = 1:length(bin_seq_tot_fh)/25-1
temp = bin_seq_tot_fh(start:ending);
start = start + 25;
ending = ending + 25;
fprintf(studID, str);
fprintf(studID,'%s\n',temp);

end
temp = bin_seq_tot_fh(start:end);
fprintf(studID, str);
fprintf(studID,'%s\n',temp);
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fclose(studID);

str_alter = [' ', ' ', ' '];
file_alter = 'ds_alt_100mil.txt';
studID_alter = fopen(file_alter,'wt');
bin_seq_tot_alter = dec2bin(bin_seq_tot_alter);
temp_alter = bin_seq_tot_alter(1:24);
fprintf(studID_alter, str_alter);
fprintf(studID_alter,'%s\n',temp_alter);
temp_alter = zeros(1,25);
start_alter = 25;
ending_alter = 49;
for i = 1:length(bin_seq_tot_alter)/25-1
temp_alter = bin_seq_tot_alter(start_alter:ending_alter);
start_alter = start_alter + 25;
ending_alter = ending_alter + 25;
fprintf(studID_alter, str_alter);
fprintf(studID_alter,'%s\n',temp_alter);
end
temp_alter = bin_seq_tot_alter(start_alter:end);
fprintf(studID_alter, str_alter);
fprintf(studID_alter,'%s\n',temp_alter);
fclose(studID_alter);

str_xor = [' ', ' ', ' '];
file_xor = 'ds_xor_100mil.txt';
studID_xor = fopen(file_xor,'wt');
bin_seq_tot_xor = dec2bin(bin_seq_tot_xor);
temp_xor = bin_seq_tot_xor(1:24);
fprintf(studID_xor, str_xor);
fprintf(studID_xor,'%s\n',temp_xor);
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temp_xor = zeros(1,25);
start_xor = 25;
ending_xor = 49;
for i = 1:length(bin_seq_tot_xor)/25-1
temp_xor = bin_seq_tot_xor(start_xor:ending_xor);
start_xor = start_xor + 25;
ending_xor = ending_xor + 25;
fprintf(studID_xor, str_xor);
fprintf(studID_xor,'%s\n',temp_xor);
end
temp_xor = bin_seq_tot_xor(start_xor:end);
fprintf(studID_xor, str_xor);
fprintf(studID_xor,'%s\n',temp_xor);
fclose(studID_xor);
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B

PURCS System

B.1

SKILL Code for Modeling the Chaotic Oscillator

declare(Vc[1])
Vc[0]=520m
myport1=outfile("/home/ashanta1/seneca/Monte Carlo 2
output/Threshold/ctrl_0_Vc_520m_50_iter_threshold.csv")
cycle = 25
per_a= 1u
per=2*cycle*per_a

del=50n
ttr=100p
for( k 0 0
simulator( 'spectre )
design(
"/data1/aysha/simulation/chaos_gate/spectre/schematic/netlist/netlist")
resultsDir( "/data1/aysha/simulation/chaos_gate/spectre/schematic" )
modelFile(
'("/data1/IBM_PDK_MOD/cmos10lpe/V1.5.0.0RF/Spectre/models/design.scs"
"")
)
stimulusFile( ?xlate nil
"/home/ashanta1/seneca/Monte Carlo 2
output/Threshold/stimuli_constantVc_4_input.scs")
analysis('tran ?stop "4*per+per/2" ?errpreset "conservative" )
desVar( "per_a" per_a )
desVar( "ttr" ttr )
desVar( "delay_a" del )
desVar( "del" del )
desVar( "per" per )
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desVar( "Vc" Vc[k] )
envOption(
'analysisOrder list("tran" "dc")
)
option( ?categ 'turboOpts
'proc_affinity "8"
'numThreads "32"
'mtOption "Manual"
'uniMode "APS"
)
temp( 27 )
run()
selectResult( 'tran )
;plot(getData("/clk") getData("/Vc") getData("/G0") getData("/net29")
getData("/Y") getData("/clka") getData("/clkb") getData("/IN")
getData("/OUT") getData("/nclkb") )
for(i 0 3
for(j 0 cycle-1
to1=i*per+(del+per/2)
to2=j*per_a+(0.25*per_a)
tsamp1=to1+to2
y1=value(v("/out1" ?result "tran") tsamp1)
fprintf(myport1 "%e," y1)
tsamp2=tsamp1+per_a/2
y2=value(v("/out2" ?result "tran") tsamp2)
fprintf(myport1 "%e," y2)
)
fprintf(myport1 "\n")
)
)
close(myport1)
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B.2

Matlab Code for Creating the Characterization Table

%key structure(N-bit): Vc(p-bit)|n(q-bit)|Vth(r-bit)|Cb(s-bit)

%parameter
p=4; %Vc
q=5; %iteration
r=0; %threshold
s=1; %control bit
N=p+q+r+s;
Vc=[486,488,490,506,510,512,518,520,524,528,526,538,540,546,556,564];
Vth=0.6207; %determined by calculating the median of all the values in
32 files
Cb=[0,1];
len_Vc=2ˆp;
len_Cb=2ˆs;
len_Vth=2ˆr;
len_n=2ˆq;

nchip=1;
for chip_no=1:nchip
%for chip_no=1:nchip
temp_char=zeros(2ˆN,6); %filed for key,individual parameter,function
for i=1:len_Vc %iterating through number of Vc
for j=1:len_Cb %iterating through number of Cb
infile=csvread(strcat(".\Raw data nominal
edited\ctrl_",int2str(Cb(j)),
"_Vc_",int2str(Vc(i)),"m_50_iter_edited.csv"));
field_Vc=flip(de2bi(i-1,p));
field_Cb=flip(de2bi(j-1,s));
for k=1:len_n %iterating through n
field_n=flip(de2bi(k-1,q));
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for l=1:len_Vth %iterating through Vth
field_Vth];
key=[field_n field_Vc field_Cb];
key_index=bi2de(flip(key))+1;
index_mat_funct=k+18:50:200;%index of 00,01,10,11 in
the raw file
funct=infile(chip_no,index_mat_funct);
%thresh=(l*(1.2)/(2ˆr));
thresh=Vth(l);
funct=(funct>thresh).*1; %convert analog output to
binary
funct=bi2de(flip(funct));
temp_char(key_index,1)=key_index;
temp_char(key_index,2)=Vc(i);
temp_char(key_index,3)=k+18;
temp_char(key_index,4)=thresh;
temp_char(key_index,5)=Cb(j);
temp_char(key_index,6)=funct;
end
end
end
end
csvwrite(strcat(".\Characterization_nominal_median
\characterization_last_32_iteration_nominal_med.csv"),temp_char;
end

B.3

SKILL Code for Generating Data for Monte Carlo Simulation

NumRuns = 25 ;number of iteration (2 output chaos gates have double
iterations)
MC

= 100

;number of chips analyzed (# Monte Carlo sims)
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per_a=1u
per = 2*NumRuns*per_a
del=50n
ttr=100p
Vc_temp = 486m

simTime = 4*per + per/2 ;4 inputs analyzed all at once
sprintf(simTstr "%e" simTime)

;====================== Set to XL mode
=========================================
ocnSetXLMode()
ocnxlProjectDir( "/data1/aysha/mc_results" )
ocnxlTargetCellView( "chaos_redesigned" "chaos_gate" "adexl" )
ocnxlResultsLocation( "/data1/aysha/mc_results" )
ocnxlSimResultsLocation( "/data1/aysha/mc_results" )

;====================== Tests setup
============================================

ocnxlBeginTest("chaos_redesigned:chaos_gate:1")
simulator( 'spectre )
design( "chaos_redesigned" "chaos_gate" "schematic")
;resultsDir(
"/data1/aysha/mc_results/chaos_gate_single_output/spectre/schematic"
)
modelFile(
'("/data1/IBM_PDK_MOD/cmos10lpe/V1.5.0.0RF/Spectre/models/design.scs"
"")
)
stimulusFile( ?xlate nil
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"/home/ashanta1/seneca/Monte Carlo 2 output/Monte
Carlo/stimuli_constantVc_2_output_ctrl_0_mc.scs")
analysis('tran ?stop simTstr ?errpreset "conservative" )

desVar( "per_a" per_a )
desVar( "ttr" ttr )
desVar( "delay_a" del )
desVar( "del" del )
desVar( "per" per )
desVar( "Vc" Vc_temp )

printf("\n\n\n\nhere %d\n\n\n\n" NumRuns)

envOption(
'analysisOrder list("tran" "pz" "dcmatch" "stb" "envlp" "ac" "dc"
"noise" "xf" "sp" "pss" "pac" "pstb" "pnoise" "pxf" "psp" "qpss"
"qpac" "qpnoise" "qpxf" "qpsp" "hb" "hbac" "hbnoise" "sens")
)
temp( 27 )

option( ?categ 'turboOpts
'apsplus t
'mtOption "Auto"
'uniMode "APS"
)

run()
selectResult( 'tran )
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;plot(getData("/clk") getData("/G0") getData("/net29")
getData("/clka") getData("/clkb") getData("/IN") getData("/nclkb")
getData("/out1") getData("/out2"))

for(ind1 1 4
ind3 = 0
for(ind2 1 NumRuns
to1 = (ind1-1)*per+del+per/2
to2 = (ind2-1)*per_a + per_a/4
tsamp1 = to1 + to2
sprintf(Oout "value(v(\"/out1\" ?result \"tran\") %e)" tsamp1)
sprintf(Ooutn "out%d_%d" (ind1-1) ind3 )
ocnxlOutputExpr( Oout ?name Ooutn ?plot t ?save t)
ind3 = ind3 + 1
tsamp2 = tsamp1 + per_a/2
sprintf(Oout "value(v(\"/out2\" ?result \"tran\") %e)" tsamp2)
sprintf(Ooutn "out%d_%d" (ind1-1) ind3 )
ocnxlOutputExpr( Oout ?name Ooutn ?plot t ?save t)
ind3 = ind3 + 1

)
)

ocnxlEndTest() ;

;====================== Model Group setup
==========================================

;====================== Corners setup
==========================================
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;====================== Job setup
==============================================

ocnxlJobSetup( '(
"blockemail" "1"
"configuretimeout" "300"
"distributionmethod" "Local"
"lingertimeout" "300"
"maxjobs" "4"
"name" "ADE XL Default"
"preemptivestart" "1"
"reconfigureimmediately" "1"
"runtimeout" "-1"
"showerrorwhenretrying" "1"
"showoutputlogerror" "0"
"startmaxjobsimmed" "1"
"starttimeout" "300"
"usesameprocess" "1"
) )

;====================== Disabled items
=========================================

;====================== Run Mode Options
======================================
sprintf(num_of_MC "%d" MC)
ocnxlMonteCarloOptions( ?mcMethod "all" ?mcNumPoints num_of_MC
?mcNumBins "" ?mcStopEarly "0" ?mcStopMethod "Significance Test"
?samplingMode "random" ?saveProcess "1" ?saveMismatch "0"
?useReference "0" ?donominal "1" ?saveAllPlots "0" ?monteCarloSeed
"" ?mcStartingRunNumber "" ?dumpParamMode "yes" )
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;====================== Starting Point Info
======================================

;====================== Run command
============================================
ocnxlRun( ?mode 'monteCarlo ?nominalCornerEnabled t ?allCornersEnabled
t ?allSweepsEnabled t)
ocnxlOutputSummary(?yieldSummary t ?exprSummary nil ?specSummary nil
?detailed nil)

;====================== save data points
======================================

sprintf(strYield "/data1/aysha/mc_results/yield_chaos_gate.csv")
sprintf(strTrans "/data1/aysha/mc_results/outputs_chaos_gate.csv")
sprintf(dtTranFile
"/data1/aysha/mc_results/mc_chaos_gate_50_iter_100_chip_Vc_486m_ctrl_0.csv")
sprintf(detailFile "/data1/aysha/mc_results/chaos_gate_det_raw.csv")
ocnxlExportOutputView(strYield "Yield")
ocnxlExportOutputView(dtTranFile "Detail-Transpose")
ocnxlExportOutputView(detailFile "Detail")

axlOutputsExportToFile(ocnxlGetSession() strTrans)

;====================== End XL Mode command
===================================

ocnxlEndXLMode()
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B.4

Python Code for Calculating the Controllability

import csv
import sys
import math

def controllability(netarray, filename):
rows = []
fields = []
with open(filename, 'r') as csvfile:
# creating a csv reader object
csvreader = csv.reader(csvfile)

# extracting field names through first row
fields = next(csvreader)

# extracting each data row one by one
for row in csvreader:
rows.append(row)

final = []
flag = 0

nodes = []
for j in range(0,len(netarray)):
nodes.append(netarray[j][1]);

for j in range(0,len(netarray)):
inp1 = netarray[j][2];
inp2 = netarray[j][3];
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#count1 and count2 represent the column index
count1 = 0
count2 = 0
col1 = []
col2 = []
for i in range (0,len(fields)):
if inp1 == fields[i]:
count1 = i;
if inp2 == fields[i]:
count2 = i;

#extracting the values of columns in col1 and col2
for i in range(0, len(rows)):
col1.append(rows[i][count1])
col2.append(rows[i][count2])

#a,b,c,d keeps track of how many combinations of 00, 01, 10 and
11 exists
a = 0
b = 0
c = 0
d = 0
temp = []
for i in range(0,len(col1)):
if (col1[i] == '0' and col2[i] == '0'):
a = a + 1
elif (col1[i] == '0' and col2[i] == '1'):
b = b + 1
elif (col1[i] == '1' and col2[i] == '0'):
c= c + 1
else:
d = d + 1
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temp.append(a)
temp.append(b)
temp.append(c)
temp.append(d)
final.append(temp)

#logth contains the value of controllability
prob = []
logth = 0
for j in range(0,len(final)):
inp1 = netarray[j][2];
inp2 = netarray[j][3];
if inp1 == inp2:
flag = 1
else:
flag = 0
x = final[j]
sum = 0
for k in range(0,4):
temp = x[k]/float(len(rows))
sum = sum + temp*temp
if flag == 0:
logth = math.log((1/sum),4)
else:
logth = math.log((1/sum),2)
prob.append(logth)
index = sorted(range(len(prob)), key=lambda k: prob[k], reverse =
True)

return prob, nodes
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B.5

Python Code for Calculating the Observability

import csv
import sys

def recurse(node,path,temp,netarray,outpname,inp1,inp2):
#global netarray,outpname,inp1,inp2
temp_copy=temp[0:]
#find children
index1 = [index for index in range(len(inp1)) if inp1[index] == node]
index2 = [index for index in range(len(inp2)) if inp2[index] == node]
index=set(index1+index2)
child=[netarray[i][1] for i in index]

for i in range(0,len(child)):
if child[i] not in outpname:
temp.append(child[i])
recurse(child[i],path,temp[0:],netarray,outpname,inp1,inp2)
temp=temp_copy[0:]

else:
temp.append(child[i])
path.append(temp)
temp=temp[0:-1]

return path

def cond_observ(node,path,netarray,outpname,outp,inp1,inp2,gate):
#global netarray,outpname,outp,inp1,inp2,gate
dict={'AND':1,'NAND':1,'OR':0,'NOR':0}
name_secinp=[]
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val_secinp=[]
for i in range(0,len(path)):
tmp_name_secinp=[]
tmp_val_secinp=[]
for j in range(0,len(path[i][:])):
ind=outp.index(path[i][j])
tmp_gate=gate[ind]
if (j==0):
if((tmp_gate!='XOR') and (tmp_gate!='XNOR')):
if(inp1[ind]!=node):
tmp_name_secinp.append(inp1[ind])
tmp_val_secinp.append(dict[tmp_gate])
elif(inp2[ind]!=node):
tmp_name_secinp.append(inp2[ind])
tmp_val_secinp.append(dict[tmp_gate])
else:
if((tmp_gate!='XOR') and (tmp_gate!='XNOR')):
if(inp1[ind]!=path[i][j-1]):
tmp_name_secinp.append(inp1[ind])
tmp_val_secinp.append(dict[tmp_gate])
elif(inp2[ind]!=node):
tmp_name_secinp.append(inp2[ind])
tmp_val_secinp.append(dict[tmp_gate])
name_secinp.append(tmp_name_secinp)
val_secinp.append(tmp_val_secinp)
return name_secinp,val_secinp

def different_output_paths(path, outpname):
num_output = len(outpname)
lists = []

for i in range(0,num_output):
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gatelist_temp=[]
for j in range(0, len(path)):
if path[j][-1] == outpname[i]:
gatelist_temp.append(path[j])
if (len(gatelist_temp)!=0):
lists.append(gatelist_temp)
return lists

def final_count_code(nodename,nodevalue,filename):
c = any( isinstance(e, list) for e in nodename)
rows = []
fields = []
with open(filename, 'r') as csvfile:
# creating a csv reader object
csvreader = csv.reader(csvfile)

# extracting field names through first row
fields = next(csvreader)

# extracting each data row one by one
for row in csvreader:
rows.append(row)

if c == False:
col = []
index = []
for k in range(0,len(nodename)):
for i in range(0,len(fields)):
if nodename[k] == fields[i]:
col.append(i)

final_count = 0
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nodevalues = []
for i in range(0,len(nodevalue)):
nodevalues.append(str(nodevalue[i]))

for i in range(0,len(rows)):
val = []
for k in range(0,len(col)):
val.append(rows[i][col[k]])
if val == nodevalues:
index.append(i)

final_count = len(index)

else:
col_final = []
index = []
for k in range(0,len(nodename)): #length of list
col = []
for p in range(0,len(nodename[k])): #length of sublist
for i in range(0,len(fields)):
if nodename[k][p] == fields[i]:
col.append(i)
col_final.append(col)

final_count = 0
nodevalues = []
for i in range(0,len(nodevalue)):
temp = []
for k in range(0,len(nodevalue[i])):
temp.append(str(nodevalue[i][k]))
nodevalues.append(temp)
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for i in range(0,len(rows)):
for k in range(0,len(col_final)):
val = []
for p in range(0,len(col_final[k])):
val.append(rows[i][col_final[k][p]])
if val == nodevalues[k]:
index.append(i)
index = set(index)
final_count = len(index)/float(len(rows))

return final_count

def observability(netarray, outpname, filename):
inp1=[]
for i in range(0,len(netarray)):
inp1.append(netarray[i][2])

inp2=[]
for i in range(0,len(netarray)):
inp2.append(netarray[i][3])

outp=[]
for i in range(0,len(netarray)):
outp.append(netarray[i][1])

gate=[]
for i in range(0,len(netarray)):
gate.append(netarray[i][0])

cand_outp = outp
obs_res=[0]*len(cand_outp)
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for i in range(0,len(cand_outp)): #iterating over all gate output
print("operating on gate output:",i)
tarnode=cand_outp[i]
path = recurse(tarnode,[],[],netarray,outpname,inp1,inp2)
lists = different_output_paths(path, outpname)
temp_calc=[0]*(len(outpname)+1)
if tarnode in outpname:
temp_calc[0]=1
for j in range(0,len(lists)):
testlist=lists[j]
nodename,nodevalue=cond_observ(tarnode,
testlist,netarray,outpname,outp,inp1,inp2,gate)
fcount=final_count_code(nodename,nodevalue,filename)
temp_calc[1+j]=fcount
sum_temp=sum(temp_calc)/float(len(outpname))
obs_res[i]=sum_temp
return obs_res, cand_outp

B.6

Python Code for Calculating the Testability

from observability_final import observability
from controllability_final import controllability
from bench_to_spice_format import extract_from_bench
from bench_to_spice_format import write_in_scp
from logicsolver import mixed_logic_solver
import numpy as np
from random import *
import csv
import sys
import math
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def netlist_to_netarray(fnetlist):
netarray=[] # 2D list for gate description
netname=[]
with open(fnetlist) as fnet:
for line in fnet:
'''
line=line.replace(" ","")
line=line.strip("\n")
'''
count=0
temp=[]
for word in line.split():
#print(word)
temp.append(word)
if count!=0:
if word not in netname:
netname.append(word)
count=count+1
netarray.append(temp)
return netarray

def generating_truth_table(fspice, inpname, outpname, inpval, rows):
filename = 'bool_truthtable_'+fspice+'.csv'
netarray=netlist_to_netarray(fspice)
f=open(filename,'w')
netval = mixed_logic_solver(fspice,inpname,inpval,outpname)
net_keys = list(netval.keys())
for j in range(len(net_keys)):
f.write(str(net_keys[j]))
#f.write(net_keys[j])
f.write(',')
f.write('\n')
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linp = len(inpname)
print('generating boolean truth table .....')
for i in range(0,rows):
print('truth table row:',i)
cryptogen = SystemRandom()
inpval = [cryptogen.randrange(2) for i in range(linp)]
#adding HI and LO if there exists NOT gates in the schematic
for i in range (0,len(inpname)):
if inpname[-2] == 'HI' and inpname[-1] == 'LO':
del inpval[-1]
del inpval[-1]
inpval.append(1)
inpval.append(0)
break
else:
for i in range (0,len(netarray)):
if netarray[i][3] == 'LO':
del inpval[-1]
inpval.append(0)
break
for i in range (0,len(netarray)):
if netarray[i][3] == 'HI':
del inpval[-1]
inpval.append(1)
break
#print("inpval", inpval)
netval = mixed_logic_solver(fspice,inpname,inpval,outpname)
#print(netval)
for j in netval:
output = netval[j]
#print(output)
f.write(str(output))
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f.write(',')
f.write('\n')

f.close()
return filename

def testability(fbench,bench_no,rows):
inpname,keyname,outpname,net = extract_from_bench(fbench)
print(inpname,len(inpname))
fspice = write_in_scp(fbench,bench_no)
netarray=netlist_to_netarray(fspice)
#print(netarray)
linp=len(inpname)
#print("length of input name",linp)
cryptogen = SystemRandom()
inpval = [cryptogen.randrange(2) for i in range(linp)]
#adding HI and LO if there exists NOT gates in the schematic
for i in range (0,len(netarray)):
if netarray[i][3] == 'HI':
inpname.append('HI')
inpval.append(1)
break
for i in range (0,len(netarray)):
if netarray[i][3] == 'LO':
inpname.append('LO')
inpval.append(0)
break
filename =

generating_truth_table(fspice, inpname, outpname,

inpval, rows) #HI and LO is already appended in inpname
print("truthtable generation complete")
print("observability in progress.....")
obs, outp = observability(netarray, outpname, filename)
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print("observability calculation complete")
print("controllability in progress....")
prob, nodes= controllability(netarray, filename)
print("controllability calculation complete")
test = []
for i in range(0,len(obs)):
temp = obs[i]*prob[i]
test.append(temp)
index = sorted(range(len(test)), key=lambda k: test[k], reverse =
True)
return index

B.7

Python Code for Solving a Given Netlist

def logic_func(*args):
arg=[]
for val in args:
arg.append(val)
if arg[0]=='AND':
outp=arg[1] & arg[2]
elif arg[0]=='OR':
outp=arg[1] | arg[2]
elif arg[0]=='XOR':
outp=arg[1] ˆ arg[2]
elif arg[0]=='NAND':
outp=(˜(arg[1] & arg[2]))%2
elif arg[0]=='NOR':
outp=(˜(arg[1] | arg[2]))%2
elif arg[0]=='XNOR':
outp=(˜(arg[1] ˆ arg[2]))%2
return outp
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def mixed_logic_solver(fnetlist,inpname,inpval,outpname):

netname=[] # list of all nets in the netlist
netarray=[] # 2D list for gate description
with open(fnetlist) as fnet:
for line in fnet:
count=0
temp=[]
for word in line.split():
#print(word)
temp.append(word)
if count!=0:
if word not in netname:
netname.append(word)
count=count+1
netarray.append(temp)

inpdict={}
#creating dictionary for input net name and value
for i in range(0,len(inpname)):
inpdict[inpname[i]]=inpval[i]

netval={} #dictionary for keeping the value of each net
netstatus={} #dictionary for keeping the updated status
(valid/invalid) of each net
for i in range(0,len(netname)):

#initializing value of each net
if netname[i] in inpname:
netval[netname[i]]=inpdict[netname[i]]
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else:
netval[netname[i]]=0
#print(netval)
#initializing status of each net
if netname[i] in inpname:
netstatus[netname[i]]=1
else:
netstatus[netname[i]]=0

#solver
#iterating each gate
i=0
while (i<len(netarray)):
gate_name=netarray[i][0]
o_p=netarray[i][1]
i_p1=netarray[i][2]
i_p2=netarray[i][3]

#if the inputs of the gate are evaluated yet
if (netstatus[i_p1]==1)&(netstatus[i_p2]==1):

netval[o_p]=logic_func(gate_name,netval[i_p1],netval[i_p2])
netstatus[o_p]=1
i=i+1
else:
#print(False)
#taking the element to the last of the list for considering
later
temp=netarray[i]
del(netarray[i])
netarray.append(temp)
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#print(netarray)
#print("netval:", netval)
#print("netstatus:", netstatus)
outpval=[0]*len(outpname)
for i in range(0,len(outpname)):
outpval[i]=netval[outpname[i]]
#print(netval['s'])
#print(netval['co'])
return netval

B.8

Python Code for Replacing the Gates Based on Testability

from random import *
def testable_chao_netlist(fnetlist,clist):
#fnetlist='ISCAS85.scp'
netarray=[]
#read original netlist file
with open(fnetlist) as fnet:
for line in fnet:
'''
line=line.replace(" ","")
line=line.strip("\n")
'''
count=0
temp=[]
for word in line.split():
#print(word)
temp.append(word)
# if count!=0:
# if word not in netname:
# netname.append(word)
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count=count+1
netarray.append(temp)
#print(netarray)

n=len(netarray)
#clist=[] # gate no. to be replace
klist=[]
kname=[]

for i in range(0,len(clist)):
#print(clist)
kname.append(netarray[clist[i]][0])
#print(kname)
netarray[clist[i]][0]='CHAO'
netarray[clist[i]].append('k'+str(clist[i]+1))
klist.append('k'+str(clist[i]+1))
#print(klist)

#write modified netlist to another file
fmod=open('netlist_testable_replacement.scp','w')
for i in range(0,n):
for j in range(0,len(netarray[i])):
fmod.write(netarray[i][j])
fmod.write(' ')
if i<=n:
fmod.write('\n')
return klist,kname
close(fmod)
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B.9

Python Code for Calculating the Hamming Distance

from testability_chaogate_replacement import testable_chao_netlist
from random_chaogate_replacement import random_chao_netlist
from testability_final import testability
from logicsolver_chao import mixed_logic_solver
from logicsolver_chao import logic_func
from bench_to_spice_format import extract_from_bench
from finding import finding_index
from random import *
import math

#netlist is in .scp format
def create_netarray(netlist):
netname = []
netarray = []
#making netarray from scp
with open(netlist_original) as fnet:
for line in fnet:
count=0
temp=[]
for word in line.split():
#print(word)
temp.append(word)
if count!=0:
if word not in netname:
netname.append(word)
count=count+1
netarray.append(temp)
return netarray

cryptogen = SystemRandom()
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################INPUTS###################################
bench_no = [3540]
no_chip=65
replace_percentage =
[0.05,0.10,0.15,0.20,0.25,0.30,0.35,0.40,0.45,0.50,
0.55,0.60,0.65,0.70,0.75,0.80,0.85,0.90,0.95,1.00]
#replace_percentage =
[0.10,0.20,0.30,0.40,0.50,0.60,0.70,0.80,0.90,1.00]
#replace_percentage = [0.05, 0.15, 0.25]
no_of_inputs = [200] #different number of inputs where for each input
key varies to generate challenge
no_of_char_files = 1
observation=500; # no. of measurement to find the hamming distance
between responses from correct and random key
rows = [5000]
#########################################################
kb=10 #keybits
####################finding 10 random chips##############
char_file_no = []

cc = [cryptogen.randrange(1,66)]
for p in range(0,no_of_char_files):
while (cc in char_file_no):
cc = [cryptogen.randrange(1,66)]
#print("cc",cc)
char_file_no.append(cc)
print("characterization file",char_file_no)
############################################################
for bb in range(0,len(bench_no)):

netlist_bench='./Benchmark Circuits/c'+str(bench_no[bb])+'.bench'
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inpname,keyname,outpname,net = extract_from_bench(netlist_bench)
#extracting inpname, keyname and outpname from bench
linp=len(inpname)
loutp = len(outpname)
print('length of output ' + str(loutp))
inpsize = 2**linp
print("length of input",linp)

netlist_original = './Benchmark Circuits/c'+str(bench_no[bb])+'.scp'
netarray = create_netarray(netlist_original)
print("netarray", netarray)
#############generating different inputs to apply to the
circuit##############################
inpval = []
temp = []
for i in range (0,len(netarray)):
if netarray[i][3] == 'HI':
inpname.append('HI')
break
for i in range (0,len(netarray)):
if netarray[i][3] == 'LO':
inpname.append('LO')
break

temp = [cryptogen.randrange(2) for i in range(linp)]
for p in range(0,no_of_inputs[bb]):
while (temp in inpval):
temp = [cryptogen.randrange(2) for i in range(linp)]

#adding HI and LO if there exists NOT gates in the schematic
if inpname[-2] == 'HI' and inpname[-1] == 'LO':
temp.append(1)
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temp.append(0)
else:
if inpname[-1] == 'HI':
temp.append(1)
if inpname[-1] == 'LO':
temp.append(1)
inpval.append(temp)
##########################################
print("bench number", bench_no[bb])
print("input value",inpval)
print("length of input value", len(inpval))
print("input name", inpname)
print("output name", outpname)
print("input size", inpsize)

fnetlist='netlist_testable_replacement.scp'
complete_list = testability(netlist_bench,bench_no[bb],rows[bb])
print("complete_list", complete_list)
len_complete = len(complete_list)
print("length of complete list", len_complete)

for aa in range(0,len(replace_percentage)):
len_clist = int(math.ceil(replace_percentage[aa]*len_complete))
print("length of replaced list", len_clist)
clist = []
for i in range(0,len_clist):
clist.append(complete_list[i])
print("replaced gates", clist)

[keyname,keygate]=testable_chao_netlist(netlist_original,clist)
print("keyname",keyname)
print("keygate", keygate)
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keyval=[0]*len(keyname)
lkey=len(keyname)

hd_filename='ent_hamming_distance_testability_c'
+str(bench_no[bb])+'_perc'+' '+str(replace_percentage[aa])+'.csv'
#chip_number in different columns
f_hd=open(hd_filename,'w')
for p in range(0, len(char_file_no)):
char_file='./Characterization 65 chip
new/characterization_65_chip_last
_32_iteration_'+str(char_file_no[p][0])+'.csv'
a, b, c, d, e, f = finding_index(char_file) #and, or, xor,
nand, nor, xnor
keydict={'AND':a,'OR':b,'XOR':c,'NAND':d,'NOR':e, 'XNOR':f}
print("chip number", char_file_no[p][0])
###uncomment this for netlist with key gate
keyval_correct=[0]*len(keygate)
for i in range(0,len(keygate)):
keyval_correct[i]=keydict[keygate[i]]
#print("correct keyval",keyval_correct)
keyval=[0]*len(keyval_correct)
###
cum_HD=0.0
cum_HD_ent = 0.0
cum_HD_inp_ent = []
for i in range(0,no_of_inputs[bb]):
cum_HD_inp=0.0
# cum_HD_ent = 0.0
#print(i)
resp_correct=mixed_logic_solver(char_file,
fnetlist,inpname,inpval[i],keyname,keyval_correct,outpname)
#print("correct_response", resp_correct)
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for j in range(0,observation):
#print(j)
for jj in range(0,lkey):
keyval[jj]=randint(0,(2**kb)-1)
#print("random keyval",keyval)
resp=mixed_logic_solver(char_file,
fnetlist,inpname,inpval[i],keyname,keyval,outpname)
#print("wrong_response", resp)
temp_sum=0.0
temp_sum_ent = 0.0
for k in range(0,loutp):
temp_sum=temp_sum+abs(resp[k]-resp_correct[k])
temp_sum_ent=temp_sum_ent+abs(resp[k]-resp_correct[k])
temp_sum=temp_sum/loutp
temp_sum_ent=temp_sum_ent/loutp
#print(temp_sum)
cum_HD=cum_HD+temp_sum
cum_HD_inp=cum_HD_inp+temp_sum
#print(cum_HD)
if temp_sum_ent > 0.5:
temp_sum_ent = 1-temp_sum_ent
cum_HD_ent=cum_HD_ent+temp_sum_ent
cum_HD_inp=(cum_HD_inp*100)/(observation)
print("cum_HD_input",cum_HD_inp)
if cum_HD_inp > 50:
cum_HD_inp = 100-cum_HD_inp
cum_HD_inp_ent.append(cum_HD_inp)
print("cum_HD_inp_ent",cum_HD_inp_ent)
cum_HD=(cum_HD*100)/(observation*no_of_inputs[bb])
cum_HD_ent=(cum_HD_ent*100)/(observation*no_of_inputs[bb])
sum = 0.0
for i in range(0,len(cum_HD_inp_ent)):
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sum = sum + cum_HD_inp_ent[i]
avg = sum/len(cum_HD_inp_ent)

print(cum_HD)
print(cum_HD_ent)
print(avg)
f_hd.write(str(cum_HD)+'\n')
f_hd.write(str(cum_HD_ent)+'\n')
f_hd.write(str(avg)+'\n')

f_hd.close()

fnetlist='netlist_random_replacement.scp'

for aa in range(0,len(replace_percentage)):
replace = int(math.ceil(replace_percentage[aa]*len(netarray)))
[keyname,keygate]=random_chao_netlist(netlist_original,replace)
print("keyname",keyname)
print("keygate", keygate)
keyval=[0]*len(keyname)
lkey=len(keyname)

hd_filename='ent_hamming_distance_random_c'+str(bench_no[bb])+'_perc'+'
'+str(replace_percentage[aa])+'.csv' #chip_number in different
columns
f_hd=open(hd_filename,'w')
for p in range(0, len(char_file_no)):
char_file='./Characterization 65 chip
new/characterization_65_chip_last_
32_iteration_'+str(char_file_no[p][0])+'.csv'
a, b, c, d, e, f = finding_index(char_file) #and, or, xor,
nand, nor, xnor
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keydict={'AND':a,'OR':b,'XOR':c,'NAND':d,'NOR':e, 'XNOR':f}
print("chip number", char_file_no[p][0])
###uncomment this for netlist with key gate
keyval_correct=[0]*len(keygate)
for i in range(0,len(keygate)):
keyval_correct[i]=keydict[keygate[i]]
#print("correct keyval",keyval_correct)
keyval=[0]*len(keyval_correct)
###
cum_HD=0.0
cum_HD_ent = 0.0
cum_HD_inp_ent = []
for i in range(0,no_of_inputs[bb]):
cum_HD_inp=0.0
# cum_HD_ent = 0.0
#print(i)
resp_correct=mixed_logic_solver(char_file,
fnetlist,inpname,inpval[i],keyname,keyval_correct,outpname)
#print("correct_response", resp_correct)
for j in range(0,observation):
#print(j)
for jj in range(0,lkey):
keyval[jj]=randint(0,(2**kb)-1)
#print("random keyval",keyval)
resp=mixed_logic_solver(char_file,
fnetlist,inpname,inpval[i],keyname,keyval,outpname)
#print("wrong_response", resp)
temp_sum=0.0
temp_sum_ent = 0.0
for k in range(0,loutp):
temp_sum=temp_sum+abs(resp[k]-resp_correct[k])
temp_sum_ent=temp_sum_ent+abs(resp[k]-resp_correct[k])
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temp_sum=temp_sum/loutp
temp_sum_ent=temp_sum_ent/loutp
#print(temp_sum)
cum_HD=cum_HD+temp_sum
cum_HD_inp=cum_HD_inp+temp_sum
#print(cum_HD)
if temp_sum_ent > 0.5:
temp_sum_ent = 1-temp_sum_ent
cum_HD_ent=cum_HD_ent+temp_sum_ent
cum_HD_inp=(cum_HD_inp*100)/(observation)
#print("cum_HD_input",cum_HD_inp)
if cum_HD_inp > 50:
cum_HD_inp = 100-cum_HD_inp
cum_HD_inp_ent.append(cum_HD_inp)
#print("cum_HD_inp_ent",cum_HD_inp_ent)
cum_HD=(cum_HD*100)/(observation*no_of_inputs[bb])
cum_HD_ent=(cum_HD_ent*100)/(observation*no_of_inputs[bb])
sum = 0.0
for i in range(0,len(cum_HD_inp_ent)):
sum = sum + cum_HD_inp_ent[i]
avg = sum/len(cum_HD_inp_ent)

print(cum_HD)
print(cum_HD_ent)
print(avg)
f_hd.write(str(cum_HD)+'\n')
f_hd.write(str(cum_HD_ent)+'\n')
f_hd.write(str(avg)+'\n')
f_hd.close()
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